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Cloud service providers typically adopt the multi-tenancy model to optimize resources
usage and achieve the promised cost-effectiveness. However, multi-tenancy in the cloud is
a double-edged sword. While it enables cost-effective resource sharing, it increases secu-
rity risks for the hosted applications. Indeed, multiplexing virtual resources belonging to
different tenants on the same physical substrate may lead to critical security concerns such
as cross-tenant data leakage and denial of service. Therefore, there is an increased necessity
and a pressing need to foster transparency and accountability in multi-tenant clouds. In this
regard, auditing security compliance of the cloud provider’s infrastructure against stan-
dards, regulations and customers’ policies on one side, and evaluating the multi-tenancy
threat on the other side, take on an increasing importance to boost the trust between the
cloud stakeholders.
However, auditing virtual infrastructures is challenging due to the dynamic and layered
nature of the cloud. Particularly, inconsistencies in network isolation mechanisms across
the cloud stack layers (e.g., the infrastructure management layer and the implementation
layer), may lead to virtual network isolation breaches that might be undetectable at a sin-
gle layer. Additionally, evaluating multi-tenancy threats in the cloud requires systematic
ways and effective metrics, which are largely missing in the literature. This thesis work
addresses the aforementioned challenges and limitations and articulates around two main
iii
topics, namely, security compliance auditing and multi-tenancy threat evaluation in the
cloud.
Our objective in the first topic is to propose an automated framework that allows audit-
ing the cloud infrastructure from the structural point of view, while focusing on virtualization-
related security properties and consistency between multiple control layers. To this end, we
devise a multi-layered model related to each cloud stack layer’s view in order to capture
the semantics of the audited data and its relation to consistent isolation requirements. Fur-
thermore, we integrate our auditing system into OpenStack, and present our experimental
results on assessing several properties related to virtual network isolation and consistency.
Our results show that our approach can be successfully used to detect virtual network iso-
lation breaches for large OpenStack-based data centers in a reasonable time.
The objective of the second topic is to derive security metrics for evaluating the multi-
tenancy threats in public clouds. To this end, we propose security metrics to quantify the
proximity between tenants’ virtual resources inside the cloud. Those metrics are defined
based on the configuration and deployment of a cloud, such that a cloud provider may
apply them to evaluate and mitigate co-residency threats. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of our metrics and show their usefulness, we conduct case studies based on both real and
synthetic cloud data. We further perform extensive simulations using CloudSim and well-
known VM placement policies. The results show that our metrics effectively capture the
impact of potential attacks, and the abnormal degrees of co-residency between a victim and
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Cloud computing is the paradigm of information technology (IT) as a utility, which has
shifted over the past decade from a buzzword to an integral part of IT. Companies are
rapidly incorporating the cloud to run their business applications instead of investing up-
front capital and operational expenditures for deploying and maintaining heavy on-premise
IT infrastructures.
Cloud service providers (CSPs) leverage large pools of high performance configurable
computing platforms, virtualization technologies and high-speed networks to deliver ubiq-
uitous, convenient and on-demand access to a seemingly unlimited amount of resources
that can be rapidly commissioned, scaled in and out, and released with minimal interaction
effort. There exist three well established cloud service models, namely, infrastructure as a
service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS). Furthermore,
cloud computing offerings can be classified based on their deployment models into two
main categories: public and private clouds. In the former deployment, the cloud infrastruc-
ture is meant to be simultaneously used by multiple customers (e.g., industrial companies,
government organizations, academic institutions, etc), while in the latter deployment, the
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cloud infrastructure is meant to be exclusively provisioned by a unique customer. The work
of this thesis specifically focuses on IaaS models in public cloud deployments.
The multi-tenancy model enables CSPs to achieve the promised cost-effectiveness,
which has been, so far, the key for the wide cloud adoption. However, virtualization
technologies, which make resource multiplexing possible, typically do not provide per-
fect logical isolation between tenants’ resources and add an important layer of complexity
to the cloud-stack. This makes the security-level of public cloud vary inversely with the
multi-tenancy model payoff [5]. Therefore, the cloud security concerns together with the
loss of control, the lack of transparency and the non-compliance risks, make many business
owners and prospective customers still reluctant towards the adoption of the cloud [6]. Au-
diting security compliance of cloud implementations with respect to standards, and threat
evaluation constitute viable solutions to bring more visibility into the cloud and boost the
trust of tenants in CSPs as for the proper management and the protection of their assets.
Security auditing is an assurance approach which consists of checking whether the
cloud-stack implementations are compliant with regulatory requirements and predefined
security policies, while threat-evaluation consists of identifying and quantifying potential
security threats in cloud deployments as part of the risk assessment process. The outcome
of both security auditing and threat evaluation processes enables CSPs, on one side, to
enhance the transparency of their services by providing customers with more awareness re-
garding the contractual compliance aspects and the security risks related to their outsourced
applications. On the other side, it enables CSPs to improve the applied security measures
and management strategies to have better control over different risks.
However, auditing in the cloud constitutes a real challenge. First, the significant gap
between the high-level description of compliance recommendations (e.g., Cloud Control
Matrix (CCM) [7] and ISO 27017 [8]) and the low-level raw logging information drasti-
cally hinders the auditing automation process. Second, the coexistence of a large number
2
of virtual resources on one side (e.g., a decent-size cloud is said to have around 1,000
tenants and 100,000 users [2]), and the important complexity that is brought by the virtu-
alization layer on the other side, constitute a real challenge for identifying the relationship
between different components. Third, the layered nature of the cloud-stack and the inter-
layer dependencies make existing per-layer verification approaches ineffective, as multiple
layers maintain different but complementary views of the isolation mechanisms configu-
ration. Finally, correctly identifying the relevant data and their sources in the cloud for
each security requirement increases the complexity of auditing. From another perspective,
some policies and business requirements, may naturally require quantitative approaches to
provide tenants with more visibility about the security posture of their outsourced virtual
infrastructures. For instance, a tenant may want a specific threshold for resource sharing
to minimize the multi-tenancy threats. In this case, appropriate tools (i.e., security metrics)
are needed for threat evaluation to inform the tenant about the degree of compliance with
his predefined requirements.
There exist various efforts on cloud auditing, however, those works either focus on
verifying the operational properties that assess the behavioral aspect of the cloud (e.g., net-
work reachability) [9], and omit the structural settings of tenants’ virtual infrastructures, or
they conduct the auditing process at a single layer of the cloud, which makes their solution
not effectively capturing isolation breaches [10]. Furthermore, quantitative approaches and
supporting metrics for per tenant threat evaluation are largely missing in the literature (a
detailed literature review will be provided in Section 2.3).
1.2 Problem Statement
The research problem addressed in this thesis is drawn from the above mentioned chal-
lenges and limitations. We consider the broad context of security compliance auditing and
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multi-tenancy threat evaluation in public cloud virtualized infrastructures. Specifically, to-
days’ IaaS cloud platforms (e.g., Amazon AWS EC2 [11], Google Cloud Platform (GCP)
[12] and Microsoft Azure [13]) expose rich APIs through which tenants can create several
virtual infrastructures, which are mainly composed of virtual machines (VMs) and their
connecting virtual private networks. Tenants’ virtual infrastructures are then implemented
at the physical-level via the cloud infrastructure management system (e.g., OpenStack),
which is in charge of maintaining the logical segregation between tenants’ resources. How-
ever, the highly dynamic, elastic and self-service nature of the cloud, together with the
continuously increasing size of the managed resources (e.g., AWS reports 100K new VM
instances created per day [14]) introduce a very high-level of complexity that may pre-
pare the floor for misconfigurations leading to non-compliance with security standards and
increased threat-levels. Particularly, failure to properly implement network isolation mech-
anisms to segregate multiple segments of virtual private networks may lead to interference
of traffic belonging to different corporations. Moreover, the cloud elasticity mechanisms
may cause VMs belonging to different trust levels to co-reside within a close proximity,
leading to potential threats (e.g., information leakage through side channel attacks [15]).
In this thesis, we propose approaches and tools to bring more transparency into the
security posture of actual cloud implementations, which would provide CSPs with more
credibility and increase tenants’ trust.
Particularly, for security auditing, we address the following research questions:
• How to bridge the gap between high-level standards and low-level cloud implemen-
tation details, and automate the security auditing process?
• How to leverage the complex inter-dependencies between the cloud-stack layers to
capture subtle virtual network isolation breaches in tenants’ virtual infrastructures?
As for threat evaluation in cloud infrastructures, the questions we tackle are:
4
• How to evaluate the degree of exposure of tenants’ virtual infrastructures with respect
to other potentially distrusted tenants based on resource sharing at different levels of
the cloud infrastructure?
• How to evaluate abnormal degrees of co-residency between a victim and potential
attackers independently of specific attacks?
We elaborate on our contributions to address those questions in the following section.
1.3 Contributions
Our contributions mainly revolve around providing a formal verification support for the
compliance auditing of cloud infrastructures, and security metric tools to support per tenant
threat evaluation, which provides an increased level of transparency to tenants.
Automated security auditing of cloud virtualized infrastructures. The objective of the
first work of the thesis is to provide an automated approach for the verification of the
proper configuration of virtual resources based on structural properties (e.g., assignment of
instances to physical hosts and configuration of virtualization mechanisms). To this end,
we focus on filling the existing gap between the high-level security standards, and low-
level cloud implementations. In this respect, we first compile a list of structural security
properties relevant to the cloud virtualized environment. The latter list maps into different
recommendations described in several security compliance standards in the field of cloud
computing. Afterwards, we map each security property to the relevant set of cloud in-
frastructure data sources (e.g., configuration and logged information from different cloud
layers). Additionally, we formalize the extracted properties into First Order Logic (FOL).
Finally, we transform the formalized properties and the audit data into a constraint satis-
faction problem (CSP) to verify the security properties and provide audit evidence using
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an off-the-shelf CSP-solver. We furthermore implement our auditing approach into Open-
Stack [16], one of the most commonly used cloud infrastructure management systems,
and conduct experiments to show the scalability of our approach (e.g., we audit a dataset
of 300,000 virtual ports, 24,000 subnets, and 100,000 VMs in less than 8 seconds). We
elaborate on the details of this work in Chapter 3.
Consistent virtual layer 2 network isolation verification. As network isolation failures
are among the foremost security concerns in the cloud [17, 18], our objective in the second
part of this work is to verify layer 2 virtual private networks isolation1, taking into con-
sideration the inter-dependencies between different cloud layers’ views. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first effort on auditing cloud infrastructure isolation at layer 2 virtual
networks and overlay taking into account cross-layer consistency in the cloud-stack. To
capture the semantics of the audit data and its relation to consistent isolation requirements,
we first devise a multi-layered model for data related to each cloud layer’s view, then we
derive a set of concrete security properties to check the proper configuration of layer 2 and
overlay isolation mechanisms. Furthermore, we integrate our auditing system into Open-
Stack, and present our experimental results on assessing several properties related to virtual
network isolation and consistency. Our results show that our approach can be successfully
used to detect virtual network isolation breaches for large OpenStack-based data centers
in a reasonable time (e.g., we audit a dataset of 60k VMs in less than 4.6 seconds). The
details of this work are presented in Chapter 4.
Distance metrics for evaluating multi-tenancy threats. The multi-tenancy threats result-
ing form resource sharing at different levels of the cloud infrastructure, constitute some of
the main security concerns as tenants’ resources are exposed to distrusted parties. In this
work, we define a multi-level physical distance that captures the threats related to cross-
tenant attacks requiring resource sharing not only at the host-level but also at higher levels
1We refer to the network layers defined in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model
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of the cloud infrastructure. We then refine this physical distance along the compute and net-
work dimensions to evaluate the degree of compute and network resource exposure with
respect to potential attackers. We show the effectiveness of our metrics through case studies
conducted both on real and synthetic cloud data. We further show the applicability of our
metrics for quantified auditing and per tenant risk assessment. We elaborate on the details
of this work in Chapter 5.
Security metrics for evaluating and mitigating co-residency threats. Although cross-
tenant attacks may target different resources, they all require a degree of co-residency with
the victim as a prerequisite for the attacks to succeed. While existing metrics enable only to
detect attacks at run-time by monitoring resource usage (e.g., the throughput [19]), we pro-
pose a set of attack-agnostic security metrics that capture abnormal degrees of co-residency
between tenants’ virtual infrastructures along two different dimensions, namely, the attack
extent and the attack intensity. Our metrics enable to apply mitigation measures (e.g., VM
migration) in order to avoid large scale damage. To show the applicability of our metrics
and their usefulness in capturing increased co-residency threats, we conduct a case study
on a real cloud data, and perform extensive experiments using CloudSim. The obtained
results show the applicability of our metrics and their effectiveness in capturing abnormal
co-residency degrees with the increased attacks’ success rates. The details of this work are
presented in Chapter 6.
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are the following.
• We provide an automated solution for auditing the security compliance of cloud
infrastructures against standards and tenants’ predefined requirements. As per our
knowledge, this is the first effort for formally verifying security properties related to
the structural settings of tenants’ virtual infrastructures implementations in the cloud.
• While existing works focus on one cloud layer only, we propose an automated frame-
work for auditing consistent isolation between virtual networks in OpenStack-managed
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cloud spanning over overlay networks and layer 2 virtual networks by considering
multiple cloud layers’ views.
• We integrate our auditing systems into OpenStack, and present our experimental re-
sults to show the applicability and the scalability of our auditing solutions.
• We propose suites of security metrics to evaluate the threat-level related to the multi-
tenancy situation in public cloud. We conduct case studies and experiments on both
real and fictitious clouds. The obtained results show the effectiveness and applicabil-
ity of our metrics.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized into six chapters as follows. Chapter 2 provides a background on
cloud computing, virtualization and multi-tenancy, and discusses existing works on secu-
rity auditing and threat evaluation in the cloud. Chapter 3 presents our security auditing
solution for virtualized cloud infrastructures. Therein, we further detail our formal verifi-
cation methodology, elaborate on the implementation details, and discuss the experimental
results. In Chapter 4, we detail our approach for layer 2 virtual networks isolation verifica-
tion in OpenStack-managed cloud deployments. In Chapter 5, we present our multi-level
security metrics for evaluating the distance between tenants’ virtual infrastructures inside
cloud deployments. We further show through several use cases, the applicability and use-
fulness of our metrics. Chapter 6 details our methodology for deriving security metrics
to evaluate the proximity between tenants’ resources starting from the common prerequi-
sites to co-residency attacks in multi-tenant clouds. We show the usefulness of our metrics
through use cases and extensive simulations. The conclusion and discussion on potential
future works are summarized in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Introduction
Cloud service providers typically adopt the multi-tenancy model to optimize resources us-
age and achieve the promised cost-effectiveness. Sharing resources between different ten-
ants and the underlying complex technology increase the necessity for transparency and
accountability. In this regard, auditing security compliance of the provider’s infrastructure
against standards, regulations and customers’ policies, and evaluating the potential threats
related to the multi-tenancy situation, take on an increasing importance to boost the trust
between the cloud stakeholders. In this chapter, we provide a description of the cloud and
its services. Furthermore, we briefly elaborate on virtualization and multi-tenancy, as those
are the main aspects of IaaS around which articulates our thesis work. Finally, we provide
a literature review on cloud security auditing and multi-tenancy threats evaluation.
2.2 Cloud Computing
To run their business workloads, enterprises traditionally have to invest prohibitive costs
for owning or licensing, running and maintaining data center equipment. In this respect,
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cloud offerings propose to substantially lighten this burden by providing underlaying in-
frastructures and services enabling customers to more focus on their core business.
In [20], the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the cloud as
”a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool
of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction”. Furthermore, NIST specifies three main cloud models based
on the delivered resources and customers’ capabilities. Those models can be described as
follows:
• Software as a service (SaaS). In this model, CSPs offer ready to use applications that
can be enjoyed by the customers through the Internet. SaaS offerings are currently
massively used both by individuals and organizations. For instance, Google offers
the Google Calendar application. In this model, tenants do not have control, neither
over the applications’ development platform nor over the virtual infrastructure.
• Platform as a service (PaaS). In this model, CSPs provide ready to use development
platforms. Tenants run their applications on top of those frameworks and control
their settings and configuration, but they do not have control over the underlying
virtual infrastructure. An example of PaaS provider is Google App Engine1.
• Infrastructure as a service (IaaS). In this model, tenants can provision basic com-
puting resources (i.e., processing, networking and storage) to deploy and run their
own virtual infrastructures. Those virtual infrastructures are mainly composed of
VMs and their connecting virtual private networks. Tenants’ VMs are self-controlled
and are allocated into virtualised physical machines using VM placement policies.
Virtual private networks connecting those VMs are implemented using software net-
working devices (e.g., Open vSwitch [21]) and network virtualization mechanisms
1https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/
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such as virtual LAN (VLAN) and Virtual Extended LAN (VXLAN). Examples of
commercial IaaS providers are Amazon AWS EC2 [11], Google Cloud Platform
(GCP) [12] and Microsoft Azure [13].
In this thesis, we are more interested in IaaS model, where tenants have control over
their virtual infrastructures, which are directly implemented on top of the cloud facilities.
Specifically, we focus on public cloud deployments, where virtualization is leveraged to
enable resource sharing between multiple tenants.
2.2.1 Virtualization
Virtualization is the key underlaying technology for IaaS cloud. It provides the required
elasticity for on demand services, and enables resource sharing to achieve cost-effectiveness.
Host virtualization enables to run multiple VMs on top of one hardware platform. Those
VMs are managed by a software called hypervisor (also called virtual machine monitor).
The latter partitions the physical machine’s resources and provides a logical isolation be-
tween VMs so that each VM has access and visibility to its assigned resources only [5].
To provide network connectivity between tenants’ VMs, especially in large scale cloud
infrastructures, network virtualization plays a vital role, as an example, virtual switches
such as Open vSwitch (OVS) [22] are used. Furthermore, in order to support the highly
dynamic and elastic nature of tenants’ virtual infrastructures, virtual switches export in-
terfaces for remote and runtime configuration, as a response to various events (e.g., VMs
creation, shut down or migration).
Those interacting layers of virualization induce an increased complexity in cloud in-
frastructures, which opens up the floor for security breaches and vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by malicious entities. For instance, a poorly configured hypervisor can be an
easy target to different attacks (e.g., escape and hyper-jacking attacks) [23], which would
threaten all the VMs running on top of it. Furthermore, the complex interactions between
11
the cloud management layers and the virtualized network layer at the implementation level,
together with the large number of tenants’ virtual private networks, may result in network
misconfigurations leading to traffic interference (a detailed example will be discussed in
Chapter 4). Additionally, virtualization technologies inevitably create side channels that
can be exploited by malicious insiders to breach tenants’ confidentiality (e.g., Hammer
attack [24]).
2.2.2 Multi-Tenancy
CSPs adopt the multi-tenancy model through resource sharing to increase the financial
gain, which is one of the driving factors to the adoption of public cloud. On the down
side, by allowing co-residency between business competitors or selfish and malicious cus-
tomers [25], multi-tenancy significantly expands the attack surface of shared cloud en-
vironments [26, 27]. In fact, recent works have demonstrated the feasibility of real-life
attacks conducted in commercial clouds including Amazon EC2, aiming at forcing mali-
cious virtual machines (VMs) to co-reside with targeted VMs either inside the same host or
at higher proximity levels (e.g., the rack level) inside the cloud data center [28, 29]. Once
co-residency achieved, attackers can mount harmful attacks against integrity, availability
and confidentiality of their target’s assets via side-channels, covert-channels, etc.
2.3 Related Work




Table 2.1 summarizes the qualitative comparison between existing works on compliance
verification in the cloud and our work. We compare the proposals based on the types of
verified properties, structural or operational (structural properties are related to the static
configuration of the virtualized infrastructure, while operational properties are related to
the forwarding network functionality), the coverage of multiple cloud stack layers and
cross-layer consistency, and finally the approach, which is either retroactive (off-line) or
intercept-and-check (on-line) [30].












Anteater [31] • One •
Hassel [32] • One •
VeriFlow [33] • One •
NetPlumber [34] • One •
Save [35] • One •
CloudRadar [36] • One •
Xu et al. [37] • Multiple • •
Congress [38] • One • •
Majumdar et al. [39] • One •
Majumdar et al. [40] • One •
Madi et al. [41] • Multiple • •
ISOTOP [42] • Multiple • •
Table 2.1: Comparing features of existing solutions with our works. The symbol (•) indi-
cates that the proposal offers the corresponding feature
To the best of our knowledge, our works on security auditing are the first to tackle
the verification of the structural configurations and the topology isolation and consistency
between cloud stack layers’ views of the virtual layer 2 and overlay networks.
Several works target the verification of forwarding and routing rules, particularly in
OpenFlow networks (e.g., [9, 43]). For instance, Anteater [31] verifies network invariants
by translating them into instances of SAT problems and translating data plane information
into boolean expressions. Then, it uses a SAT solver to check the resulting SAT formulas
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to detect violations of key network invariants such as absence of loops and black-holes.
Hassel [32] is a protocol agnostic tool for checking network invariants and reachability-
related policies. It is built on a geometric model where packet headers are modeled as
points in a geometric space and network devices are modeled as invertible transfer functions
defined on the same space. Then, custom algorithms are used to check network invariants
and reachability-related policies.
VeriFlow [33], NetPlumber [34] (extension of [32]), and AP verifier [44] propose a near
real-time verification, where network events are monitored for configuration changes, and
verification is performed only on the impacted part of the network. Libra [9] uses a divide
and conquer technique to verify forwarding tables in large networks. It encompasses a
technique to capture stable and consistent snapshots of the network state and a verification
approach based on graph search techniques that detects loops, black-holes and other reach-
ability failures. Sphinx [43] enables incremental real-time network updates and constraints
validation. It allows detecting both known and potentially unknown security attacks on
network topology and forwarding plane. These works are complementary to our work as
they aim at verifying operational properties of networks including reachability, isolation
and absence of layer 3 network misconfiguration (e.g., loops, black-holes, etc.). However,
they target mainly SDN environments and not necessarily the cloud, whereas our focus is
more oriented towards auditing the structural properties of cloud virtualized infrastructures.
Some other works focus on security as a service to provide needed security. For in-
stance, Mundada et al. [45] propose SilverLine, a collection of techniques that enables
cloud providers to enforce data and network isolation for a cloud tenant’s service. It uses a
transparent operating system-level information-flow tracking layer assisted by an enforce-
ment layer in the virtual machine monitor to provide data isolation. Our work aims at
auditing compliance of security controls, which is considered as security assurance, and
thus can be applied to such proposed security enforcement services.
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In the context of cloud auditing, several works (e.g., [10, 46]) focus on firewalls and
security groups. Probst et al. [46] present an approach for the verification of network ac-
cess controls implemented by stateful firewalls in cloud computing infrastructures. Their
approach combines static and dynamic verification with a discrepancy analysis of the ob-
tained results against the clients’ policies. Bleikertz [10] analyzes Amazon EC2 cloud in-
frastructures using reachability graphs and vulnerability discovery and builds attack graphs
to find the shortest paths, which represent the critical attack scenarios against the cloud.
The proposed approaches tackle layer 3 isolation mechanisms, but do not address chal-
lenges related to network virtualization mechanisms configuration issues and their impact
on layer 2 virtual networks isolation, which are addressed by our work on cloud security
auditing.
Other works focus on virtualization aspects (e.g., [35, 47, 48]). Bleikertz et al. [35, 47]
propose SAVE, a static information flow analysis system for virtualized infrastructures
based on graph traversal towards verifying information flow isolation. The configuration
information is captured from the virtualization infrastructure via a set of probes created for
different virtualization technologies. Then, the approach transforms the discovered config-
uration input into a graph, where vertices are resources such as virtual machines, hyper-
visors, physical machines, storage and network resources and edges represent information
flows. The graph is traversed based on explicitly specified trust rules and information flow
rules. Bleikertz et al. [36] extend the previous work to tackle near-real time security anal-
ysis of the virtualized infrastructure in the cloud. Their objective is mainly the detection
of configuration changes that impact the security. A differential analysis based on comput-
ing graph deltas (e.g., added or removed nodes and edges) is proposed based on change
events. The graph model is maintained synchronized with the actual configuration changes
through probes that are deployed over the infrastructure and intercept events that may have
a security impact. Contrarily to our auditing approach, this works do not involve properties
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verification at multiple layers and cross-layer consistency verification, which reduces the
scope of violations that can be detected compared to our approach. In our case, we cor-
relate audit data collected form different sources and at different layers in order to detect
violations that would definitely go unnoticed if relying only on one cloud layer at a time.
In [49], an autonomous agent-based incident detection system is proposed. The system
detects abnormal infrastructure changes based on the underlying business process model.
The framework is able to detect cloud resource and account misuse, distributed denial of
service attacks and VM breakout. This related work is more oriented towards monitor-
ing changes in cloud instances and infrastructures and evaluating the security status with
respect to security business flow-aware rules.
Xu et al. [37] investigate network inconsistencies between network states extracted
from OpenStack and the configuration of network devices. They use Binary Decision Di-
agrams (BDDs) to represent and verify these states. Similarly to our work, they tackle
inconsistency verification. Xiang et al. [50] propose a graph-based OpenStack debugging
approach enabling to extract the interaction between different modules from log files and
databases. However, in these works, authors do not check isolation properties across dif-
ferent layers as suggested by our work. Furthermore, we are interested in auditing, thus our
approach supports a wider view than simple verification, where log files are as important
source of information as configuration.
In [51], authors propose a cross-layer data collection approach to reconstruct the net-
work connectivity graph in cloud infrastructures. Our work can be extended to use the
constructed connectivity graphs in order to audit tenant predefined security policies.
There exist other works (e.g., [38], [52], [30]) offering runtime security policy checking
and enforcement in the cloud. Our work in [30] proactively verifies security compliance ef-
ficiently through pre-computation by utilizing dependency models. Weatherman [52] aims
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at mitigating misconfigurations and enforcing security policies in a virtualized infrastruc-
ture. CloudSight [53] is a transparency-as-a-service abstraction that enables to track state
changes of different tenants’ components (e.g., VMs and virtual interfaces) by inserting
monitoring functions in the infrastructure management system’s modules.
In [54], authors propose a framework to evaluate the CSP’s services prior to and after
cloud adoption. However, the proposed framework only defines a set of generic concepts
around which the auditing process should be articulating (e.g., actors, goals, risks and
evidences) without providing any concrete implementation.
Congress [38] is an open project for OpenStack platforms. It enforces policies ex-
pressed by tenants and then monitors the state of the cloud to check its compliance. Further-
more, Congress attempts to correct policy violations when they occur. Our work shares the
policy inspection aspect with Congress. Therefore, we integrated our solution in Congress
as part of our contributions (see details in Section 4.4).
In the same fashion as the current work, formal verification approaches in [39, 55, 56]
are proposed for checking security compliance in other security domains, mainly, Identity
and Access Control. Majumdar et al. [39] propose auditing the multi-domain cloud at
the user level with OpenStack as an application, which is a complementary effort to our
work. Cotrini et al. [55] use FOL to express Role-based Access Control (RBAC) policies
and rely on an off-the-shelf SMT solver to analyze them. In [56], authors apply model
checking techniques to verify that access control policies implemented locally at the VM
and hypervisor levels actually satisfy the global access control policies.
2.3.2 Multi-Tenancy Threats Evaluation
As per our knowledge, the work of this thesis is the first to propose metrics for quantifying
the distance between tenants’ virtual infrastructures inside cloud deployments.
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Few works provide quantitative assessment frameworks to evaluate Security SLAs (Se-
cLAs) in the cloud [57, 58, 59, 60]. For instance, Luna et al. [57] developed a set of
metrics to quantitatively compare, benchmark and evaluate the security level of CSPs’
reference SecSLAs. Authors in [58] propose a framework enabling cloud customers to
choose the appropriate CSP according to their security requirements. In the same fashion,
authors of [59] propose a CSPs’ ranking mechanism based on Analytic Hierarchy Pro-
cess (AHP). The latter work is extended in [60] by leveraging specific notions of Cloud
SecSLAs adopted from current standardization efforts and real-world case studies. While
those approaches provide valuable frameworks for prospective cloud customers to choose
the right CSP based on the advocated SecLAs, our security metrics enable tenants to have
more visibility on the multi-tenancy threat-level with respect to cloud implementation mea-
surements.
Since VM-placement policies constitute the cloud infrastructure management compo-
nent in charge of mapping tenants’ VMs to hosts, many efforts have been deployed to
harden placement policies against co-residency attacks. For instance, Han et al. [61, 62]
proposed a VM-placement policy, namely, PSSF, to increase attackers’ difficulty in achiev-
ing malicious co-residency with the victim. To evaluate the resistance of their placement
policy to co-residency attacks, they further proposed a theoretical model composed of three
metrics (efficiency, coverage and VMmin). Contrarily to our metrics, the proposed model
is based on the assumption that the attacker is known, which is not the case in real cloud.
By considering that any tenant sharing the cloud is a potential attacker, our metrics en-
able CSPs to proactively mitigate co-residency attacks, and tenants to have visibility on the
security posture of their virtual infrastructures from the co-residency point of view.
SMOOP [63] is a security aware multi-objective VM-placement algorithm, which is
based on risk assessment. The latter relies on a set of metrics to evaluate the cloud-level
risk from multiple perspectives (VMs, hosts and network connections). Although, our
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metrics do not provide risk assessment, they can be used to assess the co-residency threat
related to different cloud deployments of tenants’ virtual infrastructures.
In [29], authors propose an experimental approach to assess real cloud placement poli-
cies against co-residency attacks. They consider the random-placement policy as a yard-
stick against which they evaluated the success rate and relative cost of malicious VM-
launch strategies for actual cloud VM-placement policies. Similarly, authors in [28] pro-
pose an experimental study based on intensive measurement probing to evaluate how re-
sistant modern IaaS models (e.g., Amazon EC2 and their VPC) are against co-residency
threats both at the host-level and at the rack-level. In this work, we take a complementary
direction as we propose a suite of security metrics that enables to evaluate the co-residency
threats according to tenants’ virtual infrastructures with respect to current cloud deploy-
ments.
In [64], authors propose a CSP-assisted VM migration service that aims at limiting the
information leakage due to side channels, by applying the moving target defense technique.
Migrate [65] is another VM migration-based solution that mitigates side channel attacks
in multi-tenant clouds. Our metrics can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of those
approaches in reducing the multi-tenancy threats in cloud deployments.
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Chapter 3
Auditing Security Compliance of the
Virtualized Infrastructure in the Cloud:
Application to OpenStack
3.1 Introduction
Several security challenges faced by the cloud, mainly the loss of control and the difficulty
to assess security compliance of the cloud providers, leave potential customers reluctant
towards its adoption. These challenges stem from cloud-enabling technologies and charac-
teristics. For instance, virtualization introduces complexity, which may lead to new vulner-
abilities (e.g., incoherence between multiple management layers of hardware and virtual
components). At the same time, concurrent and frequent updates needed to meet various
requirements (e.g., workload balancing) may create even more opportunities for miscon-
figuration, security failures, and compliance compromises. Cloud elasticity mechanisms
may cause virtual machines (VMs) belonging to different corporations and trust levels to
interact with the same set of resources, causing potential security breaches [66]. Therefore,
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cloud customers take great interest in auditing the security of their cloud setup.
Security compliance auditing provides proofs with regard to the compliance of imple-
mented controls with respect to standards as well as business and regulatory requirements.
However, auditing in the cloud constitutes a real challenge. First, the coexistence of a large
number of virtual resources on one side and the high frequency with which they are created,
deleted, or reconfigured on the other side, would require to audit, almost continuously, a
sheer amount of information, growing continuously and exponentially [67]. Furthermore,
a significant gap between the high-level description of compliance recommendations (e.g.,
Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) [7] and ISO 27017 [8]) and the low-level raw logging infor-
mation hinders auditing automation. More precisely, identifying the right data to retrieve
from an ever increasing number of data sources, and correctly correlating and filtering it
constitute a real challenge in automating auditing in the cloud.
We propose in this work to focus on auditing security compliance of the cloud virtual-
ized environment. More precisely, we focus primarily on virtual resources isolation based
on structural properties (e.g., assignment of instances to physical hosts and the proper con-
figuration of virtualization mechanisms), and consistency of the configurations in different
layers of the cloud (infrastructure management layer, software-defined networking (SDN)
controller layer, virtual layer and physical layer). Although there already exist various ef-
forts on cloud auditing (a detailed review of related works is given in Section 2.3.1), to the
best of our knowledge, none has facilitated automated auditing of structural settings of the
virtual resources while taking into account the multi-layer aspects.
Motivating example. The following illustrates the challenges to fill the gap between
the high-level description of compliance requirements as stated in the standards and the
actual low-level raw audit data. In CCM [7], the control on Infrastructure & Virtualization
Security Segmentation recommends “isolation of business critical assets and/or sensitive
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user data, and sessions”. In ISO 27017 [8], the requirement on segregation in virtual com-
puting environments mandates that “cloud service customer’s virtual environment should
be protected from other customers and unauthorized users”. Moreover, the segregation
in networks requirements recommends “separation of multi-tenant cloud service customer
environments”.
Clearly, any overlap between different tenants’ resources may breach the above re-
quirements. However, in an SDN/Cloud environment, verifying the compliance with the
requirements requires gathering information from many sources at different layers of the
cloud stack: the cloud infrastructure management system (e.g., OpenStack [16]), the SDN
controller (e.g., OpenDaylight [68]), and the virtual components and verifying that effec-
tively compliance holds in each layer. For instance, the logging information corresponding
to the virtual network of tenant 0848cc1999-e542798 is available from at least these
different sources:
• Neutron databases, e.g., records from table “Routers” associating tenants to their vir-
tual routers and interfaces of the form 0848cc1999e542798 (tenants id)
‖ 420fe1cd-db14-4780 (vRouter id) ‖ 6d1f6103-9b7a-4789-ab16
(vInterface id).
• Nova databases, e.g., records from table “Instances” associating VMs to their
owners and their MAC addresses as follows: 0721a9ac-7aa1-4fa9 (VM ID)
‖ 0848cc1999e542798 (tenants id) and fa:16:-3e:cd:b5:e1
(MAC)‖ 0721a9ac-7aa1-4fa9(VM ID).
• Open vSwitch databases information, where ports and their associated tags can be
fetched in this form qvo4429c50c-9d (port name)‖1084(VLAN ID).
As illustrated above, it is difficult to identify all the relevant data sources and to map infor-
mation from those different sources at various layers to the standard’s recommendations.
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Furthermore, potential inconsistencies in these layers make auditing tasks even more chal-
lenging. Additionally, as different sources may manipulate different identifiers for the same
resource, correctly correlating all these data is critical to the success of the audit activity.
To facilitate automation, we present a compiled list of security properties relevant to the
cloud virtualized environment that maps into different recommendations described in sev-
eral security compliance standards in the field of cloud computing. Our auditing approach
encompasses extracting configuration and logged information from different layers, corre-
lating the large set of data from different origins, and finally relying on formal methods to
verify the security properties and provide audit evidence. We furthermore implement the
verification of these properties and show how the data can be collected and processed in
the cloud environment with an application to OpenStack. Our approach shows scalability
as it allows auditing a dataset of 300,000 virtual ports, 24,000 subnets, and 100,000 VMs
in less than 8 seconds.
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort on auditing cloud virtualized en-
vironment from the structural point of view taking into account consistency between
multiple control layers in the cloud.
• We identify a list of security properties from the literature that may fill the gaps
between security standards recommendations and actual compliance validation and
allows audit automation.
• We report real-life experience and challenges faced when trying to integrate auditing
and compliance validation into OpenStack.




In this section, we present some preliminaries and describe our approach for auditing and
compliance validation.
3.2.1 Threat Model
We assume that the cloud infrastructure management system has implementation flaws and
vulnerabilities, which can be potentially exploited by malicious entities. For instance, a
reported vulnerability in OpenStack Nova networking service, OSSN-0018/2014 [69], al-
lows a malicious VM to reach the network services running on top of the hosting machine,
which may lead to serious security issues. We trust cloud providers and administrators,
but we assume that some cloud users and operators may be malicious [70]. We trust the
cloud infrastructure management system for the integrity of the audit input data (e.g., logs,
configurations, etc.) collected through API calls, events notifications, and database records
(existing techniques on trusted auditing may be applied to establish a chain of trust from
TPM chips embedded inside the cloud hardware to auditing components, e.g., [71]). We as-
sume that not all tenants trust each other. They can either require not to share any physical
resource with all the other tenants, or provide a white (or black) list of trusted (or untrusted)
customers that they are (not) willing to share resources with. Although our auditing frame-
work may catch violations of specified security properties due to either misconfiguration
or exploits of vulnerabilities, our focus is not on detecting specific attacks or intrusions.
Example 3.1. For illustrating purposes in our running example, we consider two tenants.
Tenant Alpha can be exposed to malicious outsiders and insiders. A malicious insider could
be either an adversary (tenant Beta) sharing the same cloud resources with tenant Alpha
or a malicious operator with a higher access privilege.
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3.2.2 Modeling the Virtualized Infrastructure
In a multi-tenant cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model, the provider’s physical
and virtual resources are pooled to serve on demands from multiple customers. The IaaS
cloud reference model [72] consists of two layers: The physical layer composed of net-
working, storage, and processing resources, and the virtualization layer that is running on
top of the physical layer and enabling infrastructure resources sharing. Figure 3.1 refines
the virtualization layer abstraction in [72] by considering tenant specific virtual resources
such as virtual networks and VMs. Accordingly, a tenant can provision several VM in-
stances and virtual networks. VMs may run on different hosts and be connected to many
virtual networks through virtual ports. Virtualization techniques are used to ensure isola-
tion among multiple tenants’ boundaries. Host virtualization technologies enable running
many virtual machines on top of the same host. Network virtualization mechanisms (e.g.,
VLAN and VXLAN) enable tenants’ network traffic segregation, where virtual networking
devices (e.g., Open vSwitches) play a vital role in connecting VM instances to their hosting
machines and to virtual networks.
In addition to these virtual and physical resources illustrated as nodes, Figure 3.1 shows
the relationships between tenants’ specific resources and cloud provider’s resources. These
relations will be used in Section 3.4 for the formalization of both the virtualized infrastruc-
ture model and the security properties. For instance, IsAttachedOnPort is a relationship
with arity 3. It attaches a VM to a virtual subnet through a virtual port. This model can be
refined with several levels of abstraction based on the properties to be checked.
3.2.3 Cloud Auditing Properties
We classify virtualization related-properties into two categories: Structural and operational






































































Figure 3.1: A generic model of the virtualized infrastructures in the cloud
infrastructure such as the assignment of instances to physical hosts, the assignment of vir-
tual networking devices to tenants, and the proper configuration of isolation mechanisms
such as VLAN configuration of each port. Operational properties are related to the for-
warding network functionality. Those are mainly reachability-related properties such as
loop-free forwarding and absence of black holes. Since the latter category has received
significant attention in the literature (e.g., [9], [10], [43]), the former category constitutes
the main focus of the current work. As the major goal of this work is to establish a bridge
between high-level guidelines in the security standards and low-level logs provided by cur-
rent cloud systems, we start by extracting a list of concrete security properties from those
standards and the literature in order to more clearly formulate the auditing problem. Table
3.1 presents an excerpt of the list of security properties we consider for auditing relevant
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standards (e.g., ISO 27002 [73], CCM [7]). Therein, we also classify properties based on
their relevance to the stakeholders. In the following, we provide a brief description fol-
lowed by an illustrating example for the sample properties, namely, absence of common
ownership of resources, no co-residency, and topology consistency.
Virtual Resource Isolation (No common ownership). Resource sharing technology was
not designed to offer strong isolation properties for a multi-tenant architecture and thus has
been ranked by the CSA among the nine notorious threats related to the cloud [74]. The
related risks include the failure of logical isolation mechanisms to properly segregate virtual
resources assigned to different tenants, which may lead to situations where one tenant has
access to another tenant’s resources or data. The no common ownership property aims at
verifying that no virtual resource is co-owned by multiple tenants. Tenants are generally
allowed to interconnect their own virtual resources to build their cloud virtual networks
by modifying their configurations. However, if a virtual resource (e.g., a router or a port)
is co-owned by multiple tenants, it can be part of several virtual networks belonging to
different tenants, which can potentially create a breach of isolation.
Example 3.2. (No common ownership) This property has been violated in a real-life Open-
Stack deployment by exploiting the vulnerability OSSA-2014-008 [75] reported in the Neu-
tron networking service, which allows a tenant to create a virtual port on another tenant’s
router. An instance of our model can capture this violation as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The model instance on the left side illustrates the initial entities and their relationships
before exploiting the vulnerability. Assume that Tenant Beta, by exploiting the said
vulnerability, created vPort 21, and plugged it into vRouter A1, which belongs to
Tenant Alpha. This would modify the model instance as illustrated on the right side
showing the violation of no common ownership. Indeed, Tenant Beta is the owner
vPort 21 as he is the initiator of the port creation. But since the port is connected to
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vRouter A1, the created port would be considered as a common resource for both ten-
ants.





























Figure 3.2: Model instances for the no common ownership property before and after the
violation of no common ownership property. After creating port vPort 21, the latter
becomes owned by two tenants.
Physical Isolation (No VM co-residency). To maximize resources utilization, cloud providers
consolidate virtual machines, possibly belonging to competing customers, to be run on the
same physical machine, which may cause major security concerns as described in [76].
Physical isolation [77] aims at preventing side and covert channel attacks, and reducing
the risk of attacks staged based on hypervisor and software switches vulnerabilities (e.g.,
[78]) by hosting VMs in different physical servers. Such attacks might lead to performance
degradation, sensitive information leakage, and denial of service.
Example 3.3. (No VM co-residency) Figure 3.3 consists of two subsets of instances of the
virtual infrastructure model presented in Section 3.2.2. At the left side of the figure, we
have two virtual machines VM A1 and VM A2 belonging to Tenant Alpha and running
at compute node CN 1, and VM B1 owned by Tenant Beta while running at compute
node CN 2. Because of lack of trust, Tenant Alpha may require physical isolation of
his VMs from those of Tenant Beta. However, as illustrated at the right side of Figure
3.3, VM A2 can be migrated from CN 1 to CN 2 for load balancing. This new instance of
the model after migration illustrates the violation of physical isolation.











































Figure 3.3: Subsets of the virtual infrastructure model instances before and after violation
of the no VM co-residency property illustrating an example of data on VM locations. After
migration, VM A2 becomes co-resident with VM B1 at compute node CN 2.
layers. The architectural model of the cloud can be described as a stack of layered services:
physical layer, system resources layer, virtualized resources layer, support services layer,
and at the top cloud-delivered services. Additionally, using SDN to implement network
services increases management flexibility but also adds yet another layer in the stack. The
presence of inconsistencies between these layers may lead to security breaches, which in
turn makes the security controls at higher layers inefficient. Topology consistency consists
of checking whether the topology view in the cloud infrastructure management system,
matches the actual implemented topology, while considering different mappings between
the physical infrastructure, the virtual infrastructure, and the tenants’ boundaries.
Example 3.4. (Port consistency) We suppose that a malicious insider managed to deliber-
ately create a virtual port vPort 40 on Open vSwitch 56 and label it with the VLAN iden-
tifier VLAN 100 that is already assigned to tenant Alpha. This would allow the malicious
insider to sniff tenant Alpha’s traffic by mirroring the VLAN 100 traffic to the created port,
vPort 40. This clearly would lead to the violation of the network isolation property.
As illustrated in Figure 3.4, we build two views of the virtualized topology: The actual
topology is built based on data collected directly from the networking devices running at
the virtualization layer (Open vSwitches), and the perceived topology is obtained from the
infrastructure management layer (Nova and Neutron OpenStack databases). The dashed
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lines map one to one the entities between the two topologies (not all the mappings are
shown for more readability). We can observe that vPort 40 is attached to VLAN 100, which
maps to Net 01 (tenant Alpha’s network), but there is no entity at the infrastructure man-





































































































































Figure 3.4: Virtualized infrastructure model instance showing an OpenStack representation
and the corresponding actual virtual layer implementation. VXLAN 72 and its ports are
part of the infrastructure implementation and do not correspond to any component in tenant
Alpha’s resources.
Other Security Properties. In the following, we briefly describe other security properties
presented in Table 3.1.
• Data and processing location correctness One of the main cloud specific security
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Subject Properties and Sub-Properties StandardsISO27002 [73] ISO27017 [8] NIST800 [81] CCM [7]
Tenant
Data and processing location correctness 18.1.1 18.1.1 IR-6, SI-5 SEF-01, IVS-
04
Virt. resource isolation (e.g., no common ownership) - CLD.9.5.1 - STA-5, IVS-
09
Physical isolation (e.g., no co-residency) - 13.1.3 SC-2 IVS-8, IVS-9
Fault tolerance
Facility duplication




Provider No abuse of resources
Max number of VMs
- - - IVS-11Max number of virtual
networks
No resource exhaustion - - - IVS-05
Both Topology consistency inf. management
view/virtual inf. - 13.1.3 SC-2 IVS-8, IVS-9
SDN controller view/
virtual inf.
Table 3.1: An excerpt of security properties
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issues is the increased complexity of compliance with laws and regulations [80]. The
cloud provider might have data centers spread over different continents and governed
by various court jurisdictions. Data and processing can be moved between the cloud
provider’s data centers without tenants’ awareness, and fall under conflicting privacy
protection laws.
• Redundancy and fault tolerance Cloud providers have to apply several measures to
achieve varying degrees of resiliency following the criticality of tenants’ applica-
tions. Duplicating facilities in various locations, and replicating storage services are
examples of the measures that could be undertaken. Considering additional redun-
dancy of network connectivity and information processing facilities has been men-
tioned in ISO 27002:2013 [73] as one of best practices.
• No abuse of resources Cloud services can be used by legitimate anonymous cus-
tomers as a basis to illegitimately lead criminal and suspicious activities. For exam-
ple, cloud services can be used to stage DDoS attacks [74].
• No resource exhaustion The ease with which virtual resources can be provisioned
in the cloud introduces the risk of resource exhaustion [82]. For example, creating
a huge amount of VMs within a short time frame drastically increases the odds of
misconfiguration, which opens up several security breaches [83].
3.3 Audit Ready Cloud Framework
Figure 3.5 illustrates a high-level architecture of our auditing framework. It has five main
components: data collection and processing engine, compliance validation engine, audit
report engine, dashboard, and audit repository database. The framework interacts mainly
with the cloud management system, the cloud infrastructure system (e.g., OpenStack), and
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elements in the data center infrastructure to collect various types of audit data. It also
interacts with the cloud tenant to obtain the tenant requirements and to provide the tenant
with the audit result. Tenant requirements encompass both general and tenant-specific
security policies, applicable standards, as well as audit queries. In the following, we only
focus on the major components.
Our data collection and processing engine is composed of two sub-engines: the collec-
tion engine and the processing engine. The collection engine is responsible for collecting
the required audit data in a batch mode, and it relies on the cloud management system to
obtain the required data. The role of the processing engine is to filter, format, aggregate,
and correlate this data. The required audit data may be distributed throughout the cloud and
in different formats. The processing engine must pre-process the data in order to provide
specific information needed to verify given properties. The last processing step is to gener-
ate the code for compliance validation and then store it in the audit repository database to
be used by the compliance validation engine. The generated code depends on the selected
back-end verification engine.
The compliance validation engine is responsible for performing the actual verification
of the audited properties and the detection of violations, if any. Triggered by an audit re-
quest or updated inputs, the compliance validation engine invokes our back-end verification
and validation engines. We use formal methods to capture formally the system model and
the audit properties, which facilitates automated reasoning and is generally more practical
and effective than manual inspection. If a security audit property fails, evidence can be
obtained from the output of the verification back-end. Once the outcome of the compliance
validation is ready, audit results and evidences are stored in the audit repository database
and made accessible to the audit reporting engine. Several potential formal verification en-
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Figure 3.5: A high-level architecture of our cloud auditing framework
3.4 Formal Verification
As a back-end verification mechanism, we propose to formalize audit data and properties
as Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP) and use a constraint solver, namely Sugar [84],
to validate the compliance. CSP allows formulation of many complex problems in terms of
variables defined over finite domains and constraints. Its generic goal is to find a vector of
values (a.k.a. assignment) that satisfies all constraints expressed over the variables. If all
constraints are satisfied, the solver returns SAT, otherwise, it returns UNSAT. In the case of
a SAT result, a solution to the problem is provided. The key advantage of using CSP comes
from the fact that it enables uniformly presenting the system’s setup and specifying the
properties in a clean formalism (e.g., First Order Logic (FOL) [85]), which allows to check
a wide variety of properties [86]. Moreover using CSP avoids the state space traversal,
34
which makes our approach more scalable for large data sets.
3.4.1 Model Formalization
Depending on the properties to be checked, we encode the involved instances of the virtu-
alized infrastructure model as CSP variables with their domains definitions (over integer),
where instances are values within the corresponding domain. For example, Tenant is de-
fined as a finite domain ranging over integer such that (domain T ENANT 0 max tenant)
is a declaration of a domain of tenants, where the values are between 0 and max tenant.
Relations between classes and their instances are encoded as relation constraints and their
supports, respectively. For example, HasRunningVM is encoded as a relation, with a sup-
port as follows: (relation HasRunningVM 2 (supports(vm1, t1)(vm2, t2))). The support of
this relation will be fetched and pre-processed in the data processing step. The CSP code
mainly consists of four parts:
• Variable and domain declaration. We define different entities and their respective
domains. For example, t is a variable defined over the domain T ENANT , which
ranges over integers.
• Relation declaration. We define relations over variables and provide their support
from the audit data.
• Constraint declaration. We define the negation of each property in terms of predi-
cates over the involved relations to obtain a counter-example in case of a violation.
• Body. We combine different predicates based on the properties to verify using Boolean
operators.
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Relations in Properties Evaluate to True if
BelongsTo(r, t) The resource r is owned by tenant t
HasRunningVM(vm, t) The tenant t has a running virtual machine vm
DoesNotTrust(t1, t2) Tenant t2 is not trusted by tenant t1 which means that
t1’resources should not share the same hardware with t2’ in-
stances
IsLocatedAt(vm,cn) The instance vm is located at the compute node cn
IsAssignedPortVLAN
(p,v,t)
the port p is assigned to the VLAN v which is in turn as-
signed to tenant t
HasPortVLAN(vs, p,v) The port p is created at the virtual switch vs and assigned to
VLAN v
Table 3.2: First Order Logic predicates
3.4.2 Properties Formalization
Security properties would be expressed as predicates over relation constraints and other
predicates. We express the sample properties in FOL. Table 3.2 summarizes the predicates
required for expressing the properties. Those predicates correspond to CSP relation con-
straints used to describe the current configuration of the system. Note that predicates that
do not appear as relationships in Figure 3.1 are inferred by correlating other available rela-
tions.
No Common Ownership. We check that a tenant-specific virtual resource belongs to a
unique tenant.
∀r ∈ Resource,∀t1,t2 ∈ TENANT (1)
BelongsTo(r,t1)∧BelongsTo(r,t2) → (t1= t2)
No Co-residence. Based on the collected data, we check that the tenant’s instances are not
co-located in the same compute node with adversaries’ instances.
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∀t1,t2 ∈ TENANT,∀vm1,vm2 ∈ INSTANCE, (2)
∀cn1,cn2 ∈ COMPUTEN :
HasRunningVM(vm1,t1)∧HasRunningVM(vm2,t2)∧
DoesNotTrust(t1,t2)∧IsLocatedAt(vm1,cn1)∧
IsLocatedAt(vm2,cn2)→ cn1 6= cn2
Topology Consistency. We check that mappings between virtual resources over different
layers are properly maintained and that the current view of the cloud infrastructure man-
agement system on the topology, matches the actual topology of the virtual layer. In the
following, we consider port consistency as a specific case of topology consistency. We
check that the set of virtual ports assigned to a given tenant’s VLAN by the provider corre-
spond exactly to the set of ports inferred from data collected from the actual infrastructure’s
configuration for the same tenant’s VLAN.
∀vs ∈ vSWITCH, ∀p ∈ Port ∀t ∈ TENANT ∀v ∈ VLAN (3)
HasPortVlan(vs,p,v)⇔ IsAssignedPortVLAN(p,v,t)
Example 3.5. Listing 3.1 is the CSP code to verify the no common ownership, no co-
residence and port consistency properties for our running example. Variables along with
their respective domains are first declared. Based on the properties of interest, a set of
relations are defined and populated with their supporting tuples, where the support is gen-
erated from actual data in the cloud. Then, the properties are declared as predicates over
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these relations. Finally, the disjunction of the predicates is instantiated for verification.
As we are formalizing the negation of the properties, we are expecting the UNSAT result,
which means that none of the properties holds (i.e., no violation of the properties). We
present the verification outputs in Section 3.5.
Listing 3.1: Sugar source code for common ownership, co-residence and port consistency
property verification
1 / / D e c l a r a t i o n
2 ( domain TENANT 0 60000) ( domain RESOURCE 0 216000)
3 ( domain INSTANCE 0 100000) ( domain HOST 0 1000)
4 ( domain PORT 0 3 0 0 ; 000) ( domain VLAN 0 60000)
5 ( domain VSWITCH 0 1000)
6 ( i n t T1 TENANT) ( i n t T2 TENANT)
7 ( i n t R1 Reso u rce ) ( i n t R2 Reso u rce )
8 ( i n t VM1 INSTANCE) ( i n t VM2 INSTANCE)
9 ( i n t H1 HOST) ( i n t H2 HOST ) ( i n t V VLAN)
10 ( i n t T TENANT) ( i n t P PORT) ( i n t vs VSWITCH)
11 / / R e l a t i o n s D e c l a r a t i o n s and Au d i t d a t a a s t h e i r s u p p o r t
12 ( r e l a t i o n BelongsTo 2 ( s u p p o r t s (18037 1 0 ) (1 8 0 3 8 1 0 ) ( 18039 1 0 )
13 (18040 1 0 ) (1 8 0 3 8 1 1 ) (1 8 0 4 2 1 1 ) (1 8 0 4 3 1 1 ) (1 8 0 4 4 1 1 ) (1 8 0 4 5 1 1 )
14 (18046 1 2 ) (1 8 0 4 7 1 2 ) ) )
15 ( r e l a t i o n HasRunningVM 2 ( s u p p o r t s (6100 1 0 ) (6 1 0 1 1 0 ) (6 1 0 2 1 1 )
16 (6103 1 1 ) (6 1 0 4 1 1 ) (6 1 0 5 1 1 ) ) )
17 ( r e l a t i o n I s L o c a t e d A t 2 ( s u p p o r t s ( ( ( 6 0 8 9 1 1 0 0 0 ) (6 0 9 0 11000)
18 (6093 1 1 0 0 0 ) (6 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 ) (6 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 ) )
19 ( r e l a t i o n Do esNo tTru s t 2 ( s u p p o r t s (9 1 1 ) ( 9 1 3 ) ( 9 1 4 ) ) )
20 ( r e l a t i o n IsAssignedPortVLAN 3 ( s u p p o r t s (18028 6017 9 ) (1 8 0 2 9 6018 9 )
21 (18030 6019 1 0 ) (1 8 0 3 1 6019 1 0 ) (1 8 0 3 2 6020 1 0 ) ) )
22 ( r e l a t i o n HasPortVLAN 3 ( s u p p o r t s (511 18030 6 0 1 9 ) (5 1 1 18031 6019 1 0 )
23 (512 18032 6 0 2 0 ) (5 1 2 18033 6 0 2 1 ) ) )
24 / / S e c u r i t y p r o p e r t i e s e x p r e s s e d i n t e r m s o f p r e d i c a t e s o v e r r e l a t i o n s
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25 ( p r e d i c a t e ( CommonOwnership T1 R1 T2 R2 )
26 ( and ( BelongsTo T1 R1 ) ( BelongsTo T2 R2 ) (= R1 R2 ) ( n o t (= T1 T2 ) ) ) )
27 ( p r e d i c a t e ( c o R e s i d e n c e T1 T2 VM1 VM2 H1 H2 ) ( and ( Do esNo tTru s t T1 T2 )
28 ( HasRunningVM VM1 T1 ) ( HasRunningVM VM2 T2 ) ( I s L o c a t e d A t H1 VM1)
29 ( I s L o c a t e d A t H2 VM2) (=H1 H2 ) ) )
30 ( p r e d i c a t e ( p o r t C o n s i s t e n c y P V T)
31 ( o r ( and ( IsAssignedPoprtVLAN P V T )
32 ( n o t ( HasPortVLAN VS P V ) ) )
33 ( and ( HasPortVLAN VS P V) ( n o t ( IsAssignedPoprtVLAN P V T ) ) ) ) )
34 \\The Body
35 ( o r ( CommonOwnership T1 R1 T2 R2 ) ( c o R e s i d e n c e T1 T2 VM1 VM2 H1 H2 )
36 ( p o r t C o n s i s t e n c y P V T) )
3.5 Application to OpenStack
This section describes how we integrate our audit and compliance framework into Open-
Stack. First, we briefly present the OpenStack networking service (Neutron), the compute
service (Nova) and Open vSwitch [21], the most popular virtual switch implementation.
We then detail our auditing framework implementation and its integration in OpenStack
along with the challenges that we faced and overcame.
3.5.1 Background
OpenStack [16] is an open-source cloud infrastructure management platform that is being
used almost in half of private clouds and significant portions of the public clouds (see [1]
for detailed statistics). The major components of OpenStack to control large collections
of computing, storage and networking resources are respectively Nova, Swift and Neutron
along with Keystone. Following is the brief description of Nova and Neutron:
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Nova [16] This is the OpenStack project designed to provide massively scalable, on de-
mand, self service access to compute resources. It is considered as the main part of an
Infrastructure as a Service model.
Neutron [16] This OpenStack system provides tenants with capabilities to build rich net-
working topologies through the exposed API, relying on three object abstractions, namely,
networks, subnets and routers. When leveraged with the Modular Layer 2 plug-in (ML2),
Neutron enables supporting various layer 2 networking technologies. For our testbed we
consider Open vSwitch as a network access mechanism and we maintain two types of net-
work segments, namely, VLAN for communication inside of the same compute node, and
VXLAN for inter compute nodes communications.
Open vSwitch [21]. Open vSwitch is an open source software switch designed to be used
as a vSwitch in virtualized server environments. It forwards traffic between different virtual
machines (VMs) on the same physical host and also forwards traffic between VMs and the
physical network.
3.5.2 Integration to OpenStack
We focus mainly on three components in our implementation: the data collection engine,
the data processing engine, and the compliance validation engine. The data collection
engine involves several components of OpenStack e.g., Nova and Neutron for collecting
audit data from databases and log files, different policy files and configuration files from the
OpenStack ecosystem, and log files from various virtual networking components such as
Open vSwitch to fully capture the configuration. The data is then converted into a consistent
format and missing correlation is reconstructed. The results are used to generate the code
for the validation engine based on Sugar input language. The compliance validation engine
performs the verification of the properties by feeding the generated code to Sugar. Finally,
Sugar provides the results on whether the properties hold or not. Figure 3.6 illustrates the
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Figure 3.6: Our OpenStack-based auditing solution with the example of data collection,
formating, correlation building and Sugar source generation
steps of our auditing process. In the following, we describe our implementation details
along with the related challenges.
Data collection engine. We present hereafter different sources of data in OpenStack along
with the current support for auditing offered by OpenStack and the virtual networking
components. The main sources of audit data in OpenStack are logs, configuration files,
and databases. Table 3.3 shows some sample data sources. The involved sources for audit-
ing depend on the objective of the auditing task and the tackled properties. We use three
different sources to audit configuration correctness of virtualized infrastructures:
• OpenStack. We rely on a collection of OpenStack databases, hosted in a MySQL
server, that can be read using component-specific APIs such as Neutron APIs. For in-
stance, in Nova database, table Compute-node contains information about the hosting
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Relations Sources of Data
BelongsTo Table Instances in Nova database and Routers, Subnets and
Ports in Neutron database, Neutron logs
DoesnotTrust The tenant physical isolation requirement input
IsLocatedAt Tables Instances in Nova database
IsAssignedPortVLAN Networks in Nova database and Ports in Neutron database
HasPortVLAN Open vSwitch instances located at various compute nodes
HasRunningVM Table Instances in Nova database
Table 3.3: Sample data sources in OpenStack, Open vSwitch and tenants’ requirements
machines such as the hypervisor’s type and version, table Instance contains informa-
tion about the project (tenant) and the hosting machine, table Migration contains mi-
gration events’ related information such as the source-compute and the destination-
compute. The Neutron database includes various information such as security groups
and port mappings for different virtualization mechanisms.
• Open vSwitch. Flow tables and databases of Open vSwitch instances located in dif-
ferent compute nodes and in the controller node constitute another important source
of audit data for checking whether there exist any discrepancies between the actual
configuration and the OpenStack view.
• Tenant policies. We consider security policies expressed by the customers, such as
physical isolation requirements. As expressing tenants’ policies is out of the scope
of this work, we assume that they are parsable XML files.
Data processing engine. Our data processing engine, which is implemented in Python,
mainly retrieves necessary information from the collected data according to the targeted
properties, recovers correlation from various sources, eliminates redundancies, converts it
into appropriate formats, and finally generates the source code for Sugar.
• Firstly, for each property, our plug-in identifies the involved relations. The relations’
support is either fetched directly from the collected data such as the support of the
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relation BelongsTo, or recovered after correlation, as in the case of the relation IsAs-
signedPortVLAN.
• Secondly, our processing plug-in formats each group of data as an n-tuple, i.e., (re-
source, tenant),(port, vlan, tenant), etc.
• Finally, our plug-in uses the n-tuples to generate the portions of Sugar’s source code,
and append the code with the variable declarations, relationships and predicates for
each security property (as discussed in Section 3.4). Different scripts are needed to
generate Sugar source code for the verification of different properties.
Compliance Validation. The compliance validation engine is discussed in details in Sec-
tion 3.4. In the following example, we discuss how our auditing framework can detect the
violation of the no common ownership, no co-residence and port inconsistency security
properties caused by the attack scenarios of our running example.
Example 3.6. In this example, we describe how a violation of no common ownership, no
co-residence and port-consistency properties may be caught by auditing.
Firstly, our program collects data from different tables in the Nova and Neutron
databases, and logs from different Open vSwitch instances. Then, the processing engine
correlates and converts the collected data and represents it as tuples; for an example:
(18038 10) (6100 11000) (512 6020 18033) where Port 84: 18038, Alpha: 10, VM 01:
6100, Open vSwitch 56: 512, vPort 40: 18033 and VLAN 100: 6020. Additionally, the
processing engine interprets each property and generates the associated Sugar source code
(see Listing 3.1 for an excerpt of the code) using processed data and translated properties.
Finally, Sugar is used to verify the security properties.
We show for each property how the violation is detected:
• No common Ownership. The predicate CommonOwnership will evaluate to true if
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there exists a resource belonging to two different tenants. As Port 84 has been cre-
ated by Beta, BelongsTo(Port 84, Beta) evaluates to true based on collected data
from Neutron logs. Port 84 is defined on Alpha’s router, hence, BelongsTo(Port 84,
Alpha) evaluates to true based on collected data from Neutron database. Conse-
quently, the predicate CommonOwnership evaluates to true. In this case, the output
of sugar (SAT) is the solution of the problem, (r1 = 18038; r2 =18038; t1 =10;
t2=11), which is actually the proof that Port 84 violates the no common ownership
property.
• No co-residence. In our example (see Figure 3.3), the supports Has-
RunningVM((VM 02, Alpha)(VM 03, Beta)), IsLocatedAt((VM 02, Com-
pute Node 96)(VM 03,Compute Node 96) and DoesNotTrust(Alpha, Beta), where
VM 02:6101, VM 03:6102, and Compute Node 96:11100, make the predicate
evaluate to true meaning that the no co-residence property has been violated.
• Port-consistency. The predicate PortConsistency evaluates to true if there exists
a discrepancy between the OpenStack view of the virtualized infrastructure and
the actual configuration. The support HasPortVLAN(Open vSwitch 56, vPort 40,
VLAN 100) makes the predicate evaluate to true, as long as there is no tuple such that
IsAssignedPortVLAN (Port, VLAN 100, Alpha) where Port maps to vPort 40:18033.
Challenges. Checking the configuration correctness in virtualized environment requires
considering logs generated by virtualization technologies at various levels, and checking
that mappings are properly maintained over different layers. Unfortunately, OpenStack
does not maintain such overlay details.
At the OpenStack level, ports are directly mapped to VXLAN IDs, whereas at the Open-
vSwitch level, ports are mapped to VLAN tags and mappings between the VLAN tags and
VXLAN IDs are maintained. To overcome this limit, we devised a script that generates logs
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from all the Open vSwitch instances. The script recovers mappings between VLAN tags
and the VXLAN IDs from the flow tables using the ovs-o f ctl command line tool. Then, it
recovers mappings between ports and VLAN tags from the Open-vSwitch database using
the ovs-vsctl command line utility.
Checking the correct configuration of overlay networks requires correlating informa-
tion collected both from Open vSwitch instances running on top of various compute nodes
and the controller node, and data recovered from OpenStack databases. To this end, we ex-
tended our data processing plug-in to deduce correlation between data. For example, we in-
fer the relation (port vlan tenant) from the available relations (vlan vxlan) recovered from
Open vSwitch and (port vxlan tenant) recovered from the Nova and Neutron databases. In
our settings, we consider a ratio of 30 ports per tenant, which leads to 300,000 entries in
the relation (port vxlan tenant) for 10,000 tenants. The number of entries is considerably
larger than the number of tenants, because a tenant may have several ports and virtual net-
works. As a consequence, with the increasing number of tenants, the size of this relation
grows and the complexity of the correlation step also increases proportionally. Note that
the correlation is required for several of our listed properties.
An auditing solution becomes less effective if all needed audit evidences are not col-
lected properly. Therefore, to be comprehensive in our data collection process, we firstly
check fields of all varieties of log files available in OpenStack, all configuration files and
all Nova and Neutron database tables. Through this process, we identify all possible types
of data with their sources.
3.6 Experiments
In this section, we discuss the performance of our auditing solution by measuring the exe-
cution time, memory, and CPU consumption.
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3.6.1 Experimental Setting
We deployed OpenStack with one controller node and three compute nodes, each having
Intel i7 dual core CPU and 2GB memory running Ubuntu 14.04 server. Our OpenStack
version is DevStack Juno (2014.2.2.dev3). We set up a testbed environment constituted
of 10 tenants, 150 VMs and 17 routers. To stress the verification engine and assess the
scalability of our approach, we furthermore simulated an environment with 10,000 tenants,
100,000 VMs, 40,000 subnets, 20,000 routers and 300,000 ports with a ratio of 10 VMs, 4
subnets, 2 routers and 30 ports per tenant. For the compliance verification, we use the V&V
tool, Sugar V2.2.1 [84]. We conduct the experiments for 20 different audit trail datasets in
total.
All data processing and V&V experiments are conducted on a PC with 3.40 GHz Intel
Core i7 quad core CPU and 16 GB memory and we repeat each experiment 1,000 times.
3.6.2 Results
The first set of our experiment (see Figure 3.7) demonstrates the time efficiency of our au-
diting solution. Figure 3.7(a) illustrates the time in milliseconds required for data process-
ing and compliance verification steps for port consistency, no co-residence and no common-
ownership properties. For each of the properties, we vary the most significant parameter
(e.g., the number of ports, VMs and subnets for port consistency, no co-residence and no
common ownership properties respectively) to assess the scalability of our auditing solu-
tion. Figure 3.7(b) (left) shows the size of the collected data in KB for auditing by varying
the number of tenants. The collected data size reaches around 17MB for our largest dataset.
We also estimate the time for collecting data as approximately 8 minutes for a fairly large
cloud setup (10,000 tenants, 100,000 VMs, 300,000 ports, etc.). Note that data collection
time heavily depends on the deployment options and the setup complexity. Moreover, the
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(a) Time required for data processing and verification for the port consistency (left), no co-residence
(middle) and no common ownership (right) by varying number of ports, VMs and subnets respec-
tively.
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(b) Total size (left) of collected audit data and time required (right) for auditing port consistency,
no co-residence, no common ownership and sequentially auditing three properties (worst case) by
varying the number of tenants.
Figure 3.7: Execution time for each auditing step, total size of the collected audit data and
total time for different properties using our auditing solution
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initial data collection step is performed only once for the auditing process (later on incre-
mental collection will be performed at regular intervals), so the time may be considered
reasonable. Figure 3.7(b) (right) shows the total execution time required for each property
individually and in total. Auditing no common ownership property requires the longest
time, because of the highest number of predicates used in the verification step; however, it
finishes in less than 4 seconds. In total, the auditing of three properties completes within
8 seconds for the largest dataset, when properties are audited sequentially. However, since
there is no interdependency between verifying different security properties, we can easily
run parallel verification executions. The parallel execution of the verification step for dif-
ferent properties reduces the execution time to 4 seconds, the maximum verification time
required among three security properties. Additionally, we can infer that the execution time
is not a linear function of the number of security properties to be verified. Indeed, auditing
more security properties would not lead to a significant increase in the execution time.
The objective of our second experiment (Figures 3.8(a)(left) and 3.8(b)(right)) is to
measure the CPU usage (in %). In Figure 3.8(a)(left), we measure the peak CPU usage
consumed by data processing and verification steps while auditing the no common owner-
ship property. We notice that the average CPU usage is around 35% for the verification,
whereas it is fairly negligible for the data processing step. According to Figure 3.8(b)(left),
the CPU usage grows almost linearly with the number of tenants. However, the speed of in-
crease varies depending on the property. It reaches a peak of over 70% for the no common
ownership property for 10,000 tenants. This is due to the huge amount of tenant-specific
resources (e.g., for 10,000 tenants the number of involved resources may reach 216,000).
Our final experiment (Figures 3.8(a)(right) and 3.8(b)(left)) demonstrates the memory
usage of our auditing solution. Figure 3.8(a)(right) shows that data processing step has a
minor memory usage (with a peak of 0.05%), whereas the highest memory usage observed
for the verification step for our largest setup is less than 0.19% of 16GB memory. Figure
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0−1 sec: Data processing 1−5 sec: Verification
(a) Peak CPU and memory usage for each step of our auditing solution over time when there are
10,000 tenants, 40,000 subnets, 100,000 VMs and 300,000 ports






























No common ownership Port consistency No co−residence
(b) CPU (left) and memory (right) usage for each step of our auditing solution over time when there
are 6,000 tenants, 24,000 subnets, 60,000 VMs and 180,000 ports
Figure 3.8: CPU and memory usage for each step and for different properties of our audit-
ing solution over time
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3.8(b) (right) shows that port consistency property has the lowest memory usage with a
percentage of 0.2% whereas no common ownership has the highest memory usage, which
is less than 0.6% for 10,000 tenants. Our observation from this experiment is that memory
usage is related to the number of relations, variables and constraints involved to verify each
property.
Discussion. In our experiments, we audited several security properties, e.g., no common
ownership and port consistency, for up to 10,000 tenants with a large set of various re-
sources (300,000 ports, 100,000 VMs, 40,000 subnets) in less than 8 seconds. The audit-
ing activity occurs upon request from the auditor (or in regular intervals when the auditor
sets regular audits). Therefore, we consider the costs of our approach to be reasonable even
for large data centers. Although we report results for a limited set of security properties
related to virtualized cloud infrastructure, promising results show the potentiality of the
use of formal methods for auditing. Particularly, we show that the time required for our
auditing solution grows very slowly with the number of security properties. As seen in Fig-
ure 3.7(a), we anticipate that auditing a large list of security properties in practice would
still be realistic. The cost generally increases almost linearly with the number of tenants.
Note that, we conduct our experiments in a single PC; if the security properties can be
verified through concurrent and independent Sugar executions, we can easily parallelize
this task by running several instances of Sugar on different VMs in the cloud environment.
Thus the parallelization in the cloud allows to reduce the overall verification time to the
maximum time for any individual security property.
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3.7 Summary
In this work, we elaborated a generic model for virtualized infrastructures in the cloud.
We identified a set of relevant structural security properties to audit and mapped them to
different standards. Then, we presented a formal approach for auditing cloud virtualized
infrastructures from the structural point of view. Particularly, we showed that our approach
is able to detect topology inconsistencies that may occur between multiple control layers
in the cloud. Our evaluation results show that formal methods can be successfully applied
for large data centers with a reasonable overhead.
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Chapter 4
ISOTOP: Auditing Virtual Networks
Isolation Across Cloud Layers in
OpenStack
4.1 Introduction
Despite the abundant benefits of the cloud, security and privacy concerns are still holding
back its widespread adoption [87]. Particularly, multi-tenancy in cloud environments, sup-
ported by virtualization, allows optimal and cost-effective resource sharing among tenants
that do not necessarily trust each other. Furthermore, the highly dynamic, elastic, and self-
service nature of the cloud, introduces additional operational complexity that may prepare
the floor for misconfigurations and vulnerabilities, leading to violations of baseline secu-
rity and non-compliance with security standards (e.g., ISO 27002/27017 [73, 8] and CCM
3.0.1 [7]). Particularly, network isolation failures are among the foremost security concerns
in the cloud [17, 18]. For instance, virtual machines (VMs) belonging to different corpo-
rations and trust levels may share the same set of resources, which opens up opportunities
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for inter-tenant isolation breaches [66]. Consequently, cloud tenants may raise questions
like: “How to make sure that all my virtual resources and private networks are properly iso-
lated from other tenants’ networks, especially my competitors? Are my vertical Network
Segments (e.g., for finance, human resources, etc.) properly segregated from each other?”.
Security auditing aims at verifying that the implemented mechanisms are actually pro-
viding the expected security features. However, auditing security without suitable auto-
mated tools could be practically infeasible due to the design complexity and the sheer size






















Figure 4.1: A two-layer view of a multi-tenant cloud virtualized infrastructure: The infras-
tructure management layer and the implementation layer
Motivating Example. Figure 4.1 illustrates a simplified view of an OpenStack [16]
configuration example for virtualized multi-tenant cloud environments. Following a lay-
ered architecture [88], the cloud stack includes an infrastructure management layer re-
sponsible of provisioning, interconnecting, and decommissioning a set of virtual resources
belonging to different tenants, at the implementation layer, across distributed physical re-
sources. For instance, at the infrastructure management layer, virtual machines VM Adb
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and VM Bapp1, are defined in separate Virtual Networks, vNet A and vNet B belong-
ing to Tenant Alpha and Tenant Beta, respectively. At the implementation layer,
these VMs are instantiated on Physical Server 1 as VM 11 and VM 21 and are inter-
connected to form those virtual networks. As the latter networks share the same physical
substrate, network isolation mechanisms are defined at the management layer and config-
ured at the implementation layer through network virtualization mechanisms to ensure their
logical segregation. For instance, Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) is used to isolate
different virtual networks at the host level (more details are provided in Section 4.2.1). To
audit isolation as defined in applicable standards, there exist several challenges.
• The gap between the high-level description of the requirements in the standards and
the actual security properties hinders auditing automation. For instance, the require-
ment on segregation in networks in ISO 27017 [8] recommends “separation of multi-
tenant cloud service customer environments”. Stated as such, these requirements do
not detail exactly what data to be checked or how it should be verified.
• The layered nature of the cloud stack and the dependencies between layers make
existing approaches that separately verify each single layer ineffective. Those lay-
ers maintain different but complementary views of the virtual infrastructure and
current isolation mechanisms configurations. For instance, assume Tenant Beta
compromises the hypervisor on Physical Server 1 (e.g., by exploiting some
vulnerabilities [78]) and succeeds to directly modify VLAN 200 associated with
VM 21 to become VLAN 100 that is currently associated with VM 11 and VM 12 on
Physical Server 1. This leads to a topology isolation breach as both VMs will
become part of the same Layer 2 virtual network defined for vNet A, opening the
door for further attacks [89]. The verification of the management layer view cannot
detect such a breach as VLAN tags are managed locally at the implementation layer.
Additionally, verifying the implementation layer only without mapping the virtual
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resources to their owners (maintained only at the management layer), would not al-
low a per-tenant identification of the breached resource. For example, the association
between VM Bapp1, vNet B and their owner (Tenant Beta) in the management
layer view should be consistently mapped into the association between VM 21 in
Physical Server 1 with VLAN 200 at the implementation level. This should
be done for all tenants. Considering the implementation layer after the attack in Fig-
ure 4.1, VM 11, VM 12 and VM 21 in Physical Server 1 can be identified to
be on the same VLAN, namely, VLAN 100. However, without considering that the
corresponding VMs at the management layer are in different virtual networks and
belong to different tenants, the breach cannot be properly detected.
• Correctly identifying the relevant data and their sources in the cloud for each secu-
rity requirement increases the complexity of auditing. This can be amplified with the
diversity and plurality of data sources located at different cloud stack layers. Fur-
thermore, the data should not be collected only from different layers but also from
different physical servers. In addition, their underlying semantics and relationships
should be properly understood to be able to process it. The relation of this data and
its semantics to the verified property constitutes a real challenge in automating cloud
auditing.
In summary, taking into account the complexity factor and multi-layered nature of the
cloud, the majority of existing approaches (e.g., [41, 37]) are not designed to handle cross-
layer consistent isolation verification. Thus, in this work, we propose an automated cross-
layer approach that tackles the above issues for auditing isolation requirements between
virtual networks in a multi-tenant cloud. We focus on isolation at Layer 2 Virtual Networks
and Overlay Networks, namely topology isolation, which is the basic building block for
networks communication and segregation for upper network layers. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first effort on auditing cloud infrastructure isolation at layer 2 virtual
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networks and overlay taking into account cross-layer consistency in the cloud stack. The
following summarizes our main contributions:
• To fill the gap between standards and isolation verification, we devise a set of con-
crete security properties based on the literature and common knowledge on layer 2
virtual networks isolation and relate them to relevant requirements in security stan-
dards.
• To identify the relevant data for auditing network isolation and capture its underlying
semantics across multiple layers, we elaborate a model capturing the cloud-stack lay-
ers and the verified network layers along with their inter-dependencies and isolation
mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose such a model.
• We propose an off-line verification approach that spans the OpenStack implemen-
tation and management layers, which allows to evaluate the consistency of layer 2
virtual network isolation. We rely on the model defined above as input to our ap-
proach and a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) solver, namely, Sugar [84], as a
back-end verification tool.
• We report real-life experience and challenges faced when integrating our auditing
and compliance validation solution into OpenStack. We further conduct experiments
to demonstrate the applicability of our approach.
4.2 Models
In this section, we provide a background on the network isolation mechanisms considered
in this work, and we present the threat model followed by our model that captures tenants’
virtual networks at the infrastructure management and implementation layers.
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4.2.1 Preliminaries
In this work, we focus on layer 2 virtual networks deployed in cloud environments man-
aged by OpenStack. We furthermore consider Open vSwitch (OVS)1 for providing layer 2
network function to guest VMs at the host level [90].
In large scale OpenStack-based cloud infrastructures, layer 2 virtual networks are im-
plemented on the same server using Virtual LANs (VLAN), and across the physical net-
work through Virtual Extended LAN (VXLAN) as an overlay technology. The VXLAN
technology is used to overcome the scale limitation of VLANs, which only allows for a
maximum of 4,096 tags [18]. More specifically, on each physical server, disjoint VLAN
tags are assigned to ports connecting VMs that are part of different isolated virtual net-
works. Furthermore, a unique VXLAN identifier is assigned per isolated virtual network
in order to extend layer 2 virtual networks between different physical servers, thus forming
an overlay network. When the traffic leaves a VM (or a physical server), the appropriate
VLAN tag (or VXLAN identifier) is inserted into the traffic by configurable OVS forward-
ing rules to maintain proper layer 2 traffic isolation. The mapping between VLAN tags and
VXLAN identifiers performed by the OVS rules ensures that the traffic is smoothly steered
between sources and destinations deployed over different physical servers.
Example 4.1. Figure 4.2 illustrates a more detailed view of layer 2 virtual networks imple-
mentation for the configuration showed in Figure 4.1. According to the latter figure, VM 11,
VM 12 and VM 13 belong to Tenant Alpha and are connected to vNet A. VLAN 100
is defined at Physical Server 1 to enable isolated layer 2 communication between
VM 11 and VM 12, whereas VLAN 200 is defined to isolate VM 21 at the same physical
server since the latter VM is connected to another virtual network (vNet B). Similarly,
at Physical Server 2, different VLAN tags, namely, VLAN 101 and VLAN 201, are
1Open vSwitch OVS is one of the mostly used OpenFlow-enabled Virtual Switches in more than 30%
deployments, and is compatible with most hypervisors including Xen, KVM and VMware.
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defined to isolate VM 13 and VM 22 respectively since they are connected to different net-
works. Since VM 11, VM 12 and VM 13 are all connected to the same virtual network (see
Figure 4.1) but deployed over two different physical servers, VXLAN is used as an overlay
protocol to logically connect VMs across physical servers while ensuring isolation. To this
end, two distinct VXLAN identifiers, namely, VXLAN 0×100 and VXLAN 0×200, are
associated to vNet A and vNet B, respectively. Then, to achieve end to end isolation,
VXLAN 0×100 is attached to VLAN 100 on Physical Server 1 and to VLAN 101
on Physical Server 2, while VXLAN 0×200 is attached to VLAN 200 on Physical
Server 1 and to VLAN 201 on Physical Server 2. This would allow to isolate the
virtual networks both at the host level (through different VLAN tags) and at the physical
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Figure 4.2: A detailed view of the implementation layer of Figure 4.1
4.2.2 Threat Model
We assume that the cloud infrastructure management system has implementation flaws and
vulnerabilities, which can be potentially exploited by malicious entities leading to tenants’
virtual infrastructures isolation failures. For instance, a reported vulnerability in OpenStack
Neutron OSSA-2014-008 [91] allows a tenant to create a virtual port on another tenant’s
58
virtual router without checking his identity. Exploiting such vulnerabilities leads to seri-
ous isolation breaches opening doors to more harmful attacks such as network sniffing. As
another example, a malicious tenant can take advantage from the known cloud data cen-
ters configuration strategies to locate his victim inside the cloud [66]. In addition, he can
compromise some host hypervisors to deliberately change network configurations at the
implementation layer.
Our auditing approach focuses on verifying security compliance of OpenStack-managed
cloud infrastructures with respect to predefined security properties related to virtual infras-
tructure isolation defined in relevant security standards or tenant specific requirements.
Thus, our solution is not designed to replace intrusion detection systems or vulnerabil-
ity analysis tools (e.g., vulnerability scanners). However, by verifying security properties,
our solution may detect the effects and consequences of certain vulnerabilities exploit or
threats on the configuration of the cloud under the following conditions: a) the vulnera-
bility exploit or threat violates at least one of the security properties being audited, b) the
violations generate logged events and configuration data, c) the corresponding traces of
those violations in logs and configuration data are intact and not erased or tampered with,
as the correctness of our audit results depends on the correct input data extracted from logs,
databases, and devices.
The out of scope threats include attacks that do not violate the specified security prop-
erties, attacks not captured in the logs or databases, and attacks through which the attackers
may remove or tamper with logged events. Existing techniques on trusted auditing may be
applied to establish a chain of trust from TPM chips to auditing components, e.g., [71]).
We focus on layer 2 virtual network, and our work is complementary to existing solu-
tions at other network layers (e.g., TenantGuard [92]). We assume the verification results
do not disclose sensitive information about other tenants and regard potential privacy issues
as a future work.
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Finally, we focus on auditing structural properties such as the assignment of instances
to physical hosts, the proper configuration of virtualization mechanisms, and consistency
of the configurations in different layers of the cloud. Those properties mainly involve
static configuration information that are already stored by the cloud system at the cloud
management layer and the implementation layer. The verification of operational properties,
which are related to the network forwarding functionality, are out of the scope of this work.
4.2.3 Virtualized Cloud Infrastructure Model
In this section, we present the two-layered model that we derive to capture information
related to isolated virtual networks at both the infrastructure management and the imple-
mentation layers. This model was derived based on common knowledge and studied liter-
ature on implementation and management of isolated virtual networks [93]. For instance,
to elaborate and validate the infrastructure management layer model, we analyzed the ab-
stractions exposed by the most popular cloud platforms providing tenants the capability to
build virtual private networks (e.g., AWS EC2- Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) [11], Google
Cloud Platform (GCP) [12], Microsoft Azure [13], VMware virtual Cloud Director (vCD)
[94] and OpenStack [16]). More details will be provided in Table 4.7 (Section 4.6). For the
implementation model, we relied on performing extensive tests on OpenStack compute and
network nodes, then we supported our understanding by exploring the literature [95, 18].
Finally, we validated our two-layer model with subject matter experts.
The model allows capturing the data to be audited at each layer, its underlying semantics
and relation with isolation requirements. It also defines cross-layer mappings of data in
different layers to capture consistency requirements.
Infrastructure Management Model. The upper model in Figure 4.3 captures the view
from the cloud infrastructure management system perspective. This layer manages virtual

























































Figure 4.3: Two-layered model for isolated multi-tenant virtualized infrastructures in the
cloud: Generic model for the infrastructure management layer (upper model) mapped into
an implementation-specific model of the infrastructure layer (lower model)
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ownership relation (represented as relationships) with respect to tenants. Once connected
together, these resources form the tenants’ virtual infrastructures. Some entities, for in-
stance Tenant, are only maintained at the management layer and have no counterpart at
the lower layer. Other entities exist across layers (e.g., VMs and ports), however, one-to-
one mappings should be maintained. These mappings allow inferring missing relationships
between layers and help checking consistency between the cloud stack layers. Isolation be-
tween different virtual networks at this layer is defined using a segmentation mechanism,
modeled as entity Segment. A segment should be unique for all elements of the same
virtual infrastructure.
Example 4.2. Ownership is modeled using the BelongsTo relationship in Figure 4.3
between Tenant and vResource. The related cardinality constraint (M:1), ex-
presses that, following the directed edge, a given vResource can only belong to
a single (i.e., 1) Tenant, but, a Tenant can own multiple (i.e., M) virtual re-
sources. The isAssignedSeg relationship and its cardinality constraint (1:1) re-
lating Segment to vNet allows having a unique segment per network. Relationships
isConnectToVnet and HasRunningVM are of special interest to us and thus they are
depicted in the model even though they can be inferred from other relationships.
Implementation Model. The lower model in Figure 4.3 captures a typical OpenStack im-
plementation of the infrastructure management view using well-known layer 2 isolation
technologies, VXLAN and VLAN. The model can capture other layer 2 isolation mecha-
nisms such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) by replacing the entity VXLAN with
entity GRE. Some entities and relationships in this model represent the implementation of
their counterparts at the management model. For instance, VXLAN combined with VLAN
are implementation of entity Segment. Other entities such as virtual networking devices
Open vSwitch (OVS) and Virtual Tunneling End Point (VTEP) are specific to the imple-
mentation layer as they do not exist at the infrastructure management model. They play
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the vital role in connecting VM instances to their hosting machines and to their virtual net-
works across different servers. Indeed, VTEPs are overlay-aware interfaces responsible for
the encapsulation of packets with the right tunnel header depending on the destination VM
and its current hosting server.
Example 4.3. At the lower model in Figure 4.3, the ternary relationshipisAssignedVLAN
with cardinality (M:M:1) means that each single port in a given OVS can be assigned
at most one VLAN but multiple ports can be assigned the same VLAN. To capture
isolation at overlay networks spanning over different servers, the ternary relationship
isMappedtoVXLAN states that each VLAN in each OVS is mapped to a unique VXLAN.
The unicity between a specific port and a VLAN in an OVS as well as the unicity of the
mapping of a VLAN to a VXLAN in a given OVS, are inherited from the unicity of the
mapping of a segment to a virtual network. The two ternary relationships hasMapping
and isAssociatedWith are used to model VTEPs information existing over different
physical servers. Several relations have similar semantics in both models, however, we
use different names for clarity. For instance, VMRunningOn at the implementation layer
corresponds to isRunningOn at the management layer.
Entities and relationships defined in these models will be used in our approach to au-
tomate the verification of isolation between tenants’ virtual infrastructures. They will be
essentially used to express system data and the relations among them in the form of in-
stances of these models. Also, they will be used to express properties related to isolation
as will be presented in next section.
4.3 Methodology
In this section, we detail our approach for auditing compliance of virtual layer 2 networks
with respect to a multi-tenant cloud.
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4.3.1 Overview
Figure 4.4 presents an overview of our approach. Our main idea is to use the derived
two-layered model (Section 4.2) to capture the implementation of the multi-tenant virtual
infrastructure along with its specification. We then verify the implementation against its
specification to detect violation of the properties.




















Figure 4.4: An overview of our verification approach
To be able to automatically process the model as the specification support for the virtual
infrastructure, we first express it in First Order Logic (FOL) [85]. We encode entities
and relationships in both models into a set of FOL expressions, namely, variables and
relations. We also express isolation and consistency rules as FOL predicates based on the
FOL expressions derived from the model. This process is performed offline and only once.
To obtain the implementation of the system, we collect real data from different layers
(cloud management and cloud infrastructure) and use the model entities and relationships
definitions to build an instance of the model representing the current state of the system.
As we aim at detecting violations, we represent relationships between real data as instances
of FOL n-ary relations without restricting instances to meet cardinality constraints. This
will be detailed later on in this section. As a back-end verification mechanism, we rely
on the off-the-shelf CSP solver Sugar. The latter allows formulation of many complex
problems in terms of variables defined over finite domains and constraints. Its generic
goal is to find a vector of values (a.k.a. assignment) that satisfies all constraints expressed
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over the variables. If all constraints are satisfied, the solver returns SAT, otherwise, it
returns UNSAT. In the case of a SAT result, a solution to the problem, which is a specific
assignment of values to the variables that satisfies the constraints, is provided. One of
the key advantages of using constraint solving is to enable uniformly specifying systems
data and properties in a clean formalism and covering a wide range of properties [86].
Furthermore, the latter allows to identify the data violating the verified properties as it will
be explained in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Cloud Auditing Properties
Among the goals of this work is to establish a bridge between high-level security standards
and low-level implementation as well as to enable verification automation. Therefore, this
section describes a set of concrete security properties related to layer 2 virtual network and
overlay network isolation in a multi-tenant environment. In this work, we focus on the
verification of structural properties gathered from the literature and the subject matter. To
have a more concrete example of layer 2 virtual network isolation mechanisms, we refer to
VLAN and VXLAN as examples of well-established technologies.
Table 4.1 presents an excerpt of the security properties mapped to relevant domains
and control classes in security standards, namely, CCM [7] (Infrastructure and virtualiza-
tion security segmentation domain), ISO27017 [8] (Segregation in networks section) and
NIST800 [81] (System and communications protection, System and information integrity
security controls). Those properties either check topology isolation based on individual
cloud layers (i.e., infrastructure management level or implementation level), or they check
topology consistency based on information gathered from both layers at the same time. In
the following, we discuss examples illustrating how those properties are related to isolation
and consistency, and how they can be violated.
Topology Isolation. This property ensures that virtualization mechanisms are properly
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configured and provide adequate logical isolation between virtual networks. By using iso-
lated virtual topologies, traffic belonging to different virtual networks would travel on log-
ically separated paths, thus ensuring traffic isolation. The following example illustrates a




























































Figure 4.5: Subsets of data and its relations at the could infrastructure implementation and
management layers showing isolation violation. At the implementation level, VM 21 is
connected on Port 21, that is assigned VLAN 100 as a consequence of the attack. Since
VLAN 100 is mapped to VXLAN 0×100, which is mapped to seg 256 at the infras-
tructure management layer and the latter segment is assigned to vNet A of Tenant Alpha,
VM 21 belonging to Tenant Beta is now on the same network segment as VMs in vNet A
Example 4.4. Figure 4.5 captures a subset of the data, at different layers, that is rel-
evant to virtual networks vNet A and vNet B corresponding to the deployment illus-
trated in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. The upper part of the figure shows a subset of
the data managed by the infrastructure management layer and on the lower part, the
subset of data managed by the implementation layer. Nodes represent data instances,
66
while the directed arrows represent relations between these data instances. For exam-
ple, at the infrastructure management layer, the relationship IsConnectedTovNet
relates three instances of data VM Adb, vNet A, and vPort 11, and means that VM Adb
is connected to vNet A on virtual port vPort 11. A cross-layer mapping, shown as
small dotted undirected arrows, between some of the data instances at different layers
is used to relate management-defined data to its implementation counterpart. For in-
stance, VM Adb and vPort 11 have each a one-to-one cross-layer mapping to VM 11
and Port 11, respectively, while no data entity at the implementation layer could be di-
rectly mapped to vNet A at the management layer. The latter can be indirectly mapped
to VXLAN 0x100 at the implementation layer via the segment seg 256. More precisely,
vNet A is implemented using VXLAN 0x100 and a set of corresponding VLANs, namely,
VLAN 100 and VLAN 101 (via IsMappedToVXLANonOVS), which are assigned to
Port 11, Port 13, and Port 21 (via IsAssignedVLAN).
This instance of the layered-model allows capturing topology isolation breaches and
identifying which networks, VMs, and tenants are in this situation. Indeed VM 21 is found
to be on the same virtual layer 2 segment as VM 11 and VM 13. There are two types of
isolation breaches and they are illustrated as follows:
• Intra-server topology isolation breach. At the implementation layer, VM 21 is con-
nected on port Port 21 (via relationship IsConnectedonPort), which is as-
signed VLAN 100 (via relationshipIsAssignedVLAN) in the open vSwitch OVS 1.
Additionally, since Port 11 connecting VM 11 is also assigned VLAN 100 on the
same switch, both VM 11 and VM 21 connected via these ports are located on the
same virtual network segment VLAN 100 (which corresponds to vNet A at the in-
frastructure management level) leading to an isolation breach. Since both VMs are
in the same server, namely, Server 1, it is said to be an intra-server topology iso-
lation at virtual layer 2. Noteworthy, without the correct mapping between VM 11
67
and VM 21 at the implementation layer to their respective counterparts VM Adb and
VM Bapp1 as well as the ownership information (i.e., these VMs belong to different
tenants and are connected on different virtual networks) at the management layer,
we cannot conclude on the existence of this breach by only considering data from the
implementation layer.
• Inter-server topology isolation breach. At the implementation layer, VLAN 100 that
is assigned to ports Port 21 and Port 11 is mapped to VXLAN 0x100 via re-
lationship IsMAppedToVXLANonOVS (which corresponds again to vNet A at the
infrastructure management level). However, this VXLAN identifier is also related to
another VLAN tag, namely, VLAN 101, which is assigned to port Port 13 con-
necting VM 13 on Server 2. This is an inter-server topology isolation breach,
since VM 13 and VM 21 are running on different servers (Physical Server 2
and Physical Server 1).
Topology Consistency. Topology consistency consists of checking whether the topology
view in the cloud infrastructure management system, consistently matches the actual im-
plemented topology, and the other way around, while considering different tenants’ bound-
aries.
Example 4.5. (Port consistency) Assume that a malicious insider deliberately created a
port Port 40 directly on OVS 1 without passing by the cloud infrastructure management
system and tagged it with VLAN 100, which is already assigned to Tenant Alpha. This
allows the malicious insider to sniff tenant’s Alpha traffic on VLAN 100 via Port 40,
which clearly leads to the violation of network isolation property.
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Name Description Mgmt. Impl.
Topology












VMs should be attached to the virtual net-




Ports-VLANs (P4) Ports should be mapped to unique VLANs ×
Mapping unicity
VLANs-VXLANs (P5) VLANs and VXLANs should be mapped
one-to-one on a given server
×
Overlay tunnels isolation (P6) In each VTEP end, VMs are associated to
their physical location and to the VXLAN as-




• • • VM location consistency (P7) Consistency between VMs’ locations at the
implementation level and at the management
level
× ×
Ports consistency (P8) Consistency between vPorts in the implemen-
tation level and their counterparts in the man-
agement level
× ×
Virtual links consistency (P9) VMs should be connected to the VLANs and
VXLANs in the implementation level that
correspond to the virtual networks they are at-
tached to at the management level
× ×
Table 4.1: Excerpt of security properties
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4.3.3 Verification Approach
In order to systematically verify isolation and consistency properties over the model, we
need to transform the model and its instances as well as the requirements into FOL expres-
sions that can be automatically processed. In the following, we present how we express the
model, the data, and the properties in FOL.
Model and Data Representation
Entities in the model are encoded into FOL variables where their domains would encom-
pass all instances defined by the system data. Each n-ary relationship is encoded into a
FOL n-ary relation over the related variables, where the instance of a given relation is the
set of tuples corresponding entities-instances as defined by the relationship.
For instance, in the model instance of Figure 4.5, the relationship
IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS is translated into the following FOL relation instances
capturing the actual implementation setup showing the mapping of a VLAN into a
VXLAN on a given OVS instance.
• IsMapedToVXLANOnOVS(OVS 2, VLAN 101, VXLAN 0×100)
• IsMapedToVXLANOnOVS(OVS 1, VLAN 100, VXLAN 0×100)
Table 4.2 shows the main FOL relations defined in our model. These relations are
required for expressing properties, which are formed as predicates as it will be presented
next.
Properties Expressions
Security properties presented in Table 4.1 can be expressed as FOL predicates over FOL




Evaluate to True if
IsRunningOn(vm,cn) Mgmt. The instance vm is located at the compute
node cn
IsMappedToSeg(vp,seg) Mgmt. The virtual port vp is mapped to the segment
seg
IsAssignedSeg(vNet,seg) Mgmt. The virtual network vNet is assigned the seg-
ment seg
IsConnectedTovNet(vm,
vNet,vp) Mgmt. vm is connect to vNet on the virtual portvp
HasPort(sw, p) Impl. The virtual switch sw has a portp
IsAssignedVLAN(sw, p,vlan) Impl. The portp on switch sw is assigned the VLAN
vlan
IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS
(sw,vlan,vxlan) Impl. vlan is mapped to vxlan on the virtual switch
sw
SwRunningOn(sw,s) Impl. The switch sw is running on the server s
V MRunningOn(vm,s) Impl. The VM vm is running on the server s
IsConnectedOnPort(vm,sw, p) Impl. The VM vm is connected on port p belonging
to the switch sw
HasMapping(ovs,vm,vxlan) Impl. The VM vm is associated to vxlan on a remote
switch ovs
IsAssociatedWith(ovs,vm,
vtep) Impl. The VM vm is associated to the remote VTEP
vtep on ovs
IsRelatedTo(vtep,s) Impl. the VTEP vtep is defined on the server s







∀vNet1,vNet2 ∈ vNET,∀seg1,seg2 ∈ Segment : [IsAssignedSeg(vNet1,seg1)∧
IsAssignedSeg(vNet2,seg2)∧¬(vNet1= vNet2)→¬(seg1 = seg2)]∧
[IsAssignedSeg(vNet1,seg1)∧ IsAssignedSeg(vNet2,seg2)∧




∀seg1,seg2 ∈ Segment,∀vp ∈ vPORT : IsMappedToSeg(vp,seg1)∧





∀vm ∈VM,∀vNet ∈ vNET,∀seg1,seg2 ∈ Segment,∀vp ∈ vPort :
IsConnectedTovNet(vm,vNet,vp)∧ IsAssignedSeg(vNet,seg1)
∧IsMappedToSeg(vp,seg2)→ (seg1 = seg2)






∀sw ∈ OV S,∀p ∈ Port,∀vlan1,vlan2∈VLAN : HasPort(sw, p)∧





∀vxlan1,vxlan2 ∈VXLAN,∀vlan ∈VLAN,∀sw ∈ OV S,
∀p ∈ PORT : (IsAssignedVLAN(sw, p,vlan)∧ IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS(sw,vlan,vxlan1)




∀vm ∈V M,∀sw1,sw2 ∈ OV S,∀p ∈ PORT,∀vxlan1,vxlan2 ∈VXLAN,∀s1,s2 ∈ Server,
∀vtep ∈ RemoteVT EP,∀vlan ∈VLAN : HasPort(sw1, p)∧SWRunningOn(sw1,s1)∧
IsConnectedOnPort(vm,sw1, p)∧ IsAssignedVLAN(sw1, p,vlan)∧
IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS(sw1,vlan,vxlan1)∧ IsAssociatedWith(sw2,vm,vtep)
∧HasMapping(sw2,vm,vxlan2)∧ IsRelatedTo(vtep,s2)→ (s1 = s2)∧ (vxlan1 = vxlan2)






∀vm1 ∈VM,∀cn ∈COMPUTEN : IsRunningOn((vm1,cn)→
∃vm2 ∈ iV M,∃s ∈ SERVER : V MRunningOn(vm2,s)∧ (vm1 = vm2)∧ (cn = s)
Ports consis-
tency (P8)
∀vNet ∈ vNET,∀seg ∈ Segment,∀vp ∈ vPORT : IsAssignedSeg(vNet,seg)
∧IsMappedToSeg(vp,seg)→
[∃sw ∈ OVS,∃vxlan ∈VXLAN,∃vlan ∈VLAN,∃p ∈ PORT : IsAssignedVLAN(sw, p,vlan)




∀vm1 ∈ iVM,∀vxlan ∈V XLAN,∀sw ∈ OVS,∀vlan ∈VLAN,∀p ∈ PORT :
IsConnectedOnPort(vm1,sw, p)∧
IsAssignedVLAN(sw, p,vlan)∧ IsMappedToVXLANOnOV S(sw,vlan,vxlan)→
[∃vm2 ∈ vV M,∃vNet ∈ vNET,∃seg ∈ Segment,∃vp ∈ vPORT :
IsConnectedTovNet(vm2,vNet,vp)∧ (vm1= vm2)∧
IsAssignedSeg(vNet,seg)∧ (seg= vxlan)]
Table 4.5: Topology consistency properties in FOL
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Table 4.3 shows FOL predicates for the isolation properties at the infrastructure man-
agement model. Table 4.4 presents FOL predicates for the isolation properties at the imple-
mentation model. Table 4.5 summarizes the expressions of consistency-related properties.
Isolation Verification
As discussed before (Section 4.3.3), model instances are built based on the collected data
and they are encoded as tuples of data representing relations’ instances. On another hand,
properties are encoded as predicates to specify the conditions that these relations’ instances
should meet.
To verify the security properties, we use both properties’ predicates and relations’ in-
stances to formulate the CSP constraints to be fed into the CSP solver. Since CSP solvers
provide solutions only in case the constraint is satisfied (SAT), we define constraints using
the negative form of the FOL predicates presented in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. Hence, the
solution provided by the CSP solver gives the relations’ instances for which the negative
form of the property is satisfied, meaning that a violation has occurred.
To better explain how the CSP solver allows to obtain the violation evidence, we provide
hereafter an example of the verification of the inter-server isolation property provided in
Example 4.4.
Example 4.6. We assume that VM location consistency and port consistency properties
were verified to be met by the configuration. From the infrastructure management level, we
recover the virtual networks connecting each VM and their corresponding segment. This is
captured through the following relation instances:
• IsConnectedTovNet((VM Bapp1, vNet B, vPort 21), (VM Adb,
vNet A, vPort 11), (VM Aweb, vNet A, vPort 13))
• IsAssignedSeg((vNet B, seg 512),(vNet A, seg 256)))
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From the implementation level, we recover the OVS and the ports connecting VMs in
addition to their assigned VLAN tags and VXLAN identifiers captured through the following
relation instances:
• IsConnectedOnPort((VM 21, OVS 1, Port 21),(VM 11, OVS 1,
Port 11), (VM 13, OVS 2, Port 13))
• IsAssignedVLAN((OVS 1, Port 21, vlan 100),(OVS 1, Port 11,
vlan 100), (OVS 2, Port 13, vlan 101))
• IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS((OVS 1, vlan 100, vxlan 0×100),(OVS 2,
vlan 101, vxlan 0×100))
We would like to verify that the VXLAN identifier assigned to a virtual network at the
implementation level is equal to the segment assigned to this same network at the infras-
tructure management level (after conversion to decimal), which is expressed by virtual link
consistency property (P9). To find whether there exist relations’ tuples that falsify this
property (¬P9), we first formulate the CSP instance using the negative form of the corre-
sponding predicate, which corresponds to the following predicate:
¬P11= ∃vm1 ∈ iVM,∃vxlan ∈ VXLAN,∃sw ∈ OVS,∃vlan ∈ VLAN,∃p ∈ PORT, (4)





By verifying predicate 4 over all the aforementioned relations’ instances, the solver
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finds an assignment such that the above predicate becomes true, which means that the
property P9 is violated. The predicate instance that caused the violation can be written as
follows:
IsConnectedOnPort(VM 21,OVS 1,Port 21)∧ (5)
IsAssignedVLAN(OVS 1,Port 21,vlan 100)∧
IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS(OVS 1,vlan 100,vxlan 0×100)∧
¬IsConnectedTovNet(VM Bapp1,vNet B,vPort 21)∨¬(VM 21= VM Bapp1)∨
¬IsAssignedSeg(vNet B,seg 512)∨¬(seg 512= vxlan 0×100)
Since seg is equal to 512 and the decimal value of VXLAN0 ×100, namely, vxlan,
is 256, then the equality seg=vxlanwill be evaluated to false and ¬(seg=vxlan)will
be evaluated to true, which makes the assignment in predicate 5 satisfying the constraint.
This set of tuples provides the evidence about what values breached the security property
P9. Note that as VM consistency and port consistency properties were assumed to be
verified, the equality between VM Bapp1 and VM 21 holds (based on their identifiers that
could be their MAC addresses for instance).
In the following section, we present our auditing solution integrated into OpenStack
and show details on how we use the CSP solver Sugar as a back-end verification engine.
4.4 Implementation
In this section, we first provide a high-level architecture of our system. We then briefly
review the most relevant OpenStack services and OVS. Finally, we detail our implemen-
tation and its integration into OpenStack and Congress [38], an open-source framework
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implementing policy as a service for OpenStack.
4.4.1 Architecture
Figure 4.6 illustrates a high-level architecture of our auditing system. It has three main
components: data collection and processing module, compliance verification module and
the dashboard and reporting module. Our solution interacts mainly with the cloud infras-
tructure management system (e.g., OpenStack) and elements in the data center infrastruc-
ture to collect various types of audit data. It also interacts with the cloud tenant to obtain
the tenant requirements and to provide the tenant with the audit results. The properties ex-
tractor intercepts tenants’ requirements (expressed as high level properties) and identifies
the corresponding low level and concrete properties that can be directly checked on the
collected and processed data. As expressing and processing tenants’ policies is out of the
scope of this work, we assume that they are parsable XML files.
Infrastructure Management and 
Implementation Models
Cloud Inf. Management System
(e.g., OpenStack)
Data Center Inf. (Switches, physical 
servers, middleboxes, ...)
Data Collection Engine

























Requirements (General/ tenant-specific security 
policies) and Audit queries
Properties Extractor
Figure 4.6: A high-level architecture of our cloud auditing solution
The data collection and processing module is composed of the collection engine and
the processing engine. The collection engine is responsible for collecting the required
audit data in a batch mode. The role of the processing engine is to filter, format, aggregate,
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and correlate this data. The required audit data may be distributed throughout the cloud
and in different formats. The processing engine pre-processes the data in order to provide
specific information needed to verify given properties. Furthermore, the processing engine
recovers the formalized form of the concrete properties that need to be audited. The last
processing step is to generate the code for compliance verification using both the processed
data and the formalized properties. The generated code depends on the selected back-end
verification engine.
The compliance verification module is responsible for performing the actual verification
of the audited properties and the detection of violations, if any. Triggered by an audit
request, the compliance verification module invokes the back-end verification engine. In
case of violation, the verification engine provides details on the breach, which are then
intercepted and interpreted by the result processing engine.
If a security audit property fails, evidence can be obtained from the output of the veri-
fication back-end. Once the outcome of the compliance verification is ready, audit results
and evidences are stored in the audit repository database and made accessible to the audit
reporting engine. Several potential formal verification engines can serve our needs, and the
actual choice may depend on the property being verified.
4.4.2 Background
As we are interested in auditing the infrastructure virtualization and network segregation,
we first investigated OpenStack documentation to learn which services are involved in the
creation and maintenance of the virtual infrastructure and networking. We found that Nova
and Neutron services in OpenStack are responsible for managing networking at the man-
agement layer. We also investigated the implementation-level, and found that OVS in-
stances running in different compute nodes are the main components that implement the
virtual infrastructure. Following is a brief description of Nova, Neutron and OVS:
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Nova [16] This is the OpenStack project designed to provide massively scalable, on de-
mand, self-service access to compute resources. It is considered as the main part of an IaaS
model.
Neutron [16] This OpenStack project provides tenants with capabilities to build network-
ing topologies through the exposed API, relying on three object abstractions, namely, net-
works, subnets and routers. When leveraged with the Modular Layer 2 plug-in (ML2),
Neutron enables supporting various layer 2 networking technologies. In many existing
deployments, OVS is used with OpenStack to manage the network connectivity between
tenants’ VMs.
In our settings, an OVS defines two interconnected bridges, the integration bridge
(br-int) and the tunneling bridge (br-tun). VMs are connected via a virtual interface
(tap device)2 to br-int. The latter acts as a normal layer 2 learning switch. It connects
VMs attached to a given network to ports tagged with the corresponding VLAN, which
ensures traffic segregation inside the same compute node.
Each tenant’s network is assigned a unique VXLAN identifier over the whole infrastruc-
ture. The br-tun is endowed with OpenFlow rules [96] that map each internal VLAN-tag
to the corresponding VXLAN identifier and vice versa. For egress traffic, the OpenFlow
rules strip the VLAN-tag and set the corresponding VXLAN identifier in order to transmit
packets over the physical network. Conversely, for ingress traffic, OpenFlow rules strip the
VXLAN identifier from the received traffic and set the corresponding VLAN-tag.
4.4.3 Integration Into OpenStack
We mainly focus on four components in our implementation: the data collection engine, the
data processing engine, the compliance verification engine and the dashboard and reporting
2This direct connection is an abstraction of a chain of one-to-one connections from the virtual interface
to the br-int. In fact, the tap device is connected to the Linux bridge qbr, which is in turn connected to the
br-int.
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engine. In the following, we describe our implementation details.
Data collection engine. The data collection engine involves several components of Open-
Stack, e.g., Nova and Neutron for collecting audit data from databases and log files, differ-
ent policy files and configuration files from the OpenStack ecosystem, and configurations
from various virtual networking components such as OVS instances in all physical servers
to fully capture the configuration and virtual networks state. We present hereafter different
sources of data along with the current support for auditing offered by OpenStack and the
virtual networking components. Table 4.6 shows some sample data sources. We use dif-
ferent sources including OpenFlow tables extracted from OVS instances in every compute
node, and Nova and Neutron databases:
• OpenStack. We rely on a collection of OpenStack databases, that can be read us-
ing component-specific APIs. For instance, in Nova database, table Instance con-
tains information about the project (tenant) and the hosting machine, table Migration
contains migration events’ related information such as the source-compute and the
destination-compute. The Neutron database includes various information such as
port mappings for different virtualization mechanisms.
• OVS. OpenFlow tables and internal OVS databases in different compute nodes con-
stitute another important source of audit data for checking whether there exists any
discrepancy between the actual distributed configuration at the implementation layer
and the OpenStack view.
For the sake of comprehensiveness in the data collection process, we firstly check fields
of a variety of log files available in OpenStack, different configuration files and all Nova
and Neutron database tables. We also debug configurations of all OVS instances distributed
over the compute nodes using various OVS’s utilities. Mainly, we recovered ports’ con-
figurations (e.g., ports and their corresponding VLAN tags) from the integration bridges
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Relations Sources of Data
IsRunningOn Table Instances in Nova database
IsAssignedSeg Table ml2 network segments in Neutron database
IsMappedToSeg Table neworkconnections in Neutron database
IsConnectedTovNet Table Instances in Nova database
HasPort OVS instances located at various compute nodes,
br int configuration
IsAssignedVLAN OVS instances located at various compute nodes,
br int configuration
IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS OVS instances located at various compute nodes,
br tun OpenFlow tables
V MRunningOn OVS instances located at various compute nodes,
br int configuration
SWRunningOn The infrastructure deployment
IsConnectedOnPort OVS instances located at various compute nodes,
br int configuration
HasMapping OVS instances located at various compute nodes
IsAssociatedWith OVS instances located at various compute nodes
IsRelatedTo OVS instances located at various compute nodes
Table 4.6: Sample data sources in OpenStack and Open vSwitch
using the utility ovs-vsctl show, and we extracted VLAN-VXLAN mappings form
the tunneling bridges’ OpenFlow tables using ovs-ofctl dump-flows. The tunnel-
ing bridge maintains a chain of OpenFlow tables for handling ingress and egress traffic. In
order to recover the appropriate data, we identify the pertinent tables where to collect the
VLAN-VXLAN mappings from. Through this process, we identify all possible types of
data, their sources and their relevance to the audited properties.
Data processing engine. The data processing engine, which is implemented in Python and
Bash scripts, mainly retrieves necessary information from the collected data according to
the targeted properties, recovers correlation from various sources, eliminates redundancies,
converts it into appropriate formats, and finally generates the source code for Sugar.
• Firstly, based on the properties, our plug-in identifies the involved relations. The
relations’ instances are either fetched directly from the collected data such as the
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support of the relation BelongsTo, or recovered after correlation, as in the case of
the relation IsConnectedTovNet.
• Secondly, our processing plug-in formats each group of data as an n-tuple, i.e.,
(resource, tenant), (ovs, port, vlan), etc.
• Finally, our plug-in uses the n-tuples to generate the portions of Sugar’s source code,
and append the code with the variable declarations, relationships and predicates for
each security property.
Checking consistent topology isolation in virtualized environments requires consider-
ing configurations generated by virtualization technologies at various levels, and checking
that mappings are properly maintained over different layers. OpenStack maintains tenants’
provisioned resources but does not maintain overlay details of the actual implementation.
Conversely, current virtualization technologies do not allow mapping VMs, networks and
traffic details to their owners. Therefore, we map virtual topology details at the implemen-
tation level to the corresponding tenant’s network to check whether isolation is achieved
at this level. Here are examples of mappings to provide per-tenant evidences for resources
and layer 2 virtual network isolation. Figure 4.7 relates relations of property P9 along with
some of their data support to their respective data sources.
• At the OpenStack level, tenants’ VMs are connected to networks through subnets
and virtual ports. Therefore, we correlate data collected from Insatances Nova table
to recover a direct connection between VMs and their connecting networks at the
centralized view through the relation IsConnectTovNet. We also keep track of
their owners.
• At the virtualization layer, networks are identified only through their VXLAN identi-
fiers. We map each network’s segment identifier recovered from OpenStack (Neutron
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Database) to the VXLAN identifier collected from OVS instances (br tun Open-
Flow tables) to be able to map each established flow to the corresponding networks
and tenants. Furthermore, for each physical server, we assign VMs to the ports that
they are connected to through the relation IsConnectOnPort, and we assign ports
to their respective VLAN-tags through the relation IsAssignedVLAN from the
configurations details recovered from br-int configuration in OVS.
• At the OpenStack level, ports are directly mapped to segment identifiers, whereas at
the OVS level, ports are mapped to VLAN-tags and mappings between the VLAN-
tags and VXLAN identifiers are maintained in OpenFlow tables distributed over
multiple OVS instances. To overcome this limit, we devised a script that recovers
mappings between VLAN-tags and the VXLAN identifiers from the flow tables in
br-tun using the ovs-ofctl command line tool. Then, it recovers mappings be-






















Figure 4.7: Mapping of relations involved in property P9 to their data sources
Depending on the properties to be checked, our data processing engine encodes the
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involved instances of the virtualized infrastructure model as CSP variables with their do-
mains definitions, where instances are values within the corresponding domain. The CSP
code mainly consists of four parts:
• Variable and domain declaration. We define different entities and their respective
domains. For example, TENANT is defined as a finite domain ranging over integer
such that (domain TENANT 0 max tenant is a declaration of a domain of tenants,
where the values are between 0 and max tenant.
• Relation declaration. We define relations over variables and provide their sup-
ports (instances) from the audit data. Relations between entities and their instances
are encoded as relation constraints and their supports, respectively. For example,
HasRunningVM is encoded as a relation, with a support as follows:(relation
HasRunningVM 2 (supports (vm1,t1) (vm2,t2))), where the sup-
port of this relation (e.g., (vm1, t1)) will be fetched and pre-processed in the data
processing step.
• Constraint declaration. We define the negation of each property in terms of predi-
cates over the involved relations to obtain a counter-example in case of a violation.
• Body. We combine different predicates based on the properties to verify using
Boolean operators.
Compliance Verification. The compliance verification engine performs the verification of
the properties by feeding the generated code to Sugar. Finally, Sugar provides the results
on whether the properties hold or not. It also provides evidence in case of non-compliance.
Example 4.7. In this example, we discuss how our auditing framework can detect the vio-
lation of the virtual links inconsistency caused by the inter-compute node isolation breach
described in Example 4.4.
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Firstly, our program collects data from different sources. Then, the processing en-
gine correlates and converts the collected data and represents it as tuples; for an exam-
ple: (18045 6100 21) (6100 512) reflect the current configuration at the infras-
tructure management level, and (18045 1 21) (1 21 100) (1 100 256) cor-
respond to a given network’s configuration at the implementation level, where VM Bapp1:
18045, VM 21: 18045, vNet B: 6100, seg 512: 512, vPort 21: 21,
OVS 1: 1, Port 21: 21, VLAN 100: 100, vxlan 1×100: 256. Addition-
ally, the processing engine interprets each property and generates the associated Sugar
source code (see Listing 4.1 for an excerpt of the code) using processed data and trans-
lated properties. Finally, Sugar is used to verify the security properties.
The predicate P9 for verifying virtual link consistency evaluates to true if there exists
a discrepancy between the network VM Bapp1 is connected to according to the infras-
tructure management view, and the layer 2 virtual network VM Bapp1 is effectively con-
nected to at the implementation level. In our case, the predicate evaluates to true since
vxlan0×100 6=seg 512 (as detailed in Example 4.6), meaning that VM Bapp1 is con-
nected on the wrong layer 2 virtual network.
Listing 4.1: Sugar Source Code
1 / / D e c l a r a t i o n
2 ( domain iVM 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ) ( domain OVS 0 4 0 0 ) ( domain PORT 0 100000)
3 ( domain VLAN 0 10000) ( domain VXLAN 0 1 0 0 0 0 ) ( doamin vVM 0 100000)
4 ( domain VNET 0 10000) ( domain SEGMENT 0 1 0 0 0 0 ) ( domain VPORT 0 100000)
5 ( i n t vm1 iVM) ( i n t vm2 vVM) ( i n t sw OVS) ( i n t p PORT ) ( i n t v l a n VLAN)
6 ( i n t v x l a n VXLAN) ( i n t v n e t VNET) ( i n t seg SEGMENT) ( i n t vp VPORT)
7 / / R e l a t i o n s d e c l a r a t i o n s and a u d i t d a t a a s t h e i r s u p p o r t from t h e
8 i n f r a s t r u c t u r e manangement l e v e l
9 ( r e l a t i o n I sCo n n ec ted To v Ne t 3 ( s u p p o r t s (18045 6100 2 1 )
10 (18037 6150 7 8 9 5 ) (1 8 0 3 8 6120 2566) ( 18039 6230 554)
11 (18040 6230 4 7 7 1 ) ) )
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12 ( r e l a t i o n I s A s s i g n e d S e g 2 ( s u p p o r t s (6150 3 5 6 ) (6 1 2 0 4 8 5 ) (6 2 3 0 265)
13 (6100 5 1 2 ) (6 2 8 5 5 8 4 ) (6 2 8 4 2 5 7 ) ) )
14 / / R e l a t i o n s d e c l a r a t i o n s and a u d i t d a t a a s t h e i r s u p p o r t from t h e
15 i m p l e m e n t a t i o n l e v e l
16 ( r e l a t i o n I s C o n n e c t e d O n P o r t 3 ( s u p p o r t s ( ( ( 1 8 0 4 5 1 2 1 ) (1 8 0 3 7 96 2 3 )
17 (18046 65 3 2 ) (1 8 0 4 0 68 8 5 6 9 ) (1 8 0 4 7 7 8 9 5 4 ) )
18 ( r e l a t i o n IsAssignedVLAN 3 ( s u p p o r t s (9 2 13 4 1 ) ( 9 2 14 4 2 ) ( 8 5 38 1 1 ) ) )
19 ( r e l a t i o n IsMAppedToVXLANOnOVS 3 ( s u p p o r t s (1 100 2 5 6 ) ( 9 2 6018 9 )
20 (9 2 6019 1 0 ) ) )
21 / / S e c u r i t y p r o p e r t i e s e x p r e s s e d i n t e r m s o f p r e d i c a t e s o v e r r e l a t i o n
22 c o n s t r a i n t s
23 ( p r e d i c a t e ( P vm1 vm2 v n e t seg v x l a n sw p vp )
24 ( and ( I s C o n n e c t e d O n P o r t vm1 sw p ) ( IsAssignedVLAN sw p v l a n )
25 ( IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS sw v l a n v x l a n ) ( I sCo n n ec ted To v Ne t vm2 v n e t vp )
26 ( I s A s s i g n e d S e g v n e t seg ) ( eq vm1 vm2 ) ( n o t ( eq seg v x l a n ) ) ) )
27 / / The body
28 ( P vm1 vm2 v n e t seg v x l a n sw p vp )
Understanding Violations Through Evidences. As explained in Section 4.3.3, we define
constraints using the negative form of properties’ predicates. Thus, if a solution satisfying
the constraint is provided by the CSP solver, then the latter solution is a set of variable
values that make the negation of the predicates evaluate to true. Those values indicate the
relation instances (system data) that are at the origin of the violation, however, they might
be unintelligible to the end users. Therefore, we replace the variables’ numerical values by
their high-level identifiers, which would help admins identify the root cause of the violation
and fix it eventually.
Example 4.8. From Example 4.7, the CSP solver concludes that the negative form of the
property is satisfied, which indicates the existence of a violation. Furthermore, the CSP
solver outputs the following variable values as an evidence: vm1=18045, vm2=18045,
vnet=6100, seg=512, vxlan=100, sw=1, p=21, vp=21. To make the evidence
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easier to interpret, we replace the value 6100 of the variable vnet by vNet B, the value
18045 of the variable vm2 by VM Bapp1 and the value 21 of the variable vp by vp 21.
Using this information, the admin will conclude that VM Bapp1 is connected to another
Tenant Alpha’s layer 2 virtual network at the implementation level identified through
VXLAN 0×100.
Dashboard and Reporting Engine. We further implement the web interface (i.e., dash-
board) in PHP to place verification requests and display verification reports. In the dash-
board, tenant admins are initially allowed to select different standards (e.g., ISO 27017,
CCM V3.0.1, NIST 800-53, etc.). Afterwards, security properties under the selected stan-
dards can be chosen. Once the verification request is placed, the summarized verification
results are shown in the verification report page. The details of any violation with a list of
evidences are also provided.
4.4.4 Integration Into OpenStack Congress
To demonstrate the service agnostic nature of our framework, we further integrate our sys-
tem with the OpenStack Congress service [38]. Congress implements policy as a service
in OpenStack in order to provide governance and compliance for dynamic infrastructures.
Congress can integrate third party verification tools using a data source driver mechanism
[38]. Using Congress policy language that is based on Datalog, we define several tenant
specific security policies. Then, we use our processed data to detect those security proper-
ties for multiple tenants. The outputs of the data processing engine is provided as input for
Congress to be asserted by the policy engine. This allows integrating compliance status for
some policies whose verification is not yet supported by Congress.
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4.5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the scalability of our approach by measuring the response time
of the verification task as well as the CPU and memory consumption for different cloud
sizes and in different scenarios (a breach violating some properties or no breach).
4.5.1 Experimental Setting
We set up a real environment including 5 tenants, 10 virtual networks each having 2 sub-
nets, 10 routers and 100 VMs. We utilize OpenStack Mitaka with one controller and three
compute nodes running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. The controller is empowered with two Intel
Xeon E3-1271 CPU and 4GB of memory. Each compute node benefits from one CPU and
2GB of memory. To further stress the verification engine and assess the scalability of our
solution, we generated a simulated environment including up to 6k virtual networks and
60K VMs with the ratio of 10 VMs per virtual network. As a back-end verification tool,
we use the CSP solver Sugar V2.2.1 [84]. All the verification experiments are run on an
Amazon EC2 C4.Large Ubuntu 16.04 machine (2 vCPU and 3.75GB of memory).
4.5.2 Results
We consider for the experiments three properties from table 4.1, where each is selected
from one of the three categories defined therein:
• Mapping unicity virtual networks-segments (P1), which is a topology isolation prop-
erty checked at the infrastructure management level.
• Mapping unicity VLANs-VXLANs (P5), which is a topology isolation property checked
at the implementation level.
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• Virtual links consistency (P9), which checks that a VM is connected to the right
VXLAN at the implementation level.
In the first set of experiments, we design two configuration scenarios to study different
response times in two possible cases: presence of violations and absence of violations. This
is because the verification of these two scenarios is expected to have different response
times due to the time required to find the evidence of the violation.
In the first scenario, we implement in our environment a configuration of the virtual
infrastructure where none of the studied properties are violated. In the second scenario, we
implement the topology isolation attack described in Example 4.4. For the latter scenario,
as generally, a fast yes or no answer on the compliance status of the system is required
by the auditor, we only consider the response time to report evidence for the first breach.
Note that we do not report the average response time to find all compliance breaches as this
depends on the number of breaches, their percentage to the total input size and their distri-
bution in the audit information. Meanwhile, as the real life scenarios can dramatically vary
from one environment to another, we cannot use any average number, percentage or distri-
bution of compliance breaches applying to all possible use cases. Therefore, we present in
Figure 4.8, the verification time for no security breach detected (left side chart) and the ver-
ification time to report non-compliance and provide evidence for the first security breach
(right side chart) for different datasets varying from 5K up to 60K VMs. Note that, we
implement the attack scenario of topology isolation described in Example 4.4 by randomly
modifying some VLAN ports and VLAN to VXLAN mappings.
As indicated in the left chart of Figure 4.8, the time required for verifying P1 and P5,
where there is no breach, is 0.6s and 4.5s, respectively, for the largest dataset of 60K VMs.
The verification time for those properties increases linearly and smoothly when the size of
the cloud infrastructure increases and there is no breach. However, the verification time
for property P9 is 102s for 30k VMs and 581s for 60k VMs. The difference in response
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Mappings unicity virtual networks-segments (P1) 
Mapping unicity VLANs-VXLANs (P5)
Virtual links consistency (P9)
Figure 4.8: Verification time as a function of the number of VMs for properties P1, P5, and
P9: (left side) time to report no breach of compliance, and (right side) time to find the first
breach and build evidence of non-compliance
time for P9 is justified as the latter is more complex than other properties and involves
more relations and thus larger input data. Later in this section, we will show how one can
decrease the response time for the verification of P9 to get more acceptable boundaries.
According to Figure 4.8 (right side chart), the time required to find the first breach and
build the supporting evidence for each one of the three properties remains under 5s for the
largest dataset, which is two orders of magnitude smaller than the time required to assert
compliance for the entire system. The time required to find the first breach, depends on
several factors such as the predicates affected by the breach and the location of the breach
in the input file. However, the latter response time is always shorter than the time required
for asserting the compliance of the system.
The left side chart of Figure 4.9 reports CPU consumption percentage as a function of
the datasets’ size, up to 60k VMs. For the largest dataset, the peak CPU usage reaches
50% for P9 and does not exceed 25% for P1. Also, the highest memory usage observed
does not exceed 8% for P9 verification (see the right chart of Figure 4.9), and 3.3% for the
largest dataset for P5. It is worthy to note that these amounts of CPU/memory usage are
not monopolized during the whole verification time and they represent the peek usage. We
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Figure 4.9: CPU (left side) and memory (right side) usage to verify no-compliance breach
for properties P1, P5 and P9
therefore remark the low cost on CPU and memory for our approach.
In our second set of experiments, since Sugar supports several SAT solvers, we run
Sugar with different SAT solvers to investigate which option provides a better response
time, particularly for property P9. According to Figure 4.10, Treengling solver provides
the longest response time with 900s for a 30k VMs dataset, whereas Minisat provides
the best response time with 102s. All previously reported verification results in the other
experiments were obtained using Minisat.
In our third set of experiments, we investigate the parameters that affect the re-
sponse time, particularly in the case of complex security properties such as P9. To this
end, we consistently split the data supports for the relations IsConnectedToVnet
and IsAssignedSeg of P9 over multiple CSP files (up to 16 files), and re-
peated the supports for the relations IsConnectedOnPort, IsAssignedVLAN and
IsMappedToVXLANOnOVS to maintain data interdependency.
Figure 4.11 reports the response times for the parallel verification of different CSP sub-
instances of P9 using multiple processing nodes for the largest dataset (60K VMs). By
splitting the data support into two CSP files, the verification time already decreases from
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Minisat Riss Plingeling Lingeling Treengling
Figure 4.10: Verification time using different SAT solvers for P9 as a function of the num-
ber of VMs: (left side) time to report no breach of compliance, and (right side) time to find
the first breach and build evidence of non-compliance
581s to 168s (i.e., a factor of improvement of 71%), whereas it decreases up to 4.6s when
splitting the data over 16 CSP sub-instance files.
Based on this last experiment, we can conclude that splitting the input data for the same
property to be verified using parallel instances of CSP solvers can improve the response
time. However, this should be performed while considering the dependency between dif-
ferent relations and their supports in the predicate to be solved.
Based on those results, we conclude that our solution provides acceptable response
time for auditing security isolation in the cloud, particularly, in the case of off-line auditing.
While the verification of simple properties is scalable for large cloud virtual infrastructures,
response time for complex properties involving large input data can induce more delays
that can be still acceptable for auditing after the fact. However, response time for those
properties can be considerably improved by splitting their CSP instance into sub-instances
involving smaller amounts of data to be checked in parallel. Note that our analysis holds
for the specific scenario where security properties are expressed as constraints defined as
logical operations over relations, which is only a subset of possible constraints that can be
offered by the CSP solver Sugar (the complete set of constraints supported by Sugar can
93
1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16












Figure 4.11: Verification time as function of the number of processing nodes for P9 for a
dataset of 60k VMs, where each processing node verifies a separate CSP sub-instance of
P9
be found in [97]). Expressing new security properties with other kinds of constraints may
require performance to be reassessed through new experiments.
4.6 Discussion
The experimental results presented in the previous section show that CSP solvers can be
used for off-line auditing verification with acceptable response time and scalability in case
of moderate size of data. Our results also show that for properties handling larger datasets,
we need to decompose the verification of the properties over smaller chunks of data to
improve the response time. Additionally, we explore a parallel processing approach to
improve the response time for very large datasets. Note that the response time can be
further improved to achieve on-line auditing by improving the performance of the CSP-
solving phase [98], which is an interesting future direction.
94
Model
Entities OpenStack AWS-EC2-VPC GCP Microsoft Azure VMware vCD
VM Instance EC2 instance VM instance Azure VM VM
vNet Network Virtual private
cloud
Auto mode vpc
Custom mode vpc Virtual Network Network
vSubnet Subnet Subnet Subnet Subnet Subnet




vPort Port - - NIC Port/port-group
Segment Network
ID
VPC ID VPC ID Virtual network ID Network ID
Table 4.7: Mapping virtual infrastructure model entities into different cloud platforms
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The abstract views offered by different cloud platforms to tenants are quite similar to
what we propose at the cloud infrastructure management view of our model. For instance,
both Amazon AWS EC2-VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) [11], Google Cloud Platform (GCP)
[12], Microsoft Azure [13] and VMware virtual Cloud Director (vCD) [94] provide tenants
with the capability to create virtual network components as software abstractions, enabling
to provision virtual networks. Therefore, our model can capture the main virtual compo-
nents that are common to most of the IaaS management systems with minor changes. Table
4.7 maps the entities of our infrastructure management view model to their counterparts in
the cloud platforms cited above.
Eucalyptus [99] is an open source IaaS management system. The Eucalyptus virtual
private cloud (VPC) is implemented with MidoNet [100], an open-source network virtual-
ization platform. In the same fashion as OpenStack Neutron, Eucalyptus MidoNet supports
virtualization mechanisms such as VLAN and VXLAN to implement large scale layer 2 vir-
tual networks spanning over the cloud infrastructure. Therefore, our implementation layer
model can be applied to Eucalyptus implementations with minor changes.
However, implementation details may significantly vary between different platforms.
Furthermore, cloud providers typically do not disclose their implementation details to their
customers. Therefore, the implementation layer of our model along with the extracted
properties might need to be revised according to the implementation details of each cloud
deployment if those are provided. However, this needs to be done only once before initial-
izing the compliance auditing process.
Our current solution is designed for the specific OpenStack virtual layer 2 implemen-
tation mainly relying on VLAN and VXLAN as well-established network virtualization
technologies, and OVS as a widely used virtual switch implementation. However, as we
use high-level abstractions to represent virtual layer 2 connectivity and tunneling technolo-
gies, we believe that our approach remains applicable in case of other overlay technologies
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such as GRE. In small to medium clouds, where VLAN tags are sufficient to implement
all layer 2 virtual networks on top of the physical network, our implementation model is
simplified and the security properties related to the mapping between VLAN and VXLAN
can be skipped.
Among the main advantages of using a CSP solver for the verification is that it allows
to integrate new audit properties with a minor effort. In our case, including a new property
consists of expressing it in FOL and identifying the audit data it should be checked against.
These properties can be modified at any stage of the cloud life cycle and their verification
or not can be decided depending on the cloud deployment offering (e.g., public or private
cloud).
In this work, we extracted a set of security properties from specific domains in rel-
evant cloud security standards that are mainly related to infrastructure virtualization and
tenants’ networks isolation (e.g., Infrastructure Virtualization Systems domain from CCM,
and Segregation in Networks section from ISO27017). Thus, our list of implemented se-
curity properties is not meant to exhaustively cover the entire security standards. Covering
other security control classes for the standards requires extracting new sets of security prop-
erties to be modeled and formalized. However, as we handle general concepts for modeling
different virtual resources, we believe that our approach can be generalized to other security
properties to support the entire security standards.
Finally, through this work, we show the applicability and the benefit of our formal
approach in verifying security properties while providing evidences to assist admins find-
ing the root causes of violations. As discussed in this section, we believe our high-level
abstractions-based model can be easily mapped to different cloud platforms. However,
the model needs to be adapted to support those different cloud platforms’ implementation
details, and augmented to support new security properties.
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4.7 Summary
Auditing compliance of the cloud with respect to security standards faces several chal-
lenges. In this work, we proposed an automated off-line auditing approach while focusing
on verifying network isolation between tenants’ virtual networks in OpenStack-managed
cloud at layer 2 and overlay. As shown in this work, the layered nature of the cloud stack
and the dependencies between layers make existing approaches that separately verify each
single layer ineffective. To this end, we devised a model that captures for each cloud-stack
layer, namely the infrastructure management and the implementation layers, the virtual
network entities along with their inter-dependencies and their isolation mechanisms. The
model helped in identifying the relevant data for auditing network isolation and capturing
its underlying semantics across multiple layers. Furthermore, we devised a set of concrete
security properties related to consistent network isolation on virtual layer 2 and overlay net-
works to fill the gap between the standards and the low level data. To provide a reliable and
evidence-based auditing, we encoded properties and data as a set of constraints satisfac-
tion problems and used an off-the-shelf CSP solver to identify compliance breaches. Our
approach furthermore pinpoints the roots of breaches enabling remediation. Additionally,
we reported real-life experience and challenges faced when trying to integrate auditing and
compliance verification into OpenStack. We further conducted experiments to demonstrate
the applicability of our approach. Our evaluation results show that formal methods can be
successfully applied for large data centers with a reasonable overhead.
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Chapter 5
QuantiC: Distance Metrics for
Evaluating Multi-Tenancy Threats in
Public Cloud
5.1 Introduction
Multi-tenancy of the cloud is a double edged sword. On one side, the economic gain
fulfilled through resource sharing constitutes one of the most appealing cloud advantages
that attract prospective customers. On the other side, the security challenges driven by
multi-tenancy and the associated risks [101] constitute some of the main concerns that are
holding back the migration of critical applications to cloud.
In fact, the proximity with the victim can be exploited by malicious cloud users to
mount several attacks. In Table 5.1, we roughly classify those attacks into two categories
according to the required proximity (the list of attacks is not meant to be exhaustive; other,
including future or unknown, attacks may also fit into those categories). When an attacker
shares the same host with the targeted victim, (s)he can launch type I attacks (e.g., side
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channel attacks[15]), whereas type II attacks (e.g., power attack [102]) can be mounted
when resources are shared with the victim at higher levels of the cloud infrastructure, (e.g.,
rack-level). Successful attacks may affect security properties of both victim’s virtual ma-
chines (VMs) and their generated network flows at various levels of the hierarchy. As an
example, recent works have demonstrated the feasibility of real-life attacks conducted in
commercial clouds including Amazon EC2, aiming at forcing malicious VMs to be placed
within a specific zone, which could be a host, a rack or a larger scale area inside the cloud
data center [28, 29].
Today’s cloud service providers (CSPs) are well aware of such multi-tenancy-related
threats, and they are often under obligation to protect their tenants against such threats,
either as part of the service level agreements or to demonstrate compliance with security
standards (e.g., CCM 3.0.1 [7]). Nonetheless, addressing multi-tenancy threats remains a
challenging issue. First of all, completely avoiding multi-tenancy is certainly impractical
since it reduces the financial benefit, which is an important factor to cloud adoption. Alter-
natively, enabling resource sharing naturally implies a degree of exposure to multi-tenancy
threats. A mid-way solution for the CSP would be to balance between the security impli-
cations and the economic benefits of resource sharing. In this respect, evaluating multi-
tenancy threats based on the proximity between tenants sharing the same cloud constitutes
a valuable means towards reaching an optimum trade-off between tolerated risks and costs
according to negotiated contracts.
Particularly, existing approaches (e.g., [63, 103]) propose metrics to evaluate the overall
cloud security risk based on vulnerabilities in cloud deployments (a detailed review of the
related work is given in Section 2.3.2). Nonetheless, none of them provides the potential
impact at tenant-level according to the degree of resource sharing. Furthermore, those
works focus only on the multi-tenancy threat related to type I attacks, while evaluating the




Cloud Inf. Levels Targeted Resources Targeted Sec. Prop.
Host only Different Levels Compute Network C I A
Type I
Side channel attacks [15] • • •
Host-based DoS attack [104] • • • •
SDN-based freeloading attack [105] • • • •
Type II
Power attacks [102] • • • •
Bandwidth attack [106] • • •
Resource abuse [107] • • •
Table 5.1: Multi-tenancy attacks, their scopes, targeted resources and the affected security properties, namely, confidentiality (C),
integrity (I) and availability (A)
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes multi-level metrics to
quantify the distance between tenants’ virtual infrastructures in an SDN-based cloud, as a
means to evaluate the multi-tenancy threats related to both type I and type II attacks and
assess the corresponding risk per tenant. Specifically, the main contributions of this work
are as follows.
• We devise a multi-level model capturing tenants’ virtual infrastructures deployment
inside SDN-based cloud.
• We propose novel metrics, namely, physical, compute and network distances, to
quantify the multi-tenancy threat in an SDN-based cloud.
• We present three case studies based on both a real cloud and fictitious clouds. The
first and second case studies show how our metrics correlate with the two types of
multi-tenancy attacks. In the third case study, we implement our metrics in Open-
Stack and show how they can be used to define the CSP’s compliance with tenants’
distance requirements.
5.2 Models
In the following, we discuss our threat model, and present the running example and the
cloud infrastructure model.
5.2.1 Threat Model
In this study, we assume that tenants do not have any prior knowledge on the identities of
other tenants hosted inside the same cloud. Our in-scope attacks include any multi-tenancy
attacks that require an adversary to share resources with the victim tenant at multiple levels





















Figure 5.1: An example demonstrating the physical distance between tenants’ virtual in-
frastructures, where VM A1,.., VM A5 belong to tenant tA and VM B1,.., VM B5 belong to
tenant tB
Consequently, we assume the information collected from the cloud infrastructure manage-
ment system to calculate our metrics are trusted.
Our metrics are meant for evaluating the multi-tenancy threats against the in-scope
attacks, and they are not designed to detect such attacks, identify the malicious tenant, or
pinpoint the vulnerabilities. In fact, our metrics can be applied without any prior knowledge
of the attacker’s identity (unlike [61]). Thus, our metrics are complementary to other attack-
specific security solutions, e.g., attack detection and vulnerability analysis.
5.2.2 Running Example
In Figure 5.1, tenant tA shares the same data center with many other tenants (to better
illustrate the case, we consider an exemplary tenant tB). Assume the CSP wants to evaluate
the impact of potential type I and type II multi-tenancy attacks depicted in Table 5.1 against
tA. Based on the deployment in Figure 5.1, the CSP can make the following observations:
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• None of tA’s VMs are co-located with tB at the host-level, therefore, it is unlikely for
tB to perform type I attacks (e.g., side channel attacks [15]) against tA’s VMs, or to
abuse their network flows (e.g., freeloading attack [105]).
• Although launching type I attacks is out of tB’s reach, a closer look reveals that tA
is still under the risk of type II attacks that take advantage of the shared infrastruc-
ture at higher levels without requiring host-level co-residency. For example, tB can
perform power attack [102] at Rack11 using VM B1 and VM B2 to disturb services
running at VM A1 and VM A2 located at the same rack. This attack also disturbs the
communication of VM A1 and VM A2 with VM A3, VM A4 and VM A5 located at
Rack22.
• Furthermore, VM A3, VM A4 and VM A5, that are located in a different rack and pod
than tB, are less exposed to type II attacks since their physical distance with respect
to tB is larger than the physical distance of VM A1 and VM A2 with respect to the
same tenant (Phy D2 > Phy D1).
The above observations intuitively show the correlation between measuring distances
between tenants’ virtual infrastructures and evaluating the degree of exposure to multi-
tenancy threats at different levels of the shared cloud infrastructure.
5.2.3 Multi-Level Cloud Infrastructure Model
To measure the distance between tenants, we derive an entity-relationship model that cap-
tures tenants’ virtual infrastructure elements, the cloud infrastructure elements and their
relationships. Figure 5.2 illustrates such a model. The cloud physical infrastructure in-
cludes servers and switches that are hierarchically structured in different management




























Figure 5.2: Multi-level cloud infrastructure model capturing tenants’ virtual infrastructures,
the physical infrastructure and their mapping. Note that the presented three-tiered network
hierarchy is shared by most cloud data center topologies [108]
A Tenant’s virtual infrastructure consists of a set of VMs and their connecting virtual net-
works (vNet). Tenants’ VMs are located at compute services running inside hosts. VMs are
connected to vNets that are typically implemented using flowspaces constituted of a set of
OpenFlow rules [96] segregated with flow tags1. These rules are configured in some phys-
ical and virtual switches in different levels of the hierarchy to enable the communication
between VMs. We use FSvNet to denote the cloud-wide flowspace of vNet, FS ivNet to denote
the flowspace of vNet at Level i, and FS swi jvNet to denote a flowspace in a given switch swi j at
Level i.
On the right side of Figure 5.2, we define four physical levels (Level 0 to Level 3)
where tenants’ virtual infrastructures (depicted on the left side of Figure 5.2) might be
located. As detailed later in Section 5.3, we use those levels to define our distance metrics.
In the following, we provide the formal definition for the multi-level cloud infrastructure
model.
Definition 1 (Multi-Level Cloud Infrastructure Model). We define the cloud infrastructure
1A flow tag is a special match field in OpenFlow rules that enables to segregate flow rules belonging to
different virtual networks
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model as an array −−→CIn f of dimension four, where CIn f [i].zone and CIn f [i].switch are
respectively the sets of zones and switches at Level i (0≤ i≤ 3).
Example 5.1. Figure 5.3 illustrates an instance of the aforementioned multi-level cloud
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Figure 5.3: An instance of the multi-level cloud infrastructure model capturing a subset of
the deployment of Figure 5.1
excerpt of the OpenFlow table in Edg11 shows the co-residency of the flow rules belong-
ing to vNet A (i.e., r1 and r2) and vNet B (i.e., r3). Specifically, VM A1 and VM A2 of
tA located at Rack11 communicate with VM A3, VM A4 and VM A5 (not shown for space
limitation) located at Rack22 through vNet A. Similarly, VM B1 located at Rack11 commu-
nicates with VM B5 located at Rack12 through vNet B. Those communications are made
possible through flowspaces installed inside Edg11, Agg11 and other switches in the topol-
ogy depending on the location of the communicating VMs. Since VM A1 and VM A2 of tA
co-reside with VM B1 at Rack11, the flowspaces governing their flows will inevitably share
Edg11 at the rack-level and possibly Agg11 at the pod-level.
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5.3 Multi-Tenancy Distance Metrics
We first define the multi-level physical distance between a pair of tenants to capture their
symmetric distance based on the level of physical resource sharing, then we refine this
distance along the compute and network dimensions to quantify their asymmetric distances
based on their virtual infrastructures’ deployment.
5.3.1 Physical Distance
The physical distance captures the symmetric relationship between a pair of tenants in
terms of the levels of shared resources. We define this distance between two tenants’ virtual
infrastructures (VMs and their flowspaces) as a four-dimensional vector Dφ , where Diφ = 0
(resp. Diφ = 1) means Level i is (not) shared. We provide an illustrative example followed
by the formal definition.
Example 5.2. In Figure 5.3, VMs of tenant tA do not co-locate in the same hosts at Level 0
with the VMs of tenant tB, their physical distance at Level 0 is therefore D0φ = 1. However,
VM A1 and VM A2 share Rack11 at Level 1 with VM B1 and VM B2, and since manage-
ment zones are nested, it follows that all the upper levels of the cloud infrastructure are
also shared. Additionally, the flowspaces associated with vNet A and vNet B share Edg11
at Level 1 and Agg11 at Level 2. Thus, the physical distance between the two tenants can
be quantified using the vector (1,0,0,0).
Let t and t ′ be two tenants hosted at the cloud data center. The virtual infrastructure
belonging to tenant t (resp. tenant t ′) is composed of a set of VMs, V Ms (resp. VM′s)
connected to vNet (resp. vNet’), where FSivNet (resp. FSivNet’) is the associated flowspace at
a given Level i (0 ≤ i ≤ 3). We define the set of shared zones between t and t ′ at Level i
to be the set of zones that are simultaneously accommodating at least one VM belonging
to tenant t and one VM belonging to tenant t ′. We denote it szi {V Ms,VM′s}. We similarly
107
define the set of shared switches between t and t ′ at Leveli to be the set of switches on





. We define the symmetric physical distance between the pair
of tenants {t, t ′} as follows:





the sets of shared zones and switches between t and t ′ at Level i. Then, their physical
distance is given by the four dimensional vector Dφ {t, t ′}, where the values of its elements















The compute distance is an asymmetric distance that captures the degree of exposure of a
tenant t’s VMs to another tenant t ′.
Example 5.3. From Example 5.2 we have Dφ {tA, tB}= (1,0,0,0). VM A1 and VM A2 of
tA share Rack11 with tB’s VMs, while VM A3, VM A4 and VM A5 share the cloud infras-
tructure with tB at Level 3 only, which corresponds to the data center. Consequently, the
compute distance for tA with respect to tB at Level 1 and Level 2 is the fraction of VMs
that do not share the same racks and pods, which is 3/5. Hence, the multi-level compute
distance for tenant tA with respect to tB is (1,3/5,3/5,0).
More formally, we define the average compute distance of tenant t with respect to tenant






Diφ {t, t ′} if szi {VMs,VM′s}= /0
∑z∈CIn f [i].zone\szi{V Ms,V M′s} |V M
z
s∩V Ms|
|V Ms|×|szi{V Ms,V M′s}|
Otherwise
We consider the average distance because the more the shared zones the higher the risk
related to multi-tenancy attacks would be, as will be discussed in Section 5.4.1. Note that
when all tenants’ VMs are deployed inside the same data center, D3ς is always equal to zero.
flowspaces
5.3.3 Network Distance
By analogy to the compute distance, the network distance is also an asymmetric distance
that captures the degree of exposure of a specific tenant’s network resources with respect
to another tenant.
Example 5.4. The OpenFlow rules depicted in Figure 5.3 have six match fields, source/des-
tination MAC, source/destination IP and source/destination port, in addition to the flow-
tag. The bit sequence composing those match fields can be either a wildcard or an exact-
match, i.e., fixed to zero or to one, where rules with more wildcarded bits define larger
flows. Since sharing more flows with other tenants increases the risk of network isola-
tion breaches (e.g., freeloading attacks [105]) and unavailability (e.g., bandwidth attack
[106]), we quantify the network distance of vNet A with respect to vNet B based on the size
of flowspaces that are not sharing the same switches. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, a case of
co-residency for the flowspaces of vNet A and vNet B is reported at Level 1 in Edg11. In
the latter switch, both flow rules r1 and r2 have all the match fields as exact match, mean-
ing that each rule handles a flow composed of one packet only. Since not all flowspaces
can be shown for space limitation, we assume that the flow size of vNet A at Edg11 is equal
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to 10, and that its total flow size at Level 1 is 16. Then, the network distance at this level
is D1η = (16− 10)/16. Additionally, if we assume that all vNet A flowspaces are shared
with vNet B at both Level 2 and Level 3, then the network distance vector for vNet A with
respect to vNet B would be equal to (1,6/16,0,0).
Let ω be the length in terms of bits of an OpenFlow rule match sequence. Similarly
to [32], we abstract away from the meaning associated with each OpenFlow rule’s header
match field, and consider a match sequence to be a sequence of bits defined over {0,1,∗}ω ,
where * is the wildcard symbol. Let ψ be the number of exact match bits of an OpenFlow
rule r, where ψ ≤ ω , and let sizeof( ) be a function that measures the flow size of the
OpenFlow rules. The flow size of r is equal to sizeof(r) = 2ω−ψ . Particularly, the flow
size defined by a rule where all bits in the match sequence are exact match, is equal to
sizeof(r) = 20 = 1 (as ψ = ω). The size of all flowspaces for a given virtual network at
a specific level can be computed by aggregating the size of all OpenFlow rules associated
with it (for simplicity, we assume that OpenFlow rules do not overlap). This is given by
size(FSivNet) = ∑r∈FSivNet sizeo f (r). We define the average network distance between the


















In this section, we illustrate through case studies the applicability of our distances with
both fictitious and real clouds. We also present a quantitative auditing approach based on
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our metrics.
5.4.1 Case Study 1 (Correlation with Multi-Tenancy Attacks)
We consider the fictitious cloud data center illustrated in Figure 5.4, which is constituted
of four pods, eight racks (two racks per pod) and 96 physical servers (12 servers per rack).
This data center is shared by several tenants. For illustrative purposes, we consider four
tenants, namely, tA, tB, tC and tD.
In the following, we show how our physical distance correlates with type I and type
II multi-tenancy attacks (see Table 5.1). The rows of matrix Dφ (tA) hereafter report the
physical distance of tA with respect to tenants, tB (first row), tC (second row) and tD (third
row) based on the deployment of Figure 5.4, where each column represents a physical level




0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0


The following shows how larger physical distances reduce the multi-tenancy threats.
Assume tB, tC and tD are malicious and want to take advantage of the multi-tenancy situa-
tion to launch type I or type II attacks (see Table 5.1) against tA. Based on Table 5.1, we can
discuss the required distance and potential impact for each category of attacks as follows.
• Type I attacks require co-residency with the targeted victim at the same host (e.g.,
side channel attacks [15]). As D0φ {tA, tB} = 0, the only potential risk of this type of
attacks is limited to tenant tB.
• Type II attacks do not necessarily require co-residency at the host-level to succeed.



























































Figure 5.4: An illustrative case study of a cloud data center topology. Physical servers are
named PS xyz, where x is the index of the pod, y is the index of the rack, and z is the index
of the physical server
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less the risk related to those attacks would be. We consider power attack [102] as an
example and similar reasoning can be applied to other type II attacks (e.g., bandwidth
attacks [106]).
The power attack exploits the power over-subscription vulnerability, which consists
of overloading a power supply with more workloads than it supports with the as-
sumption that workloads will never reach their peak simultaneously. If the attacker
succeeds to place many VMs inside a zone (server, rack or a larger zone) alimented
with the same power facility, then he can generate simultaneous power spikes, which
would lead to power outage when the power consumption exceeds the power ca-
pacity for that specific zone. However, the larger the zone attacker is targeting, the
more controlled VMs need to be deployed to increase the power consumption, since
smaller zones converge faster to their peak power2. Based on that and considering
Dφ (tA), we can infer the following:
– If tB or tC launch their attack against Rack11, this would be enough for them to
cause damage to all the resources of tA (VMs and their flows) that are located
at this rack zone, since both tenants share the same rack as the victim.
– However, it is more difficult for tD to affect tA resources since this would require
him to launch this attack at the data center scale (as no racks or pods are shared),
which would require much more effort than for tB or tC.
To show the correlation between the physical distance and the effort required to launch
power attack, we simulated the cloud architecture described in [110], with a number of
tenants’ workloads following an exponential distribution [107]. Power is defined per units,
where each unit power supports one VM. We assume each host has the capability to accom-
modate eight VMs, and the power consumption at higher levels is obtained by summing up
2It has been reported in [109] that racks reach 96% of their peak power, while pods and data centers do
not exceed respectively 86% and 72% of their peak power
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the power consumption of aggregated lower levels. Figure 5.5 reports the effort required
by an attacker at each level of the cloud infrastructure in terms of the number of deployed
VMs and their consumed power.
We observe that launching power attack at Level 0 requires the lowest effort, while
launching the attack at the data center scale requires consuming four orders of magnitude
more energy, which is achieved by deploying more VMs. From this analysis, we can
conclude that larger physical distances reduce the multi-tenancy risk for power attack. In
the next case study, we show with real cloud data, the need for refined distance metrics to
capture the impact of potential multi-tenancy attacks.
5.4.2 Case Study 2 (Real Cloud Data Center)
This case study is based on a real community cloud hosted at a major telecommunication
company. We collect data from part of this cloud composed of 22 hosts organized into two
racks as depicted in Figure 5.6. We perform our study on a dataset composed of 372 VMs
belonging to 37 tenants. The focus of this case study is to show the complex co-residency
relationships between tenants in real world cloud, and therefore, the need for metrics to
measure distances between tenants’ resources. For illustration, we randomly choose three
tenants, t1, t2 and t3. Note that the dimension of our distances is equal to three for this
hierarchy, since the latter is only composed of hosts, access and aggregate layers.
Table 5.2 reports the number of VMs of tenants t1, t2 and t3 inside each physical host of
the considered part of the cloud data center. One can notice that tenants’ VMs are scattered
over multiple physical nodes in both racks. Specifically, t1 has VMs co-residing with both
t2 and t3’s VMs in many different locations. Consequently, the flowspace of t1’s virtual
network co-resides with the flowspaces of t2 and t3 virtual networks at different physical
switches, in addition to the virtual switches running at the physical servers. Due to lack
of space, we only discuss the compute distance. The matrix Dς (t1) reports the compute
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We can infer the following from the compute distances:
• Both t2 and t3 can perform type I attacks against t1 since both are co-residing with the
victim at some physical hosts (Level 0). However, t1 has more VMs sharing the same
hosts as t2, and hence has smaller distance with respect to t2 than t3 (0.005 < 0.049).
Therefore, the impact of t2 attack on t1 VMs will be higher than the impact of t3 attack.
Note that similar reasoning can be applied on the network distances.
• Both t2 and t3 can perform type II attacks either at the rack-level or at the pod-level
as they have many VMs deployed over Rack1 and Rack2. Since the distance of t1 with
respect to t2 is equal to his distance with respect to t3 both at the rack-level (D1ς = 0.5)
and at the pod-level (D2ς = 0), attacks from the two tenants will have similar impact on
t1.
We further evaluate through simulations how the compute distance changes while in-
creasing the cloud data center’s workload and size. As illustrated in Figure 5.7, our compute
distance at Level 0 captures the expected increase in the degree of resource sharing while
increasing the total number of data center’s VMs (see Figure 5.7(a)), and the decrease in
resource sharing while increasing the data center’s size (see Figure 5.7(b)), which shows



























Figure 5.5: (a) Attacker’s requirements, and (b) average attacker’s requirement in terms of
power consumption to disrupt services of a victim at different levels of the cloud infras-

















Figure 5.6: Part of a real cloud data center topology constituted of 22 physical servers
organized into two racks hosting 372 VMs belonging to 37 tenants
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Figure 5.7: Compute distance at Level 0 (a) while increasing the number of data center’s
VMs, and (b) while increasing the number of data center’s hosts
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Racks Rack1 Rack2
Hosts S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22
t1 0 1 0 0 0 4 6 4 4 8 9 4 10 4 6 16 1 4 8 7 2 0
t2 4 0 0 2 0 4 6 12 8 5 4 2 3 6 6 6 1 10 2 0 0 1
t3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Table 5.2: Number of VMs of tenants t1, t2 and t3 insider each physical host in the considered part of the cloud data center
5.4.3 Case Study 3 (Quantitative Auditing)
In this case study, we show how our metrics can be used to quantitatively audit the com-
pliance of deployed virtual infrastructures against tenants’ requirements in terms of the
distance. As a continuity of the case study in Section 5.4.1, we assume that tenant tA’s
security team is aware of the multi-tenancy attacks and specifies accordingly a compute
distance requirement for his own VMs against other tenants as Dς (tA) = (1,1,0.5,0).
To evaluate the compliance deviation, the CSP first measures the distances for the cur-
rent cloud deployment, then he checks the measured distances against the required one to
evaluate the deviations. In the following, matrices Mς(tA) and △Dς(tA) respectively report
measured distances and deviations for tA with respect to tenants tB, tC and tD (represented
respectively by the first, second and third row in matrices) based on the cloud configuration
in Figure 5.4 and the required compute distance Dς(tA). The obtained deviation matrix
reports how much the current cloud implementation has deviated from the required spec-





0.625 0 0 0
0 0 0 0






0.375 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


We integrated the described auditing approach into OpenStack [111], one of the most
commonly used infrastructure management platforms. Algorithm 1 describes the compli-
ance deviation evaluation procedures based on the required distances. First, the procedure
Per Tenant Implemented Distance measures the implemented distances based on data col-
lected mainly from Nova3 database for the compute distances, and on the OpenDaylight4
3OpenStack Nova [111] is a project designed to provide on-demand access to compute resources
4OpenDayLight is an open source SDN controller
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[68] database for the network distances. Then, the procedure Per Tenant Deviation evalu-
ates the deviation with respect to different tenants accommodated by the same data center.
Finally, a matrix is generated to report deviations at different cloud levels. Note that if ten-
ant tA has multiple outsourced virtual infrastructures, he can specify distance-based policies
with multiple rules according to the sensitivity-level of different workloads.
Algorithm 1 Compliance Deviation Evaluation
procedure GLOBAL DEVIATION( D(t))
for each tenant t ′ belonging to the data center do
M(t, t ′)=Per Tenant Implemented Distance(t, t ′)
△D(t, t ′)=Per Tenant Deviation(D(t), M(t, t ′))
Return(△D(t))
procedure PER TENANT DEVIATION(D(t), M(t, t ′))
for i = 0 to 3 do
△D [i] = 0
if M [0]< D [0] then
△D [0] = D [0]−M [0]
Return (△D(t, t ′))
To evaluate our quantified auditing approach, we simulate the K-ary tree data center
topology [112] with 40 core switches, and deploy the virtual infrastructures of 20 tenants.
We assign tenants’ VMs to servers in a round robin fashion and build their connections in
switches at different levels.















































Figure 5.8: Changes in the deviation vectors (a) while varying the number of rules, and (b)
while varying the number of VMs per rule
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In Figure 5.8(a), we fix the number of VMs per rule to 20 and vary the number of rules,
whereas in Figure 5.8(b), we fix the number of rules to eight and vary the number of VMs
per rule. In both figures, we can notice that the most significant deviations (delta distances)
are recorded for Level 0 (up to 0.45), which correspond to the host-level. This is due to
the higher security threats related to host-level co-residency (type I attacks), leading tA to
set higher distances at Level 0 compared to other levels. Therefore, deviations from those
distance requirements drastically decimate the overall security with respect to the distance.
As for Level 1 and beyond, the deviation average does not exceed 0.1. This stems from the
less significant security threats at higher levels leading tA to relax the requested distances to
reduce costs. Note that our approach is flexible to accommodate different tenants’ security
needs as they could specify their distances at deployment time.
5.4.4 Discussions
Based on the presented case studies, we can conclude that the physical distance correlates
with the degree of difficulty for multi-tenancy attacks, while the compute and network
distances provide the potential impact of those attacks according to the degree of resource
sharing at each level. Therefore, our distance metrics can be applied for evaluating the
preliminary tenant pair-wise multi-tenancy risk incurred by a given cloud deployment. To
this end, the CSP first defines a diagonal probability matrix P, where each element pii
corresponds to the likelihood of different types of multi-tenancy attacks at Level i. Those
probabilities can be defined using existing approaches as presented in [63]. Then, the
multi-tenancy risk for a given tenant t with respect to another tenant t ′ will be given by
the weighted norm of tenant t’s distance with respect to tenant t ′. This can be expressed
as Risk(t, t ′) = ||D(t, t ′)||P =
√
D(t, t ′)⊤×P×D(t, t ′). Since potential attackers’ identity
is not known a priory, the overall multi-tenancy risk for a tenant t can be defined as the
average of tenant pair-wise risks given by Risk(t) = ∑t′∈T\{t}Risk(t,t
′)
|T |−1 , where T is the set of
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tenants of the cloud data center. Note that the multi-tenancy risk can be defined at both
compute and network levels.
Due to the dynamic nature of the cloud, calculated metric values might be quickly in-
validated by various management operations such as VM migration. By integrating our
metrics into the cloud infrastructure management platform (e.g., OpenStack [111]), the
CSP can monitor those operations and evaluate our distance metrics at runtime to continu-
ously control the co-residency threats. Additionally, in the current version of our metrics,
we assume that all VMs are equally sensitive, which might not be the case for some ap-
plications (e.g., three-tier applications). We leave the study of those directions as part of
future work.
5.5 Summary
In this work, we proposed the physical, compute and network distance metrics to quantify
proximity between tenants inside cloud deployments. We showed through different case
studies and through integration into OpenStack the effectiveness and applicability of those
metrics to evaluate multi-tenancy threats. We believe our suite of metrics can be extended
to evaluate other threats in cloud. Therefore, it should be considered as a first step toward
a more general tool-set for threat evaluation in cloud environments.
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Chapter 6
ProxiMet: Security Metrics for
Evaluating and Mitigating Co-residency
Threats in Public Cloud
6.1 Introduction
Multi-tenancy allows a cloud service provider (CSP) to serve multiple customers using
the same physical resources to achieve the desired cost effectiveness. On the other hand,
multi-tenancy is also a double-edged sword as it significantly expands the attack surface of
cloud tenants by exposing their most valuable or sensitive assets to other tenants sharing
the same physical resources. Existing works have demonstrated real-life attacks for forcing
attackers’ virtual machines (VMs) to co-reside with targeted VMs, either inside the same
host or at higher proximity levels (e.g., the same rack [28]), in commercial public clouds
including Amazon EC2 (even after the network management has been hardened through
Virtual Private Networks), Google GCE, and Microsoft Azure [28, 29, 113]. Once the
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malicious tenant achieves co-residency with the victim, he/she can launch various cross-
tenant attacks, such as side-channel attacks [66, 24, 104], host-based DoS attacks [104],
resource freeing attacks [114], and power attack [102].
Today’s cloud providers are well aware of such co-residency-related threats, and they
are often under obligation to protect their tenants against such threats through isola-
tion [115, 116], either as part of the service level agreements (SLAs) or to demonstrate
compliance with security standards (e.g., ISO 27002/27017 [73, 8] and CCM 3.0.1 [7]).
Nonetheless, addressing co-residency threats remains a challenging issue in that com-
pletely avoiding multi-tenancy is impractical since it defeats the cost-effectiveness purpose
of cloud computing. Instead, cloud providers must balance security with cost effectiveness
through resource sharing as a partial remediation. However, to achieve an optimal trade-
off among those factors, a prerequisite is to be able to evaluate the co-residency threats
of clouds, i.e., to answer the question: To which extent a tenants’ virtual infrastructure
deployment is exposed to potential co-residency threats?
As demonstrated in Table 6.1, many existing works can provide a partial answer to the
above question. However, we can also see those works largely focus on detecting specific
co-residency attacks through monitoring certain metrics about resource usage. While the
proposed metrics are effective for detecting such attacks at run-time, applying them to eval-
uate and mitigate the co-residency threats of clouds as a preventive solution has two major
limitations. First, since the metrics are designed to detect attacks as they happen, the cloud
provider cannot apply the metrics proactively to evaluate or mitigate such threats before
they actually happen. Second, as can be seen in the table, those metrics are very specific
for each attack, and consequently, the cloud provider must deal with a larger number of
such metrics, if he/she wants to cover most of the known attacks; even if the cloud provider
is willing to do so, it still may not work for future, unknown attacks which might involve
other metrics than these, or those attacks that are stealthy in nature [117]. There also exist
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some generic security metrics [61, 62] which can cover multiple attacks, but those mostly
rely on the fact that the attacker is known (a detailed review of the related work will be
given in Section 2.3.2).
In this work, we present ProxiMet, a suite of novel security metrics to quantify the
proximity between cloud tenants’ virtual infrastructures. Our key observation is that, as
demonstrated in Table 6.1, although specific co-residency attacks may involve very dif-
ferent resources and thus require different metrics of resource usage for detection (e.g.,
CPU usage for a side channel attack and power consumption for a power attack), they
all share similar prerequisites in terms of co-residency, i.e., attackers must first gain suffi-
cient co-residency with a victim. Based on this observation, we first extract such common
co-residency prerequisites from co-residency attacks along two dimensions, namely, the
co-residency extent, and the co-residency intensity, which captures two different aspects of
co-residency threats. Second, we define metrics to evaluate those co-residency dimensions
based on the proximity between tenants’ virtual infrastructures according to their cloud
deployment. Third, we show the usefulness of our metrics through a case study based on
data collected from a real cloud. We further assess the effectiveness of our security met-
rics through simulations using CloudSim based on two well-known cloud VM-placement
policies [61]. The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• We examine various co-residency attacks and extract their common co-residency pre-
requisites in order to define our proximity metrics.
• We show through a real cloud-based case study the effectiveness of our metrics and
how they enable the control and mitigation of the co-residency threat level through
cloud management operations.
• We further conduct extensive simulations to show the relationship between our met-

























Last-level cache [15] •
Hammer attack [24] •
L2 cache exploration [118] •
Whispers [120] •
Host-based DoS attack [104] •
CPU consumption attack [119] •
Resource-freeing attack [114] •
Power attack [102] • • •
CIDoS attack [121] •
Bandwidth saturation [106] •
Table 6.1: An excerpt of metrics used in detecting several co-residency-based attacks. The symbol • means the metric can be used
in the detection of the attack
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6.2 Preliminaries
This section gives our cloud infrastructure model, threat model, and running example.
6.2.1 Multi-Level Cloud Infrastructure Model
In the following, we model cloud tenants’ virtual infrastructures and their deployment in-
side the physical infrastructure. A virtual infrastructure consists of virtual resources in-
cluding VMs (deployed in physical hosts) and virtual networks (deployed in infrastructure
switches). The assignment of VMs to physical hosts is usually decided based on specific
placement policies. Figure 6.1 illustrates an entity-relationship diagram that captures our
model, where nodes represent physical and virtual resources and arrows depict their re-
lationships (e.g., mapping or association). The cloud physical infrastructure consists of
nested management zones shown as aggregated nodes (e.g., several hosts can be aggre-
gated into a rack zone, and multiple rack zones can be aggregated into a pod zone). We
use the terms single-node zone and multi-node zone, to refer to zones at the host level
(servers), and zones at higher levels of the hierarchy, respectively. Our model captures
the tree-based hierarchical network topologies (e.g., basic-tree, fat-tree and clos networks)
[122], currently in-use in several data centers’ designs [112], [123], and our model can be
adapted to other topologies [122].
6.2.2 Threat Model
As in [29], we assume a malicious tenant has the same privilege of a regular tenant to ac-
cess the interface for launching and terminating his/her own VMs. As in [29, 28], we also
assume a malicious tenant can infer the VM-placement policy used in the cloud and con-
sequently craft special launch strategies to increase his/her chances of co-residency with


























Figure 6.1: A multi-level model capturing tenants’ virtual infrastructures, the cloud physi-
cal resources, and their relationships
to co-reside certain resources with the resources of a victim tenant. Any attacks that in-
volve administrator privileges or target the cloud infrastructure or provider are out of the
scope. Consequently, we assume the information collected from the cloud infrastructure
management system to calculate our metrics are trusted.
Our metrics are meant for evaluating the general security posture of clouds against the
in-scope attacks, and they are not designed to detect such attacks, identify the malicious
tenant, or pinpoint the vulnerabilities. In fact, our metrics are to be applied before the
attacks actually happen (unlike [25]), and without any prior knowledge of the attacker’s
identity (unlike [61]). Thus, our metrics are complementary to other attack-specific security
solutions, e.g., attack detection and vulnerability analysis.
6.2.3 Running Example
To build intuitions, we discuss our running example shown in Figure 6.2. In this cloud
deployment, we assume Tenant A has a three tier application composed of two database
servers (DB A in hosts 1 and 2), five application servers (App A in host 3), and three web
servers (WB A in host 4). The right-side table of Figure 6.2 shows the total number of VMs
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Figure 6.2: An example showing the deployment of the virtual infrastructures of tenants A,
B, C and D inside the data center
Assume the cloud provider would like to evaluate the level of co-residency threats of
Tenant A’s virtual infrastructure, without knowing which of the three tenants (Tenant B,
Tenant C, and Tenant D) would be malicious, and which attacks (as shown in Table 6.1)
would be used. At the same time, the co-residency status shown in the figure would cer-
tainly determine (as a necessary but not sufficient condition) whether any such attack may
succeed. For example, Tenant C cannot launch any side-channel attack on the database
servers of Tenant A (since Tenant C is not co-residing with Tenant A on hosts 1 and 2),
whereas he/she can potentially stage server-level or rack-level power attacks [102] or host-
based DoS attacks [104] against the web and application servers, since he/she has a large
number of VMs co-residing with Tenant A on hosts 3 and 4. Clearly, it is not straightfor-
ward to design security metrics that can effectively evaluate the co-residency threat levels




In this section, we first extract some common aspects of co-residency attacks then we define
our proximity metrics.
6.3.1 Extracting Common Aspects of Co-Residency Attacks
The co-residency attacks shown in Table 6.1 may look very different at first glance as they
employ different techniques and have different objectives. However, those attacks have in
common one prerequisite, i.e., the malicious tenant must first co-reside with the victim.
Therefore, we start by examining how such a prerequisite applies to each attack in more
details. In Table 6.2, we classify the attacks into two categories (the list of attacks is not
meant to be exhaustive; other, including future or unknown, attacks may also fit into those
categories), and we discuss their co-residency prerequisite as follows.
Type I Attacks. In Table 6.2, the first seven attacks are very different in nature, however,
they have commonalities with respect to co-residency prerequisites. For instance, last-level
cache attack, hammer attack and L2 cache exploration attack are all side/covert channel
attacks whose objective is either to steal sensitive information from the victim’s resources to
breach confidentiality, or to establish illicit communication paths exploiting co-residency.
Host-based DoS attacks attempt to compromise victim’s hosts availability by deploying
well-tuned controlled VMs over those hosts, while resource freeing attack objective is to
use shared hosts’ resources on the victim’s expense. Another example of type I attacks is
the hyperjacking attack, where a single malicious VM constitutes the only prerequisite to
exploit the hypervisor (e.g. CVE-2015-3456 [124]) and take control over co-hosted VMs.
The common aspect of all those attacks is to place at least one malicious VM inside the
same host with the victim’s VMs. Through those attacks, the adversary may target either a





Fractional Complete At least one As many as possible
Type I
Last-level cache [15] X X X
Hammer attack [24] X X X
L2 cache exploration [118] X X X
Whispers [120] X X X
Host-based DoS attack [104] X X X
CPU consumption attack [119] X X X
Resource freeing attack [114] X X X
Type II
Power attack [102] X X
CIDoS attack [121] X X
Bandwidth saturation attack [106] X X
Table 6.2: Co-residency attacks and their common aspects of co-residency prerequisite
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is referred to as complete coverage [125, 66].
Example 6.1 (CPU consumption attack [119]). CPU consumption attack is a co-residency-
based attack that exploits hypervisors’ vulnerabilities. Under this attack, one malicious VM
can increase the CPU cycles usage on a host from the legitimate limit (40%) up to 85%. An
attacker whose objective is to disturb the right functioning of a specific victim’s application
and increase her expenses (since customers are charged based on the amount of time their
VMs are running) will place at least one VM in each host accommodating the victim’s
resources in order to maximize the overall victim’s charged costs. Therefore, a necessary
condition for this attack to succeed is to co-reside with the largest number of victim’s VMs.
It follows that its percentage of success is determined by the degree of coverage attacker
achieves with respect to his victim’s resources. We refer to this coverage-level as extent
since it defines the degree of damage that could be caused to the victim assuming that all
her resources are equally important.
Type II Attacks. This category includes attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in the cloud man-
agement strategies (e.g., resource over-subscription [126, 102]). Examples are power attack
[102] and bandwidth saturation attack [106]. These attacks aim at affecting the availability
of a given zone of the cloud infrastructure, which could be at the host-level, rack-level or
higher levels in the cloud hierarchy (as described in Section 6.2). To succeed and maximize
the effect, those attacks require as many malicious resources as possible to be placed inside
the targeted zone. Furthermore, they typically target a fraction of their victim’s resources
located at a specific zone since larger targets, e.g., the data center, are significantly more
difficult to compromise.
Example 6.2 (Power attack [102]). Power attack exploits the power over-subscription vul-
nerability, which consists of overloading a power supply with more workloads than it sup-
ports with the assumption that workloads will never reach their peak simultaneously. If the
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attacker succeeds to place many VMs inside a zone alimented with the same power facil-
ity, then he can generate simultaneous power spikes, which would lead to power outage
when the power consumption exceeds the power capacity for that specific zone. It has been
shown in [102] that one malicious VM can increase the power consumption of the hosting
machine with up to 95 watt while a benign VM causes a power increase of 45 watt only.
Obviously, the more the number of controlled VMs attacker could place in the targeted
zone, the higher the risk related to those attacks would be. The number of VMs needed will
be depending though on the power supply capacity. Indeed, the larger the rated capacity of
a zone’s circuit breaker, the more VMs the attacker needs to place in it to cause its outage.
Additionally, the larger the zone attacker is targeting, the more controlled VMs need to be
deployed to increase the power consumption, since smaller zones converge faster to their
peak power1.
As demonstrated through above discussions, those seemingly different attacks indeed
share the common prerequisite of co-residency, and such prerequisite may be characterized
along two diagonal dimensions as follows.
• Co-residency Extent. This aspect of the co-residency prerequisite reflects the level
of coverage the attacker wants to achieve with respect to the victim’s resources. In
Table 6.2, the extent columns show whether each attack may target a fraction (e.g.,
type II attacks) of the victim’s resources or all of them (e.g., type I attacks).
• Co-residency Intensity. This aspect of the co-residency prerequisite reflects the amount
of malicious resources the attacker needs to place at a given zone for the attack to
succeed. In Table 6.2, the intensity columns show whether each attack may require
at least one (type I attacks), or as many as possible (type II attacks) malicious VMs
to co-reside with the victim.
1It has been reported in [109] that racks reach 96% of their peak power, while pods and data centers do
not exceed respectively 86% and 72% of their peak power.
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6.3.2 Proximity Metrics
To quantify the common aspects of co-residency prerequisites depicted in Table 6.2 and
discussed in Section 6.3.1, we define two metrics, namely, the co-residency extent, and
the co-residency intensity. The first metric is designed to capture the extent aspect, and
the last metric captures the intensity aspect of co-residency prerequisites. In addition, we
propose a generic metric, namely, the multi-tenancy attack surface, which does not directly
map to those common aspects, but evaluates the co-residency threat from a more general
perspective as will be discussed later in this section.
For notations, let t and z be a tenant and a zone in the cloud data center DC, where z
could be either a single-node zone (i.e., a host) or a multi-node zone (a rack, a pod, or the
data center as a whole). Let Rt be the set of resources belonging to a tenant t. We denote by
zt the set of zones in which tenant t has at least one resource deployed. We use the notation
|Rt| for the number of resources of tenant t. Table 6.3 summarizes our notations along with
their description.
Co-residency Extent. This metric evaluates the extent aspect of co-residency attacks. To
this end, we first calculate the resource distribution to capture how many resources of a
given tenant t (the victim) are sharing zones with another tenant t ′, the potential attacker,
by summing up t’s resource distribution values over all the zones z that are shared between
t and t ′ (z ∈ zt ∩ zt ′). This can be expressed as pairwise-extent(t, t ′) = ∑z∈zt∩zt′ RD(t,z).
Based on this, we define the co-residency extent, as the highest level of pairwise ex-
tent with respect to all the tenants having at least one zone shared with tenant t. This is
expressed as follows:
Co-residency-extent(t) = maxt ′∈T\{t}pairwise-extent(t, t ′)
This metric reports the upper bound threat-level related to type I co-residency attacks
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Var. Description
T The set of tenants inside the data center DC
Z The set of zones inside the data center DC
Tz The set of tenants having at least one of their virtual re-
sources in z
Rt The set of virtual resources belonging to tenant t
Rt,z The set of virtual resources of tenant t in zone z
Rz The set of all virtual resources in zone z
ZC(t) Zone coverage is the number of zones accommodating ten-
ant t’s resources. We denote ZC(t) = |zt|. Depending on
the zone type, we call ZChost(t), ZCRack(t) and ZCpod(t) the
host-level coverage, rack-level coverage, and pod-level cov-
erage, respectively.
RD(t,z) Resource distribution is the ratio of resources belonging to t
located at z. We denote it RD(t,z) = |Rt,z||Rt |
RA(t,z) Resource abundance is the fraction of resources belonging
to t in z over all resources in that zone (regardless of tenants
they belong to). More formally RA(t,z) = |Rt,z||Rz|
ZS(t,z) Zone sharing is the ratio of tenants effectively co-residing
with t in z (excluding t itself). More formally, ZS(t,z) =
|Tzt |−1
|T |−1
Table 6.3: Summary of the notation used in Proximet
according to the current cloud deployment.
Example 6.3. We evaluate the co-residency extent for Tenant A according to the deploy-
ment depicted in Figure 6.2. Table 6.4 reports the pairwise extent for Tenant A with respect
to other tenants. From this table, we can conclude that the co-residency extent for Ten-
ant A is equal to 1. We can see that the co-residency extent coincides with Tenant D, who
shares all the hosts with Tenant A. Hence, the metric provides an upper bound to the threat
of a co-residency attack whose prerequisite is to maximize the co-residency extent (e.g.,
Hammer attack [24]).
Co-residency Intensity. We define this metric to evaluate the intensity aspect of type II co-
residency attack. For a given tenant t, which is the victim, and a given tenant t ′, the potential
attacker, we first measure the resource abundance of t ′ at each zone z that is shared with
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Host1 Host2 Host3 Host4 Per-tenant coverage
Tenant B 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.2
Tenant C 0 0 0.5 0.3 0.8
Tenant D 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 1
Table 6.4: Host-level pairwise extent with respect to Tenant A
Host1 Host2 Host3 Host4 Per-tenant intensity
Tenant B 0.33 0.2 0 0 0.13
Tenant C 0 0 0.68 0.83 0.37
Tenant D 0.33 0.6 0.09 0.04 0.26
Table 6.5: Host-level pairwise intensity with respect to Tenant A
t, we sum up the resource abundance values over all shared zones (z ∈ zt ∩ zt ′), then, we
normalize the obtained value by the zone coverage of tenant t, the potential victim. This is




Similarly to the previously defined metric, as we are evaluating potential threats, we
define the co-residency intensity, which provides an upper bound to the threat of type II
co-residency attacks with maximum attacker’s resources intensity as a prerequisite, to be
the highest level of resource intensity with respect to all the tenants having at least one zone
shared with tenant t. Thus, the co-residency-intensity is expressed as follows:
Co-residency-intensity(t) = maxt ′∈T\{t}pairwise-intensity(t, t ′)
Example 6.4. In this example, we evaluate the co-residency intensity for Tenant A ac-
cording to the deployment of Figure 6.2. In Table 6.5, column six reports the pairwise
intensity. We can see that the co-residency intensity for Tenant A is equal to 0.37, which
corresponds to Tenant C who has the largest host-level VM abundance at Host3 and Host4
inside Rack12. This depicts the worst case scenario when there exists an adversary trying
to launch a power attack [102] or a bandwidth saturation attack [106].
Multi-Tenancy Attack Surface. This metric is designed to provide an insight about
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Host1 Host2 Host3 Host4
Resource-distribution 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3
Host-sharing 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Per-Host resource attack surface 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03
Table 6.6: Per-host attack surface with respect to VMs of Tenant A
the overall security posture of a virtual infrastructure’s deployment with respect to co-
residency without necessarily correlating with one of the common aspects to co-residency
attacks. We consider that each tenant t’s resource is a potential entry point to compromise
the tenant’s virtual infrastructure, and each tenant t ′ sharing the same zone is a potential
attacker. Hence, we define the multi-tenancy attack surface to measure the attackabil-
ity against tenant t’s resources at a given zone z by combining his resource distribution
value at that zone, with his zone sharing value inside the same zone, which is expressed as
Per-zone-attack-surface(t,z) = RD(t,z)×ZS(t,z).
To obtain the attack surface related to all of tenant t’s deployed virtual resources, we
sum up the per-zone attack surface for tenant t over all the zones where the latter exists




Example 6.5. According to the deployment of Figure 6.2, and assuming that T = 20, we
calculate the per-host attack surface for Tenant A. To this end, we first calculate the per-
host resource distribution for Tenant A’s VMs, and it’s host sharing (reported in rows two
and three of Table 6.6, respectively). Then, we evaluate the per-host VM attack surface
as reported in row four of Table 6.6. Finally, the overall multi-tenancy attack surface is
obtained by summing up the per-host attack surface values, which is equal to 0.1 (not





















Figure 6.3: Subset of a real cloud data center: (right) distribution of tenants’ VMs on a
subset of physical hosts and racks, and (left) zoom on the VMs deployment of two tenants
(T 1 and T 34) inside the physical hosts
6.4 Case Study (Real Cloud Data Center)
The objective of this case study is to show the applicability of our metrics and how they
can be used to mitigate the co-residency threats in real world cloud deployments.
This case study is based on a real community cloud hosted at a major telecommunica-
tion company. For privacy and security concerns, we collect and anonymize data from part
of this cloud composed of 22 physical machines organized into two racks as depicted on
the right side of Figure 6.3.
We perform our study on four different datasets (as subsets of the aforementioned cloud
data), where each dataset captures VMs deployment in the considered portion of the cloud
during one day. Table 6.7 reports the total number of tenants and VMs, and the average
number of tenants and VMs per host. Additionally, Figure 6.4 reports the distribution of
the number of tenants with respect to the number of VMs they own in different datasets.
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Dataset DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
# Tenants 33 31 32 21
# VMs 212 301 372 290
Average # Tenants per host 6.45 7.27 7.63 4.77
Average # VMs per host 9.63 13.68 16.9 13.18
Table 6.7: Total number of tenants (with at least one running VM) and VMs, and the
average number of tenants and VMs per host for each dataset
6.4.1 Evaluation of our Metrics on a Real Cloud
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our metrics on a real cloud. Table 6.8
summarizes the average values of the co-residency extent and the co-residency intensity
in the studied datasets. The highest average of both metrics is recorded for dataset DS3,
which has the largest total number of VMs and the largest average of VMs per host. More
specifically, Figure 6.5 depicts the distribution of our metrics’ values for different tenants
computed in the four datasets described in Table 6.7. We can see that overall, the co-
residency extent metric tends to have higher values for most of the tenants in all datasets,
whereas the co-residency intensity tends to take relatively smaller values except for few
cases where it could reach large values.
It can be noted that the large values of the co-residency extent metric in all datasets are
mainly due to several factors such as the relatively small number of VMs owned by most
of the tenants, and the small number of hosts. For instance, as most of the tenants have a
number of VMs varying between 1 and 10 VMs (as illustrated in Figure 6.4), hosted in a
relatively small number of hosts, the chance of co-residency increases, which results in a
relatively high co-residency extent for most of these tenants. The lower values of the co-
residency intensity metric can provide insights about the employed VM placement policy
(e.g., least policy), which tends to spread the VMs over multiple hosts for resiliency and
load balancing purposes. Although those results provide some hints about the relationship
between the number of VMs per tenant, the size of the data center, the VM placement



























































































Figure 6.4: Distribution of the number tenants with respect to the number of VMs they
own for (a) DS1, (b) DS2, (c) DS3, and (d) DS4. The distribution includes tenants with no
running VMs
pattern in the simulation section.
To show the advantage of defining the co-residency extent per tenant as the maxi-
mum among the recorded pairwise co-residency extent values, we analyze the distribu-
tions of pairwise co-residency extent for all tenants in DS3, the dataset with the highest
co-residency extent average (note that similar reasoning can be applied to co-residency in-
tensity). Figure 6.6 characterizes the distributions of the pairwise co-residency extent for
different tenants using box-plots2. Therein, each box-plot reports five values, namely, the
2A box-plot is a rapid visual description of a dataset, which graphically depicts the concentration and
spread of numerical data based on quartiles
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Figure 6.5: Co-residency extent and co-residency intensity in different datasets
minimum value, the first quartile, the median, the third quartiles and the maximum value,
for the distribution of pairwise co-residency extent of one tenant in the dataset. We addi-
tionally report the average (mean) for each box-plot. For convenience sake, we order the
box-plots based on their means and assign a numerical identifier to each one of them. Based
on the information provided in Figure 6.6, we can make the following interpretations:
• The five values of box-plots from 24 up to 31 are assimilated to the mean point, which
is the maximum value (co-residency extent), and is equal to one. This means that all
the pairwise co-residency extent values for the corresponding tenants are equal to
one. This high metric value is mainly due to the very small number of VMs owned
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Datasets DS1 D2 DS3 DS4
Average co-residency extent 0.882 0,966 0.992 0.982
Average co-residency intensity 0.217 0.281 0.373 0.285
Table 6.8: Average of co-residency extent and co-residency intensity for different datasets
by the corresponding tenants. Indeed, each one of those tenants has at most one VM,
therefore, one co-residency with another tenant will position the metric’s value to
one.
• Box-plots from 18 up to 23 correspond to tenants owning two VMs, meaning that the
pairwise co-residency extent can take two values only, the minimum value is 0.5 for
a tenant co-located with one VM only out of the two, and the maximum value is one
for a tenant co-residing with the two VMs. We can infer from the average of those
box-plots, which varies between 0.65 and 0.75, that the smallest co-residency extent
value is more frequent than the largest one. Therefore, choosing the co-residency
extent metric to be equal to the largest pairwise co-residency extent, instead of the
average, makes our metric more accurate in capturing the upper bound co-residency
threat level.
• Box-plots from one up to 17 correspond to tenants whose average number of VMs
is 20.4, which is more reasonable compared to the two previous cases. For those
tenants, the average of pairwise co-residency extent varies between 0.285 and 0.666.
However, we can see also that in all box-plots, most of the observed pairwise co-
residency extent values are concentrated on the lower whisker and on the interquartile
range (between the first and the third percentiles), whereas large metric values are
less observed, which is reflected by large upper whiskers. For instance, in box-plot
three, 75% of the observed pairwise co-residency extent values are below 0.481,
whereas large metric values are rare. This again shows the benefit of considering the
maximum pairwise co-residency extent as the metric value for evaluating the worst
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case scenarios of co-residency.
• A malicious tenant a, trying to achieve type I attacks (e.g., side channel attacks)
against his victim v, will obviously launch an abnormally large number of VMs or
tune a VM launching strategy (as will be detailed in Section 6.5) in order to maximize
his coverage of the victim’s VMs. This will considerably increase the pairwise co-
residency extent with respect to the victim such that any other normal tenant t sharing
the cloud will have a lower pairwise co-residency extent with respect to the victim.
This can be expressed as ∀t ∈ T \ {a} : pairwise-extent(v, t)< pairwise-extent(v,a).
Therefore, choosing the co-residency extent metric to be equal to the highest among
the pairwise co-residency extent values constitutes the best option to capture this ab-
normal increase, since any other aggregated values (e.g., mean, median, percentiles)
will loose the accuracy because of the large number of tenants sharing the cloud as
can be seen in Figure 6.6.
Clearly, the co-residency extent metric reveals critical information according to the
upper bound co-residency threats related to type I attacks. The relationship between our
metrics and the attack types will be further elaborated in Section 6.5. Although the above
discussion emphasizes the applicability and the effectiveness of our metrics, it is worth
noting that as we test our metrics on the data collected only from a small portion of the
cloud data center, the metric values we report do not reflect any fact about the co-residency
threat levels of the whole data center.
6.4.2 Mitigation through Migration
As discussed in Section 6.3, large values of co-residency extent and/or intensity reveal an
increased threat of co-residency attacks. To reduce this threat, the CSP can monitor the
metrics’ values and take some mitigation actions whenever the values exceed a specific
threshold.
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Figure 6.6: Characterizing the distributions of pairwise co-residency extent values for dif-
ferent tenants in DS3
Assume the CSP defines the co-residency extent threshold for his tenants as the average
of their pairwise co-residency extent plus a value ε = 0.1. For instance, as depicted in
Figure 6.7, the average pairwise co-residency extent of tenant T1 in dataset DS3 is equal to
0.35 (before migration), therefore, the co-residency extent threshold for this tenant should
be equal to T SH(T1) = 0.45. We recall that the co-residency between T 1 and T 34 is
illustrated in the left side of Figure 6.3. Therein, one can see that T 34 has the maximum
value of the pairwise co-residency extent with respect to T 1 (pairwise-extent(T1,T 34) =
Co-residency-extent(T1) = 1).
Obviously, this configuration does not comply with the threshold set by the CSP. Ad-
ditionally, if tenant T34 is an attacker targeting the full coverage of tenant T1’s VMs, then
the deployment illustrated in the figure will cause the largest scale damage to tenant T1.
To bring the cloud deployment to a compliant state, and hence reduce the co-residency
145
threat, the CSP needs to perform a set of migration events. To do so, the VMs to be mi-
grated and the number of source hosts need to be carefully selected in order to minimize
the cost related to migration. At the same time, these migrations need to quickly decrease
the co-residency extent to prevent large scale damage to the victim and minimize the non-
compliance time period.
Algorithm 2 shows an example of heuristics that can be used. First, for each tenant
t ′ having pairwise co-residency extent with respect to t exceeding the threshold T SH, we
identify the set of shared hosts, SourceHosts, and classify them into an increasing order
based on the number of VMs of tenant t ′ in each host. Then, we choose the first host in the
list as the source host (src) of the migration event. Finally, we migrate the VMs of tenant
t ′ inside src to a set of candidate hosts that do not accommodate any of tenant t VMs. The
choice of the exact destination host will be depending on the adopted VM placement policy.






while Max Extent> T SH do
Select-tenant t ′ such that Pairwise-extent(t, t ′)=Max Extent
SourceHosts=zt ∩ zt ′








Figure 6.7 reports the pairwise co-residency extent of tenant T1 with respect to other
tenants before and after the migration operations. We can see from this figure that the co-
residency extent for T1 decreased from 1 down to 0.444, which is slightly larger than the
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Figure 6.7: Changes in pairwise co-residency extent values for tenant T1 in dataset DS3
before and after migration events
average pairwise co-residency extent before migration (0.35) but lower than the threshold
(0.45). This scenario shows the usefulness of our metrics for mitigating the risk related co-
residency threats in cloud deployments. It is worth noting that the thresholds for metrics’
values can be specified by the CSP based on several factors (e.g., the average pairwise co-
residency extent per tenant, the size of the data center, the overall number of VMs). We
leave the study of systematic approaches for defining appropriate thresholds, and the design
of heuristics providing better optimization for different objectives as part of future work.
6.5 Simulation
In this section, we evaluate our proximity metrics by comparing their results with the per-
centage of successful simulated attacks under two well-known VM-placement algorithms
implemented in CloudSim [127], a widely used cloud environment simulator.
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6.5.1 Simulation Environment
First, we evaluate our metrics in a small data center (300 hosts) with two sets of configura-
tions for the hosts. For the first configuration with low frequency usage hosts, we specify
the capacity of hosts as 4GB RAM, 1,000 GB storage space and 10,000 MB/s bandwidth.
For the second configuration with high frequency usage hosts, we set the capacity of hosts
to 40 GM RAM, 10,000 GB storage space and 10,000 MB/s bandwidth. In both configu-
rations, we consider VMs’ resource requirements as 512 MB RAM, 10 GB storage space,
and 1,000 MB/s bandwidth, which is also the default configuration for VMs in CloudSim.
The data center can accommodate 500 VMs in the first configuration, whereas it can host
up to 5,000 VMs in the second configuration. The purpose of designing two different ca-
pacity configurations is to study the variations of our metrics in data centers with different
characteristics. We also increase the number of hosts up to 3,000 to study the impact of
larger clouds on the metrics’ values.
Background workload. Recent studies demonstrated that VMs’ requests for arrival and
departure follow the power law distribution [128]. As the latter is not provided by default
in CloudSim, we have implemented it to generate realistic workload requests based on
statistics in [128].
Placement Algorithms. In the latest version of CloudSim (version 4.4), the libraries for
placement algorithms of containers have been added, however, those for VMs are still
missing. Thus, we implemented the two placement algorithms, namely, most-VM and
least-VM policies, that are widely used in the literature [62] and in open source cloud
platforms, such as OpenStack [111]. The most-VM placement policy is based on workload
stacking to reduce resource consumption, while the least-VM policy is based on workload
balancing.
Attacker Launch Strategies. Similarly to other works (e.g., [62, 29]), we assume that
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attackers could gather the knowledge about placement algorithms and adjust their VM-
launch strategies accordingly to increase their chance of co-residency. For this purpose,
we have implemented the launch strategies described in [62]. Note that our metrics are
evaluated based on the deployments only (without having any knowledge about attackers)
and are independent of attackers’ launch strategies.
Parameter settings. In each simulation, we generate 5 hours of workload, which cor-
responds to around 12,000 VMs’ requests. An attacker with a launch strategy, As, starts
VM(As,C) VMs within one log configuration, C. The metrics’ values in all figures are the
average for at least 500 iterations.
6.5.2 Effectiveness of Proximity Metrics
In the first set of simulations, we compare co-residency extent with the percentage of suc-
cessful type I attacks (see Table 6.2). In this type of attacks (e.g., Hammer attack, CPU
consumption attack), the attacker’s objective is to co-reside with the maximum number of
victim’s VMs. In our simulation, we have chosen one malicious user, with a specific VM
launch strategy tuned based on the placement policy, as attacker, and we defined the per-
centage of successful attacks as the fraction of victim’s VMs covered by the attacker. Note
that our metrics are calculated only based on the deployment status of the cloud environ-
ment, which means that no prior knowledge of the attacker is required in our calculations.
Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 show the evolution of our metrics and the percentage of success-
ful type I attacks under our two sets of host configurations.
Results and Implications for Co-residency Extent in Most-VM Placement Policy. Fig-
ure 6.8 reports the co-residency extent metric compared to the percentage of successful
attacks under the most VM placement policy, both for a data center with low frequency
usage hosts (in Figure 6.8a) and for a data center with high frequency usage hosts (in Fig-
ure 6.8b). Based on those figures, we can make the following observations. First, the
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(Calculated without knowing the attacker)
% of successful attack (Type I)
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(Calculated without knowing the attacker)
% of successful attack (Type I)
(b)
Figure 6.8: Comparing co-residency extent with the percentage of successful type I attacks
under most-VM placement policy, in the two sets of configurations (a) low frequency usage
hosts, and (b) high frequency usage hosts
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(Calculated without knowing the attacker)
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(Calculated without knowing the attacker)
% of successful attack (Type I)
(b)
Figure 6.9: Comparing co-residency extent with the percentage of successful type I attacks
under least-VM placement policy, in the two sets of configurations (a) low frequency usage
hosts, and (b) high frequency usage hosts
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metric reaches higher values in the data center with the second configuration (as shown
in Figure 6.8b). This is mainly due to the nature of the placement policy which tends to
stack VMs together, and to the large number of VMs each host is able to accommodate.
Second, under both host configurations, attacker could achieve higher co-residency with
targeted victims with a tuned launch strategy. Third, co-residency extent provides the secu-
rity evaluation base-line for a data center. When the number of attacker’s launched VMs is
low (VM(As,C)< 5 in Figure 6.8a, and VM(As,C)< 30 in Figure 6.8b), the metric’s values
exhibit a plateau trend, which represents the normal co-residency threat level in the data
center, as the attacker could not achieve enough co-residency with the victim. Considering
such configuration, our metric can be used by the CSP to profile his data center under nor-
mal tenants’ behavior, and to provide end users with more transparency according to the
standard co-residency threat level. Fourth, when the number of attacker’s launched VMs
goes beyond 5 in the first configuration (shown in Figure 6.8a), and beyond 30 in the sec-
ond configuration (shown in Figure 6.8b), the co-residency extent follows the percentage
of successful attacks as the attacker start achieving a higher degree of co-residency with
respect to the victim compared to other tenants in the data center. Note that the average
number of VMs per tenant for the first configuration is 10, while it is equal to 49 in the
second configuration.
Based on this, we can conclude that our metric can be used both to profile the normal
co-residency threat level for a given data center, and to capture the abnormal increase in the
degree of co-residencies, which might be due to attackers’ malicious behavior in launching
their VMs.
Results and Implications for Co-residency Extent in Least-VM Placement Policy. Fig-
ure 6.9 reports the co-residency extent metric compared to the percentage of successful
attacks under the least VM placement policy, both for a data center with low frequency us-
age hosts (Figure 6.9a) and for a data center with high frequency usage hosts ( Figure 6.9b).
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From this figure, we observe that the attacker has a much lower chance to manipulate the
least VM placement policy to achieve higher co-residency with the victim, compared to
the most VM placement policy in Figure 6.8. Furthermore, in the configuration with low
frequent used hosts (Figure 6.9a), attacker could achieve higher co-residency by increasing
the number of VMs. However, under the second configuration in Figure 6.9b, achieving
enough co-residency becomes a more challenging task for the attacker. In both cases, our
metric captures the worst-case scenario inside the data center, which indicates the highest
co-residency threat level. Additionally, by observing the simulation results from Figure 6.8
(most VM placement policy) and Figure 6.9 (least VM placement policy), we can conclude
that our metric could serve as a reasonable means to evaluate the co-residency threat level
related to different VM placement policies.
The objective of the second set of simulations is to study the correlation between the
co-residency intensity and the percentage of success for type II attacks under the most
and least VM placement policies. Since type II attacks (e.g., power attack and bandwidth
saturation attack) mostly rely on placing a large number of attacker’s VMs inside the same
hosts with the victim, we defined the percentage of success as the percentage of attacker’s
resources co-residing with victim’s VMs.
Results and Implications for Co-residency Intensity. Figure 6.10 (resp. Figure 6.11)
reports the co-residency intensity values and the percentage of successful attacks under
the most (resp. least) VM placement policy, both for a data center with low frequency
usage hosts, and for a data center with high frequency usage hosts. We can observer that,
overall, the general trend of co-residency intensity increases at a slower pace than the co-
residency extent under the same configurations. This is because intensity relies on the total
number of attacker’s VMs that achieved co-residency with the victim within the same hosts,
which makes the attacks more difficult to achieve. Similarly to the co-residency extent, the
metric reaches higher values under the most VM placement policy and for the data center
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Figure 6.10: Comparing co-residency intensity with the percentage of successful type II at-
tacks under most-VM placement policy, in the two sets of configurations (a) low frequency
usage hosts (b) high frequency usage hosts
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Figure 6.11: Comparing co-residency intensity with the percentage of successful type II
attacks under least-VM placement policy, in the two sets of configurations(a) low frequency
usage hosts (b) High frequency usage hosts
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configuration with high frequency usage hosts, as illustrated in Figure 6.10b.
The third set of simulation compares the multi-tenancy attack surface, which indicates
the overall co-residency threat level and does not correlate with any type of attacks, with
the two metrics evaluated in previous simulation-sets, under the two VM-placement poli-
cies, while varying the number of victim’s VMs. In Figure 6.12a, we omit the result of
co-residency intensity metric since it stays plateau with the increase of the victim’s VMs
under the most-VM placement policy. In Figure 6.12b, the co-residency extent and the
co-residency intensity correspond to the left y-axis , while the multi-tenancy attack surface
(MAS) corresponds to the right y-axis. In this set of simulations, the number of victim’s
VMs increases up to 100, while the number of attacker’s VMs is fixed to 50.
Results and Implications. In Figure 6.12, we can observe that the trend for the multi-
tenancy attack surface is similar to other metrics. A mixed trend for both metrics could
be observed in both Figure 6.12a and Figure 6.12b. Since the co-residency intensity stays
plateau in Figure 6.12a, the multi-tenancy attack surface follows the co-residency extent at
the beginning then stays plateau after a certain number of victim’s VMs. In Figure 6.12b,
the multi-tenancy attack surface is closer to the co-residency extent when the number of
victim’s VMs remains small, while the trend gets closer to the maximum attacker’s intensity
with the increased number of victim’s VMs. This is mainly because when the number
of victim’s VMs increases, the increase of co-residency extent is faster than co-residency
intensity. Later on, when the co-residency extent changes at a slower pace, the multi-
tenancy attack surface captures better the change in co-residency intensity.
Figure 6.13a shows the change of metrics with the increased number of attacker’s VMs
under different log configurations, VM(As,C). Here again, we can see that the multi-tenancy
attack surface metric maintains strong ability to capture the change of both metrics.
Figure 6.13b reports the variation of our metrics’ values for data centers with different
sizes. Therein, we increase the number of hosts from 300 up to 3,000. The number of
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Figure 6.12: Comparing the multi-tenancy attack surface metric with co-residency extent
and co-residency intensity while increasing the number of victim’s VMs for (a) most-VM,
and (b) least-VM placement policy
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Figure 6.13: Comparing the multi-tenancy attack surface with co-residency extent and co-
residency intensity while (a) increasing the number of attacker’s VMs, and (b) varying the
number of hosts in the data center
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victim’s and attacker’s VMs are set to 100, and the number of legitimate tenants and VMs
for the data center changes proportionally to the size of the data center.
Summary of Results. All the metrics demonstrate that the co-residency threat level of
a particular tenant decreases with the increasing size of the data center, as our metrics all
decrease. We conclude that larger data centers minimize the likelihood of co-residency
attacks since attackers have lower chance to co-reside with the victim’s resources. The
multi-tenancy attack surface metric captures the change of both metrics in this simulation.
However, it correlates better with the co-residency extent for small data centers.
6.6 Summary
In this work, we proposed ProxiMet, a suite of security metrics to evaluate the proximity
between tenants’ resources. The main benefit of our approach was to evaluate and mitigate
the cloud co-residency threats. To this end, we first extracted a set of common co-residency
aspects from the most known co-residency attacks in the cloud along two dimensions, i.e.,
the extent and the intensity. Then, we designed a set of metrics to evaluate the proximity
between tenants’ resources along the extracted aspects, as a means to evaluate and miti-
gate the co-residency threats. To show the effectiveness and usefulness of our metrics, we
conducted a case study based on a real cloud, and performed extensive simulations using




The security implications emanating from virtualization technologies on one side, and the
multi-tenancy model on the other side, constitute the main factors that are still holding
back prospective cloud customers. Bringing more visibility and transparency to the cloud
infrastructure deployments is an important step to overcome this setback. Security compli-
ance auditing and threat evaluation constitute valuable solutions in this respect. However,
existing solutions for auditing virtual infrastructures isolation do not consider the complex
interdependencies between the cloud stack layers (e.g., the infrastructure management and
the implementation layers), which may result in subtle isolation breaches going unnoticed.
Furthermore, systematic ways and effective metrics for evaluating cloud threats from ten-
ants’ perspective are largely missing in the literature.
This thesis tackled the aforementioned limitations by proposing solutions for cloud se-
curity compliance auditing and threat evaluation. First, we proposed an automated audit
framework based on formal methods for verifying the cloud infrastructure configuration
correctness from the structural point of view. Then, we applied the proposed framework
for verifying cross-layer virtual network isolation, one of the most important security prop-
erties to cloud customers. Furthermore, we integrated our auditing system into OpenStack,
and presented our experimental results on assessing several properties related to virtual
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network isolation.
In the context of threat evaluation, based on our analysis for multiple cross-tenant at-
tacks, we proposed suites of security metrics to quantify the proximity between tenants’
virtual resources inside the cloud. The cloud provider may apply those metrics to evaluate
and mitigate multi-tenancy threats in cloud deployments. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of our metrics and show their usefulness, we conducted case studies based on both real and
synthetic cloud data. We further performed extensive simulations on CloudSim. Our re-
sults show that our metrics effectively capture the threat-level related to the multi-tenancy
situation in the cloud, which paves the way for the design of effective mitigation solutions
to reduce the side-effect of cloud resource sharing.
As a future direction, we intend to leverage our auditing framework for continuous
compliance checking. This will be achieved by monitoring various events, and triggering
the verification process whenever a security property is affected by the changes. We also in-
tend to extend our solution to Network Function Virtualization (NFV) environments, where
physical security appliances are replaced by their virtual counterparts, which provides the
cloud with even more flexibility, allowing the dynamic definition and implementation of
complex policies. This makes security breaches easier to happen and emphasizes the need
for security compliance verification.
As for threat-level evaluation, we intend to study multi-tenancy attacks taking advan-
tage from shared storage and propose a storage distance accordingly. We also plan to
propose cloud management strategies to enforce distances as a means to control the multi-
tenancy risk. Another future direction consists of investigating the usability of our metrics
for the runtime-detection of different types of co-residency attacks through monitoring.
This would enable to capture attacks in their early stages to avoid large scale damage. An-
other interesting direction consists of devising new mechanisms to empower tenants with
the capabilities to verify by themselves the risk related to the actual cloud deployment of
161
their virtual infrastructures without breaching other tenants’ privacy. Finally, the approach
we propose for deriving security metrics from potential attacks could be extended for the
design of a universal framework that can be used not only for evaluating the security pos-
ture of tenants’ virtual infrastructures inside cloud/NFV environments, but also to predict
attacks when combined with learning mechanisms and monitoring techniques.
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